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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THE MEDICINE OF WAR: IMF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT,
ETHNIC POLITICS, AND ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT
The dissertation research answers the question of what explains the variation across
countries where the IMF SAP implementation is associated with the onset of armed civil
conflict in some countries but not in others. Do SAPs increase the likelihood of the
outbreak of armed civil conflict in recipient countries? By what causal mechanism could
SAPs increase the probability of the onset of armed civil conflict? This study contributes to
extant literature by taking actors’ preferences and ethnicity in recipient countries into
account. I argue that the effect of SAP implementation on armed civil conflict is conditional
on the ethnic characteristics of recipient countries. From a two-level game perspective,
highly ethnic-fractionalized countries have a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF at
the international level due to their domestic weakness. Hence such governments will receive
relatively moderate conditionality from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its secondorder preference of containing the contagious effect of debt crisis and ensure the loan
repayment. The ethnically fractionalized countries will also implement the austerity measures
across different ethnic communities. The result is reducing probability of the onset of armed
civil conflict when ethnic fractionalization increases. But in ethnically-dominant countries,
the governments’ bargaining position at the international level is relatively weak due to their
domestic strength. Therefore the governments are more likely to get stringent conditionality
from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its first-order preference of satisfying its
constituents by imposing stringent conditionality. The result is to increase the likelihood of
the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic dominance increases. By analyzing crossnational data for 162 countries from 1992 to 2009 based on improved measurement of IMF
conditionality, the empirical results confirm the theoretical hypotheses. The statistical results
also reveal that SAP impact on the outbreak of armed civil conflict varies with conditionality.
Historical analyses of Ghana and Rwanda provide further understanding of the theoretical
mechanisms.
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Chapter 1
The IMF’s Adjustment Puzzle: Facilitator or Inhibitor of
Armed Civil Conflict?

1.1 The Nature of the Problem
A small but growing literature has investigated the relationship between the global
integration of national economies and the likelihood of armed civil conflict. Extant research
has shown that openness to trade decreases the probability of armed civil conflict (Esty et
al. 1998; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005). While the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) is an important mechanism through which
national economies are integrated into the global economy (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994;
Bartilow 1997; Vreeland 2003), there is controversy regarding the effect that SAPs have on
the onset of armed civil conflict in countries that implement IMF conditionality. Some
scholars show that SAPs create the conditions that generate grievances which lead to armed
civil conflict because they slash budgets, eliminate state subsidies, remove trade restrictions,
and reduce governments’ ability to compensate or confront the losers of liberal economic
reform (Auvien 1996; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010).
Other scholars, however, challenge these assumptions and have found no relationship
between IMF SAP and civil conflict (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Sidell 1988; Snider 1990).1
In the attempt to replicate the findings of Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer (2010), other scholars
challenged the theoretical and empirical evidence that supports the claim that IMF SAPs
affect the onset of armed civil conflict. These scholars show that by using a lower threshold

1

It must be noted that none of these studies address problems of endogeneity and selection bias.

1

of 25 battle deaths when defining civil war, IMF programs are negatively associated with the
onset of civil war (Midtgaard, Vadlamannati, and Soysa 2013).
However, while this debate has improved our understanding of this phenomenon,
there are no theoretically based causal mechanisms through which SAPs affect the outbreak
of armed civil conflict. If it is assumed that IMF-induced SAPs generate grievance, which
results in armed civil conflict, then what explains the lack of armed civil conflict in countries
that undergo IMF-sponsored SAPs? Essentially, extant studies (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer
2010; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Midtgaard, Vadlamannati, and Soysa 2013) do not
account for the causal mechanisms that explain why IMF-induced SAPs lead to armed civil
conflict in some countries but not in others. Civil war broke out in Uzbekistan in 1999 after
the country underwent a two-year SAP loan agreement that began in 1995. In neighboring
Tajikistan, civil war broke out in 1998 after the implementation of an SAP in 1996. There are,
however, a number of countries where the implementation of SAPs is not associated with
armed civil conflict. Over the span of ten years from the 1990s to 2000s, the implementation
of SAPs in Kenya did not lead to armed civil conflict. And ten years (1996 – 2006) of SAP
implementation in Tanzania did not end in armed civil conflict. Similarly, Guyana’s twelveyear (1994 – 2006) experience with the implementation of SAPs did not produce armed civil
conflict.

1.2 Theoretical Contribution
To understand the causal mechanisms that link SAPs to the onset of armed civil
conflict, this study considers how the implementation of SAP conditionality under
conditions of varying ethno-political characteristics in loan recipient countries affect the
likelihood of armed civil conflict. Borrowing countries vary in their ethnic characteristics and
2

IMF SAPs vary widely in terms of the scope of their conditionalities.2 The question that
motivates this research is: what explains the variation across countries where the
implementation of SAP conditionality is associated with the outbreak of armed civil conflict
in some countries but not in others?
In answering this question I analyze cross-national data for the years 1992-2009 for
162 countries that have and have not entered into SAP loan agreements with the IMF. I
make a theoretical contribution to the extant literature by utilizing the theoretical metaphor
of a two-level game that draws on and integrates existing theories of armed civil conflict,
ethnic politics and the politics of economic adjustment. This study argues that the
implementation of SAPs and the subsequent outbreak in armed civil conflict is conditional
on the ethnic characteristics of recipient countries. This research considers two types of
ethnic characteristics. These are societies characterized by ethnic fractionalization and ethnic
dominance.
Given the theoretical metaphor of the two-level game, IMF negotiators face a
bargaining dilemma (Bartilow 1997). On the one hand, in constructing SAP conditionalities
the IMF attempts to satisfy its first order preference by offering recipient governments a
loan package with stringent conditionalities that is designed to rigorously treat the debt crisis.
In doing so, the Fund satisfies the preference of its constituency of creditor states and
international commercial banks that respectively fund the IMF and supplement SAP loan
packages to debtors. These financial actors profit from the effectiveness of SAPs in
stabilizing the debt crisis as well as the Fund’s ability to manage the repayment of debt from
debtors to creditors. On the other hand, recipient governments’ domestic constituencies

This research is motivated by the SAP research agenda called by Steinwand and Stone (2008),
which focuses on the characteristics of recipient countries and variation of different structural
adjustment programs.
2

3

(Level II) must ratify tentative international level (Level I) agreements with the IMF that
relates to the implementation of SAP conditionality.
The primary objective of governments who experience mounting debt is to seek
IMF financing to stabilize their economies. However, the fractionalized nature of ethnic
politics that is embedded within the institutions of government weakens the ability of these
states to build policy consensus on economic reform to address problems that are associated
with the debt crisis. Governments whose polities are characterized by high levels of ethnic
fractionalization are more likely to defect from tentative agreements with the IMF at Level I
since they are less likely to gain the necessary domestic support to secure SAP ratification at
Level II. Consequently, these governments have a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the
IMF at Level I. Since countries who experience chronic external debt undermine the growth
and health of the global economy, the second order institutional preference of the IMF
(Bartilow 1997) is to secure SAP agreements to stabilize debt, limit its contagious effects to
other economies and in the process secure financial gains for capital markets that provide
credit to debtors. It is, therefore, not in the institutional interest of the Fund to accept
debtor defection from tentative SAP agreements that stem from political weakness in
securing domestic ratification. It is expected that under conditions of ethnic fractionalization,
IMF negotiators will moderate SAP loan conditions so as to increase the likelihood that
governments can secure the necessary domestic support and institutional ratification for the
agreement. High levels of ethnic fractionalization will also undermine governments’ ability to
effectively implement SAP conditionalities that are attached to loan agreements. Therefore,
the implementation of SAPs is less likely to create severe economic hardships and the muted
austerity measures are likely to be absorbed across different ethnic communities, which will
reduce the probability of armed resistance against the state. Moreover, armed civil conflict is
4

likely to be reduced when SAPs are implemented in ethnically fractionalized societies
because such polities increase the collective action problem, which undermines the
opportunity to coordinate armed resistance against the state.
However, in ethnic dominant polities, governments’ bargaining position vis-à-vis the
IMF at Level I is weak and it is expected that SAP loan conditionality will be more stringent.
With high degrees of ethnic dominance at Level II, IMF negotiators recognize that the
dominance of a particular ethnic group in the state and in civil society increases the
likelihood of the government’s ability to secure domestic support for SAP ratification. And
with relatively few ethno-political obstacles to ratification, it is expected that IMF negotiators
will demand the implementation of more stringent conditionality measures. To satisfy the
Fund’s demands, when implementing SAPs, recipient governments are likely to place the
burden of economic austerity disproportionately on ethnic minority communities.
Consequently, the implementation of SAPs increases minority groups’ relative economic
deprivation, which deepens the groups’ grievance and ethnic hatred - hence increasing the
probability of armed resistance against the state. In addition, the probability of armed civil
conflict is more likely when SAPs are implemented in ethnically dominant polities because
such polities reduce the collective action problem, which increase the opportunity for ethnic
minority groups to coordinate armed resistance against the state.

1.3 Empirical Contribution
This study also makes an important empirical contribution to the extant literature.
While scholarly research has made major methodological improvements by addressing issues
of endogeneity and selection (Vreeland 2003; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009), there are still
empirical limitations with the indicator used to measure the implementation of IMF SAPs.
5

Extant research measures the indicator in terms of the number of years that a country is
under an IMF-sponsored program (Vreeland 2003; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). While this indicator does not fully capture the extent of SAP
implementation, this study’s operationalization of this indicator builds upon existing
measures that are featured in the literature. The indicators that are used in this study capture
the extent to which IMF programs are implemented and incorporated into the analysis and
various program characteristics of SAP conditionalities. I develop a measure for SAP
implementation as well as measures that capture the programmatic differences in SAP
conditionalities by coding the IMF’s program reviews and the IMF Letters of Intent. The
program reviews document the Funds technical evaluation of countries’ compliance in the
implementation of SAP conditionalities. The Letters of Intent document the program
agreements between the IMF and recipient governments. Following Ivanova et al. (2006), I
code SAP implementation, using the IMF program reviews, in terms of the number of
program waivers granted by the IMF. Specifically, the more waivers that the IMF grants to
recipient governments reduce the extent of SAP implementation. And using the Letters of
Intent, I develop indicators that capture the various program characteristics of SAPs (Woo
2013). These characteristics measure the scope of SAP conditionality and since they vary in
terms of their fiscal, financial, and structural components, it is important to incorporate
these differences into the analysis as they may have different effects on the probability of
armed civil conflict.

1.4 The Roadmap of the Manuscript
This manuscript is organized as follows: In chapter 2, I examine the extant literature
regarding the politics of SAPs. I then discuss the theoretical and empirical limitations of the
6

extant literature in order to contextualize the study’s motivation. In Chapter 3, I draw upon
and integrate insights from the SAP and ethnic conflict literatures to link SAPs to the onset
of armed civil conflict. I adopt the theoretical metaphor of the two-level game to elaborate
on the causal mechanisms of the implementation of SAPs on armed civil conflict in
ethnically fractionalized and ethnically dominant countries and generate hypotheses at the
end of this discussion. Chapter 4 describes the study’s research design and methodology.
The data estimation procedures, model specifications and the measurement and
operationalization of the study’s main variables are discussed in detail.
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical findings of the effects of SAP implementation on
armed civil conflict under conditions of ethnic fractionalization. Chapter 6 discusses the
findings of the effects of SAP implementation on armed civil conflict under conditions of
ethnic dominance. In both chapters, I utilize different econometric estimators and execute a
number of robustness tests that utilize different measures for SAP implementation and
ethnicity that are featured in the extant literature.
In Chapters 7 and 8 respectively, I discuss Ghana and Rwanda as countries that are
illustrative of the impact of SAP conditionality on the outbreak of armed civil conflict in
ethnically fractionalized and ethnically dominant countries. Finally, in Chapter 9, I
summarize the main findings of the study and discuss the theoretical and policy implications
that flow from this research.

Copyright © Yanyu Ke 2014
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Chapter 2
Structural Adjustment Programs and Armed Civil Conflict:
Introduction and Existing Theoretical Approaches

2.1 The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment
From its beginning, as one of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the IMF’s
mission focused on stabilizing Europe’s post-war balance of payment (BOP) crisis. However,
as a result of the oil shock of the 1970s and the ensuing debt crisis of the 1980s, the IMF
SAPs increasingly expanded to the developing world (Polak 1991; Stone 2008; Spero 1981).3
As a consequence, IMF loans which attached conditionality increased from 26% in the 1970s
to 66% at the end of the 1980s (Boughton 2001, 561; Stone 2008). There were 271 SAPs in
the 1980s compared to 172 in the 1970s (Barro and Lee 2005; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer
2010). In responding to the debt crisis in Latin America and the Asian financial crisis in the
1990s, the IMF expanded SAPs to countries in these respective regions of the world (Best
2012).
With more adjustment programs in the developing world, SAPs have become
increasingly controversial regarding their applicability in less developed countries (LDCs). At
the heart of this controversy is the notion that the free market assumptions of SAPs when
applied to the developing world will lead to a “Debt Trap”, promoting an endless cycle of
debt, high levels of inflation, and stagnant economic growth (Hayter and Watson 1985).
However, some scholars have shown that SAPs have a positive effect on the Balance of
Payments (BoP) of recipient countries (Bird 1996, 2003).

Polak (1991, 13-14) argues that the “introduction of the Extended Fund Facility in 1974 gave
formal recognition to a medium-term outlook in Fund programs, as well as greater attention to
structural and supply aspects of adjustment.”
3
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In terms of the scope of IMF programs, SAPs can be placed into four categories.
These include: Stand-by Agreements (SBAs) that are in effect for two years;4 the Extended
Fund Facilities (EFFs) that are in effect for three years; and the Extended Structural
Adjustment Facilities (ESAFs) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs)
(Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Stone 2008).5 The first objective of SAPs is to promote
macroeconomic stability and then build countries’ institutional capacity to support long-term
economic growth (Bird 2003, 120).6
According to the IMF’s neo-liberal economic doctrine, the main objective of SAPs in
the resolution of BOP deficits is to promote economic growth. The IMF’s assumption is
that greater reliance on market forces will improve the efficient allocation of resources,
which will expand countries’ economic productive capacity (Goldsbrough et al. 1996, 55).
To achieve its objective, IMF SAPs include three policy instruments. The first is fiscal
reforms that are intended to reduce public sector deficits by raising taxes, cutting
government expenditures, increasing prices for services provided by public sector enterprises,
and freezing the wages of public sector employees. The second is monetary reforms that are
intended to reduce inflationary pressures by limiting the supply of money in the economy.
Such reforms increase interest rates and require higher reserve requirements for local banks.
The third is liberalization reforms that are intended to unleash market forces through the
abolition of import and foreign exchange controls, devaluation of the exchange rate, the
removal of price controls and consumer subsidies as well as greater privatization and

4 The typical length of a SBA is 12-24 months. However, exceptions can be made under emergency
circumstances. For example, the Greek government requested a 3-year SBA in May 2010 (IMF 2010).
5 PRGFs were succeeded by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) under the Fund’s Poverty Reduction
and Growth Trust (PRGT) recently. I use PRGFs to represent both terms.
6 While the definition of the objective of conditionality varies, Bird (2003, 120) gives a minimalist
definition, that is, “to help bring about a durable modification in economic policy designed to create
sustainability in the BoP and strengthen long-run economic performance.”
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government deregulation (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; David 1985; Haggard 1985; Bird 1996;
Crisp and Kelly 1999; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2006; Bartilow 1997).
The IMF’s policy instruments, which is also referred to as the “Washington
Consensus”,7 with its emphasis on economic and financial liberalization (Williamson 1990)
have traditionally been challenged by some schools of international relations theory. Scholars
who write in the tradition of world-systems theory contend that core capitalist industrial
states that were the architects of post-war international financial institutions, like the IMF,
use SAPs to penetrate and exploit peripheral LDC countries (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987;
Wallerstein 1992; Shannon 1996).8 In a similar fashion, dependency theorists argue that the
pro-market policies of the “Washington Consensus” reinforce the global asymmetrical
distribution of wealth and power, which perpetuates the peripheries’ dependency on the core
and maintains the core’s dominance in the capitalist world economy (Amin 1976; Frank 1980;
Shannon 1996). Scholars who write in this tradition argue that while the neo-liberal
economic reforms of the “Washington Consensus” are supposedly designed to promote
economic growth, SAPs facilitate the underdevelopment of LDC countries by promoting a
perpetual “debt trap” for countries that swallow the IMF’s medicine (Santos 1970).
Non-dependency theorist argue that the IMF promotes a ‘one size fits all” free
market ideology that is insensitive and inappropriate to the local developmental needs of
LDCs (Stone 2008; Haggard 1985). Although the IMF has responded to its critics by
The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by Williamson (1990) in 1990 to explain the IFI
polices designed as a reaction to Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s.
8 World-system theorists “regard capitalism as a global system for organizing economic activities”
(Shannon 1996, 21). Put simply, there are four critical components in the world system: economic
zones (defined in terms of the production process), nation-states, social classes (defined in terms of
the ownership of the means of production), and status groups (identity groupings). Respectively,
economic processes are carried out in core (capital intensive), periphery (labor intensive), and semiperiphery states. Furthermore, the inter-state political relationship is related to social classes. States
compete to gain recourses, which will benefit national capitalists. And if necessary, cores states will
use military force to intervene in peripheral states for the benefit of core states’ capitalists.
7
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embracing the rhetoric of “adjustment with a human face”, which it claims is an attempt to
limit the negative externalities of SAPs on the poor (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987; Streeten
1989, 9), 9 critics still contend that the impact of SAPs on LDCs external deficits and
development is analogous to “fighting fire with petrol” and the IMF’s medicine may actually
kill rather than cure the patient (Narman 1995, 45; Tevera 1995, 79).
Conservative critics of the Fund contend that the perpetual cycle of LDC debt is
not due to the inappropriateness of SAP conditionalities, but is largely a function of the fact
that the IMF’s conditions are not rigorous enough to treat the debt crisis. Some
conservatives contend that IMF programs have worked so badly that it is worth shutting
down the institution (Atoian et al. 2006, 352). While other conservatives fall short of calling
for the eliminating the IMF, they have sought to fundamentally reform the lending practices
of the institution. In 1998, the Meltzer Commission Report to the U.S. Congress proposed
abolishing all traditional IMF lending programs and replacing them with larger loan facilities
with very strict conditions for shorter program periods (Atoian et al. 2006, 353). Centerright critics of the IMF contend that the institution’s poor track record poses a serious
problem for the management of the global economy. Eichengreen (2002, 55), for example
notes that since there is strong political pressure for the Fund to lend “the IMF rarely ever
says no the first time; it says no only after being pushed into a corner by the failure of a long
series of loans … where the short-run prospects of the country are so clearly hopeless that it
becomes absurd for the IMF to continue lending.” Not only are these programs wasteful of
IMF resources, but also they have “permitted governments to cling longer…to unsustainable
policies, allowing economies and financial vulnerabilities to buildup and creating the

The social dimension means reducing the negative effects of SAPs on the most vulnerable social
groups to the greatest extent (Streeten 1989).
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potential for very severe political and social dislocations when support is ultimately
withdrawn” (Eichengreen 2002, 7).
It should be noted that although the IMF’s response to criticisms seems slow, it has
changed its approach at some areas gradually. The Fund’s early reaction to the criticisms of
SAPs was that the root of the problem was that recipient governments did not have enough
political will to carry out necessary reforms (Bird 2003; Vreeland 2003). Eventually, the Fund
began to incorporate social issues into its SAP agenda. The Fund focuses on two areas of
social issues with respect to its SAPs: social safety net and public spending on education and
health care (Gupta et al. 2000). Also, from the beginning of the 21st century, the IMF began
to stress the importance of greater program ownership to take more local conditions into
account (Boughton 2001). Then in 2013 the Fund for the first time acknowledged its
mistake in underestimating the negative effect of austerity policy on economic growth
(Blanchard and Lieigh 2013). Given that the Fund has modified its approach regarding
SAPs,10 this research covers just one of the Fund’s historical periods in its policy making.

The Economic Effects of Structural Adjustment Programs
The extant literature has moved from the customary broad theoretical critique of the
IMF’s lending practices and has emphasized the socio-economic effects of SAPs (Holm
1995; Bird 1996; Crisp and Kelly 1999; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Bird 2003; Hutchison

There have been criticisms that the Fund’s reform is not enough. But it is noteworthy that the
Fund has really changed its approach at a gradual (if slow) pace. Despite SAPs, the IMF also made
similar reforms as a response to NGO criticisms. For instance, the Fund adopted the “disclosure of
information” policy to increase transparency in 1994 (Woods 2000). It began to provide the “Public
Information Notice” (PIN) in 1997. The PIN releases information about member states’ economic
situation when national governments permit the disclosure (Woods 2000). In 2001, the Fund
established the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) to further promote transparency (Kahler 2004).
Also, the IMF increases the NGO participation by consulting with local and global civil society
(Woods and Narlikar 2001).
10
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and Noy 2003; Nsouli, Atoian, and Mourmouras 2004; Dreher 2006; Easterly 2006;
Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Vreeland 2006; Vreeland 2007). Researchers now focus their
analysis on the economic effects of SAPs in terms of improving countries’ BOP, reducing or
controlling inflationary pressures and helping to promote economic development.
The findings on the overall economic effects of SAPs have largely been mixed. As
Bird (2001, 1852) reveals in his summary of the economic effects of SAPs from 1960s to
early 1990s where the research findings during this period vary from “no effect”, “negative
effect”, to “positive effect”. However, there is consistent evidence that SAPs are successful
in improving countries’ BOP. In conducting before-and-after test on sixteen LDCs having
IMF SAPs between 1979 and 1985, Bird (1996) reports that SAPs significantly improved
countries’ BOP performance. This finding is consistent with other research on the effects of
SAPs on countries’ external BOP (Pastor 1987; Bird 2003; Vreeland 2006). It is reported that
SAPs are effective in reducing inflationary pressures in LDCs (Ivanova et al. 2006; IMF
2007).
Studies show that while SAPs may have a positive impact on countries’ BOP, they
may come at the expense of undermining economic growth 11 (Campbell and Stein 1992;
Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003, 2006; Vreeland 2007; Vreeland 2008;
Commander 1989b). In their research, Goldstein and Montiel (1986) report that SAPs have
no significant effect on economic growth. In his research, Pastor (1987) reports that the
effect of SAPs on economic growth in 18 Latin American countries from 1965 to 1981 are
mixed. While the Fund continues to argue that SAPs have a positive effect on countries’
economic growth (Nsouli et al. 1993; Goldsbrough et al. 1996; Ivanova et al. 2006; IMF

Long-run economic growth leads to development, that is, rising living standards (Hubbard and
O'Brien 2006, 642-643). Thus most research employs economic growth rate to measure the SAP
impact on economic development.
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2007; Harrigan and El-Said 2010),12 critics consistently challenge these claims. For example,
Pfeifer (1999), argues that in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt – the four cases that the
IMF reports as successes in the 1990s – there were no significant gains in economic growth
in these countries when compared to the pre-SAPs period. Crisp and Kelly (1999) report
that SAPs weakly promote economic development. After investigating sixteen Latin
American countries that implemented SAPs in the 1980s, they find that while SAPs decrease
inflation, it is weakly associated with increasing economic growth, and reducing poverty and
inequality.
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) adopt a large-N statistical design to examine 135
countries implementing SAPs from the 1951 to 1990.13 They find that SAPs negatively affect
economic growth and that countries’ economies grow faster in the absence of SAPs. While
IMF SAPs improve countries’ BOP, SAPs decrease economic development and increase
inequality (Vreeland 2006; Vreeland 2007). Easterly (2006, 67-68) finds that most “African
countries that received intensive treatment from structural adjustment have had negative or
zero growth…… Most ex-communist countries that received shock therapy and many
structural adjustment loans have had sharply negative growth and high inflation.” Nsouli
et.al (2004) use the percentage of IMF loans and irreversible interruptions to measure
compliance. They find that the implementation of SAPs negatively affects economic growth,
which is consistent with the findings of other researchers (Hutchison and Noy 2003; Dreher
2006).

12 IMF’s country reports reveal a positive effect on economic growth under some SAPs. For example,
Tunisia’s economic growth under SBA and ESAF increases from 2.8% in 1982-86 to 5.0% in 19871992 (Nsouli et al. 1993).
13 While the time period of their research is from 1951 to 1990, the data is concentrated on 79
countries from the 1970s to 1990 due to data availability from 1951 to 1970.
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There now appears to be a growing consensus that SAPs fail to increase economic
growth and decrease inflation (Hutchison and Noy 2003; Stiglitz 2003; Dreher 2006; Easterly
2006; Vreeland 2006).14 Moreover, there is a growing body of literature, which suggests that
SAPs have a negative effect on economic development.15 It appears that improvements in
countries’ BOP may be a necessary but not sufficient factor in generating economic growth
(Bird 1996, 2003). In other words, improvements in the external BOP does not necessarily
lead to economic growth and that “there are no good theoretical reasons to believe that a
balanced budget and foreign account are sufficient for growth to occur” (Przeworski and
Vreeland 2000, 399).

The Social Welfare Effects of Structural Adjustment Programs
If the evidence regarding SAPs effect on economic growth is at best inconclusive or
worst negative, then what are the social and political effects do SAPs have on recipient
countries? Scholars and NGOs hold SAPs responsible for hurting the poor
disproportionately through cutting public expenditures, reducing government subsidies on
energy and food, and devaluating the currency (Crisp and Kelly 1999; Ferreira and Keely
2000; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). Given the fact that the poor largely depend on
welfare and social programs that are funded by government expenditures and will therefore
In their review of twelve studies from 2000 to 2006 that examine the relationship between SAPs
and economic growth, Steinwand and Stone (2008) find that seven of these studies report results
that SAPs have a negative impact, two studies report SAPs having a positive impact while three
studies report SAPs having no impact.
15 While most academic research provides little evidence with respect to the positive effects of SAPs
on economic development, IMF reports paint a more encouraging and promising picture, although
the focus is on individual countries rather than large-N research. Ghana is a frequently cited example
of adjustment success given its export growth rate of 94% from 1984 to 1990 under IMF programs,
compared to 21% of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Mengisteab and Logan 1995). The Fund also claims
an increase of gross domestic savings as a ratio of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from 16.2 in
1986 to 20.4% in 1992, in Tanzania (Nsouli et al. 1993). But even the IMF itself admitted the poor
program performance for nearly half of ESAFs (IMF 1997b).
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suffer disproportionately when governments’ subsidies are reduced, scholars and NGOs
hold the IMF responsible for placing the burden of SAP conditionality on the backs of the
poor. In their summary Crisp and Kelly (1999) notes that SAPs impose a negative impact on
the poor disproportionately. First, deregulation and economic liberalization require cutting
government subsidies on energy and foodstuffs, which are directly related to the poor.
Second, cutting government spending leads to a negative impact on social welfare and public
employment.16 Third, the poor suffer the most when their purchasing power declines due to
the devaluation of the exchange rate. In short, SAPs raise living costs and unemployment
(Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997), which further intensify the tension between
governments and citizens.
After implementing SAP liberalization policies during the period 1980 to 1998,
Mexico’s GDP per capita (real PPP) rose by 10% (World Bank 2013) and the population
living in households below the poverty line decreased from 12.78% in 1984 to 8.62% in 1998
(World Bank PovcalNet). However, Mexico’s real wages and real minimal wages in 1998
decreased respectively to 57% and 29.5% of their 1980 levels (Peters 2000, 161), and during
the period 1984 to 1998 the country’s Gini coefficient recorded an 18% increase. It
increased from 46.26 in 1984 to 54.51 in 1998 (World Bank PovcalNet). In other words,
while the economic liberalization policies of SAPs may have made modest improvements in
the lives of the very poor in Mexico, it comes at the cost of widening income inequality and
the erosion of real wages. That is to say, while it increases GDP per capita, this growth in
wealth is increasingly concentrated amongst Mexico’s economic elite and did not flow to the
country’s middle class. Mexico’s experience with SAP economic liberalization is quite similar
to what other developing countries have experienced after the implementation of SAPFor example, as mandated by SAPs, Uganda carried out the civil service reform in the 1990s, which
laid off a total number of 74,000 government employees (Sharer, De Zoysa, and McDonald 1995).
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induced liberalization. For example, in her examination of the economic liberalization’s ‘race
to the bottom’ effect, Rudra (2008) reports that economic liberalization has eroded wages
and decimated the middle class in developing countries.
In Tanzania, scholars find that IMF programs decrease living standards and
manufacturing productivity (Campbell and Stein 1992). SAPs in Tanzania “precludes a
public debate” and “the public are the losers” because they are left to “shoulder the burden
of the reforms” (Kiondo 1992, 40). In South Korea, the IMF conditions during the 1997
Asian financial crisis dramatically increased unemployment. The Fund was labeled a “hostile
foreign dictatorship” in the “period of national humiliation” (Singh 1999, 85).17
During the 1990s, IMF SAPs in Mozambique increased the fees for public-health
services and privatized the country’s water management as well as various manufacturing
industries in the economy, which resulted in widespread job losses (Bond 2003). And five
years of SAP, during 1991 to 1996, two thirds of Mozambique’s civil servants lived below
the poverty line due to major cuts in wages (Hanlon 1996). Moreover, researchers report that
IMF SAPs in Africa and Latin America are responsible for increasing food prices while
decreasing disposable income. Consequently, there has been significant reductions in food,
which in turn increased malnutrition and infant mortality rates among the poor (Commander
1989a; Prinstrup-Andersen 1989). Other researchers also claim that IMF SAPs impose
unacceptable costs on the environment. Costa Rica’s implementation of nine consecutive

There is an argument that attributes Korea’s economic success ten years after the 1997 Asian
financial crisis to IMF SAPs (Neiss, Tseng, and Gordon 2009). However, given that the conclusion is
based on a single case, as Kim (2009, 35-36) notes, the claim is “a bit like a medical doctor relating
how he or she successfully treated a young man who suffered from a severe case of the flu some ten
years ago. That young man now has become a professional after having attended college and
graduate school in the meantime. On the basis of what and how he is now doing, it is difficult to say
that the doctor’s treatment of the young man was anything but a success.” After all, it “would be a
mistake to attribute his present health entirely to the doctor’s treatment ten years ago (Kim 2009, 3536).”
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SAPs from 1980 to 1989, expanded the country’s banana industry, but at the cost of massive
deforestation. Similarly, SAPs sponsored economic growth in Ghana was partially fuelled by
increases in the country’s timber production and deforestation (Bello, Cunningham, and Rau
1999). Not only is education, employment, and poverty in recipient countries negatively
affected by IMF SAPs (Simon et al. 1995), but scholars such as H. Krugmann (1995) now
conclude that the negative socio-economic impact of SAPs make them inherently
incompatible with the objectives for sustainable development .

Political Effects of Structural Adjustment Programs
The negative social and economic effects of SAPs raise questions about the effects
of IMF programs on recipient countries’ political stability. It seems plausible that IMF
financing would enhance the political stability of recipient governments that face economic
crisis (Gould 2006). However, scholars have shown that the relative deprivation that is a byproduct of SAPs promotes political instability in LDCs.18 In their study of more than 90
LDCs from 1970 to 2002, Dreher and Gassebner (2012) report that some IMF SAPs lead to
government crises, which they define as “any rapidly developing situation that threatens to
bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding situations of revolt aimed at such
overthrow” (Dreher and Gassebner 2012, 335). Likewise, Easterly’s (2006, 218) analysis of
eight cases of state failure in the 1990s finds that “spending a lot of time under an IMF
program is associated with a higher risk of state collapse.”

18 Bird (2003) argues that SAPs are less likely to influence social variables and political stability in
recipient countries because of the insignificant role played by SAPs on economic growth and
inflation. Nonetheless, Abouharb and Cingranelli’s (2006, 2007) research on SAP effects on human
rights proves that SAPs have significant effects, in the negative sense, on social variables and political
stability in recipient countries.
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Other scholars argue that different types of SAPs will have different effects on
recipient country’s political stability. In making this argument Smith and Vreeland (2006)
categorize SAPs as need-based, discretionary, and inherited. Need-based SAPs are IMF
programs to governments that have no access to alternative external sources of financing.
Discretionary-based SAPs are IMF programs that political leaders accept to finance
structural economic reforms. Inherited-based SAPs are IMF programs that political leaders
inherit from prior administrations. Smith and Vreeland (2006) find that in democracies,
inherited and discretionary SAPs help political leaders survive because they can blame
previous administrations for the negative effects of SAPs as well as claim that prior
administrative commitments now compel them to deal aggressively with pressing economic
problems. Need-based SAPs, however, can have a negative impact on democratic leader’s
political survival since under conditions of mounting economic crisis these leaders must
accept the negative externalities of SAPs as a condition for receiving funding from the IMF.
However, in autocracies, need-based SAPs are conducive to political leaders’ survival
because the programs strengthen the leader’s position by distributing loan benefits to the
core supporters of the regime. Nonetheless, inherited and discretionary SAPs decrease the
likelihood of political survival since the level of funding that is associated with these
programs severely limit the dictators ability to “distribute spoils” or patronage to supporters
(Smith and Vreeland 2006).
Moreover, SAPs hurt urban population more and so urban riots and demonstrations
are more likely to ensue (Walton and Ragin 1990). Empirical research shows strong links
between SAPs and mass demonstrations (Walton and Ragin 1990; Herring and Esman 2001;
Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). It is noteworthy most demonstrators “are drawn from the
urban poor (shantytown dwellers, unemployed youth, street vendors) and the working class
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(unions)” (Walton and Ragin 1990, 877). For example, in the beginning of 2012 in Nigeria,
there were mass urban strikes and protests immediately following the government’s
deregulation of fuel prices, which forced President Goodluck Jonathan to reinstate the fuel
subsidy in a few days (BBC 2012a, 2012b). The reason of mass urban protests following
SAPs is that urban dwellers are more likely to be negatively affected by austerity measures
such as cutting domestic subsidies, currency devaluation, and public-sector reforms (Walton
and Ragin 1990; Gupta et al. 2000). For instance, currency devaluation increases the price of
imported foods, which will hurt the urban poor disproportionately if they rely on imported
foods for daily consumption (Gupta et al. 2000).
While some scholars have studied the effects of SAPs on recipient governments’
political stability, others have examined their effects on human rights. Advocates of the
“Washington Consensus” assert that rapid economic liberalization prescribed by SAPs
promote both economic development and democracy. Since greater levels of economic
development and democratic governance are necessary for the establishment of human
rights, it is expected that SAPs should increase recipient governments’ respect for human
rights. However, empirical research challenges the assumptions of the “Washington
Consensus” and shows that IMF-sponsored SAPs exert a negative effect on recipient
governments’ respect for physical integrity rights and worsen social rights as well as
economic rights and the rights of workers (Franklin 1997; Camp Keith and Poe 2000;
Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007). These researchers argue that the implementation of
SAPs increases relative derivation and the public’s general grievance against the state. As a
result, governments’ perception of domestic threat increases, which in turn increases the
probability of the state’s repression of domestic dissent (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007,
2006, 2009; Franklin 1997; Camp Keith and Poe 2000).
20

In arriving at their results, Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006, 2007, 2009) utilized a
two-step selection model that analyzed data for a sample of 131 countries from 1981 to 2003.
They report that SAPs have a negative impact on physical integrity rights, measured by
freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing and disappearances, in
recipient countries. SAPs also have a negative effect on worker rights, and on economic and
social rights. Their research also shows that there is a selection effect for those countries that
receive SAPs loans. Countries that experience economic crisis and whose governments
respect the human rights of their citizens are more likely to get IMF loan agreements.
However, once these governments implement the conditions of the SAP loan agreement
they repress domestic dissent against SAP conditionalities (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004,
2009). Extending this research, Bartilow and Ke (2010) develop a counter-intuitive argument,
which shows that under the stress of an SAP loan agreement democracies are more likely to
repress the human rights of their citizens when implementing program conditionalities.

2.2 Armed Civil Conflict and Structural Adjustment
Since political repression and the violation of human rights may contribute to the
outbreak of civil conflict (Regan and Norton 2005), it is worthwhile to ask whether SAPs
increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict. The impact of SAPs on armed civil conflict is
of substantial importance to the study of international political economy and international
security. 19 In addition, to humanitarian disasters such as refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs), armed civil conflict impose huge costs on economic development, social
trust, political stability, health and education, and regional security (Collier et al. 2003;
Civil conflict, in a very broad sense, may include peaceful demonstrations, riots, and civil war.
However, this research focuses on armed civil conflict, that is, the armed struggle between the
government and rebel groups. The operational definition of armed civil conflict will be discussed in
Chapter 4, the methodology section.
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Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Murdoch and Sandler 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein
2006). Given the economic and humanitarian costs of armed civil conflict, the IMF since
1995 has extended its SAP programs to post-conflict countries to facilitate their
reconstruction and economic development. Seventeen countries received IMF loans for
post-conflict reconstruction from 1995 to 2009 (IMF 2011). The Republic of Congo, for
example, accepted an IMF’s long-term SAP – the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) in 1998, after it ended its civil war in 1997 (IMF 1998).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a relationship between SAPs and armed civil
conflict is deserving of scholarly attention. Tajikistan implemented an IMF SAP in 1996
when civil war broke out two years later (IMF 1997a). Do SAPs increase the probability of
the onset of armed civil conflict? And if so, under what conditions will SAPs lead to armed
civil conflict? Specifically, by what causal mechanism could SAPs increase the likelihood of
armed civil conflict in recipient countries?
Research by Abouharb (2005) and Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) and Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) have attempted to answer these questions through large-N
investigations of the relationship between SAPs and armed civil conflict. These studies all
support the proposition that SAP-induced grievance results in the onset of armed civil
conflict. Specifically, the negative socio-economic and human rights effects of SAPs that
scholars have documented increase the probability of armed civil conflict in countries that
receive IMF loans. Based on the SAP grievance-induced civil conflict perspective, Abouharb
(2005) argues that the implementation of liberal economic reforms creates economic
hardship and a sense of relative deprivation that is caused by rising unemployment, raising
living costs, and decreasing levels of disposal income - all of which contributes to the onset
of armed civil conflict. In their research Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) report that the
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economic austerity measures that are associated with SAPs increase the incidence of
rebellion, represented by demonstrations and riots against recipient governments, which
ultimately increase the probability of armed civil conflict.
In their extension of the SAP grievance-induced civil conflict thesis, Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) argue that SAPs create losers in recipient countries because the
conditionalities that are attached to these programs facilitate a regressive distribution of
wealth and income that significantly advantages capital over labor and the poor. IMF SAPs
increase the likelihood of civil war because governments who implement these programs are
less capable of compensating or suppressing those who have been disadvantaged by liberal
economic reform. Midtgaard, Vadlamannati, and Soysa (2013) have recently challenged these
arguments, showing that the reported positive effect of SAPs on civil war is simply an
artifact of how civil war is defined and measured. By changing the operationalization of civil
war to 25 battle deaths as defined in Armed Conflict Data Set, the impact of IMF programs
on the armed civil conflict onset turns from positive to negative.
To date, the work by Abouharb (2005) and Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007), Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) and Midtgaard, Vadlamannati, and Soysa (2013) represent
bourgeoning research on a timely but still under studied issue. However, the SAP grievanceinduced proposition that informs the current research and the response of its critics is more
narrative than it is theory. If SAPs always require that recipient governments implement
austerity measures that reduce incomes and increase economic hardships, then it is expected
that grievance should result in civil war for most countries that are recipients of IMF funding.
However, descriptive statistics from this study’s cross-national data for 162 countries from
1992 to 2009 show that SAPs are associated with the onset of armed civil conflict in only
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40% of the cases.20 This suggests that the SAP grievance-induced civil conflict proposition
does not explain variation across countries where the implementation of SAP conditionality
is associated with the outbreak of armed civil conflict in some countries but not in others. In
this study I argue that SAP-induced grievance alone is not enough to explain the onset of
armed civil conflict. The theory that I advance integrates SAP induced grievance proposition
with the ethno-political characteristics of recipient countries to better explain variation in
armed civil conflict that occurs across countries.
In their review of the extant literature, Steinwand and Stone (2008) argue that the
new direction in SAP research should focus on the characteristics of recipient countries as
well as the variation in structural adjustment programs to better understand the causal
mechanisms of how SAPs are associated with domestic political phenomenon. Motivated by
Steinwand and Stone (2008), I argue that SAPs are implemented within the ethno-political
context of recipient countries and, as Bartilow (1997) shows, the nature of borrowing
governments’ domestic ethno-political configurations can strengthen or weaken their
bargaining position with the IMF. Given the ethno-political context under which IMF SAPs
are negotiated and implemented, this study considers the variation in countries’ ethnic
characteristics as important factors that interact with SAP implementation, which (as
discussed in chapter 3) increases the probability of armed civil conflict in countries that are
characterized by ethnic dominance while reducing the probability of armed civil conflict in
countries that are characterized by ethnic fractionalization. Furthermore, the SAP grievanceinduced civil war proposition does not consider the fact that there are differences in the
scope of SAP conditionalities in terms of their fiscal, financial and structural components. In

The 40% association does not imply causality in here. It just describes the variation in the onset of
armed civil conflict in recipient countries’ SAP loans. Thus it is necessary to examine the countries’
characteristics.
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this study I conduct robustness tests of my theory and also consider how variation in the
scope of SAP conditionalities and their interactions with the ethno-political characteristics of
borrowing countries may have different effects on the probability of armed civil conflict.
The empirical findings, in the extant literature, which support the SAP grievanceinduced civil war proposition utilizes a proxy indicator that measures SAP implementation in
terms of the number of years that a country is under an IMF program. However, the number
of years that a country is under an IMF program is not the same as the number of years that
the program was actually implemented. Existing research has shown that many aspects of
IMF conditionalities are never fully implemented by recipient governments (Killick 1996;
Dollar and Svensson 2000; Dreher and Jensen 2007). Other researchers report that from
1992 to 1998, only 56% of all IMF programs were successfully implemented (Ivanova et al.
2006). In her research Remmer (1986) reports that the standby programs of the IMF from
1954 to 1984 did not lead to regime instability because SAP conditionalities were not
implemented. In acknowledging this limitation Abouharb and Cingranelli (2009, 58) argue
that while the proxy measure does not capture whether or not recipient governments fully
implement the conditionalities of an IMF program, partial implementation of a program may
still be sufficient to generate grievance, relative deprivation and ultimately civil conflict.
While there is merit to the logic of this argument there is still a need to develop a measure of
SAP implementation that has greater precision. Thus I improve the measurement by
constructing SAP indicators based on my coding of IMF materials.

2.3 Towards an Integrated theory of SAPs and Armed Civil Conflict
The theoretical limitations of SAP research that argue that IMF SAPs increase the
likelihood of civil conflict present an opportunity to construct a robust theoretical
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framework that integrates the SAP induced grievance proposition with the ethno-political
characteristics of recipient countries to explain the variation in armed civil conflict that
occurs across countries. In chapter 3, I fully develop the study’s theory by drawing on
insights from theories of ethnic and armed civil conflict. I place these insights into the
context of the two-level game metaphor (Putnam 1988) to show how the ethno-political
characteristics of recipient governments affect the nature of their bargaining with the IMF
and the degree to which conditionalities are stringent or moderate, which in turn shape the
ways in which SAP conditionalities are implemented with the resultant effect of inducing
armed civil conflict.

Copyright © Yanyu Ke 2014
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Chapter 3
Structural Adjustment Programs, Ethnicity, and Armed Civil Conflict:
A Two-Level Game Approach

3.1 Introduction
The negotiation of an IMF loan agreement and the implementation of the attached
conditionalities take place within the context of a two-level bargaining game between
recipient governments and the IMF (Putnam 1988). These negotiations take place
simultaneously at the international and domestic levels, which are characterized, respectively,
as Level I and Level II negotiations. Tentative agreements made with the IMF at the
international level must have the necessary domestic political support to secure ratification,
which allows recipient governments to implement the agreement. The nature of the
ratification process varies with regime type. In parliamentary democracies this process is
characterized by the legislative voting procedures to accept or reject the conditionalities of
an SAP agreement with the IMF. In authoritarian regimes the ratification process is
characterized by the level of support for tentative international agreements among coalition
members that support and sustain the regime.
In his two-level game analysis of U.S. negotiations with Haiti’s military junta for the
restoration of democracy, Bartilow (2000, 2001) demonstrated that in the absence of a
functioning democratic legislature tentative international agreements made with the U.S. and
the international community were conditional on the approval of members of the coalition
that supported the regime. Similarly, in his analysis of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes
in Latin America,

O'Donnell (1973) demonstrated that these regimes derived their

legitimacy and support from a coalition of high level military and private sector technocrats
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working within and outside of the state’s bureaucracy. These assessments suggest that while
the legitimacy of autocracies is not based on popular democratic support, they derive their
legitimacy and support from a coalition of powerful political groups through which tentative
international agreements must be domestically approved and ratified.
Since the negotiation of debt simultaneously takes place at the international and the
domestic levels, the nature of SAP conditionalities that is an outcome of this process is a
function of the convergence of the domestic political preference of recipient governments
and the preferences of the IMF. In this chapter, I argue that variation in the policy
convergence of the Fund and recipient governments explains variation in the occurrence of
armed civil conflict across countries. In developing this argument, I discuss the preferences
of the IMF as well as the preferences of recipient governments, which are shaped by the
nature of their ethno-political characteristics.

3.2 The Policy Preference of the IMF
The policy preference of the IMF is in part shaped by its institutional mission and by
the domestic political realities of recipient governments that implement the Fund’s SAP
conditionalities (Bartilow 1997). Marxist theorists argue that the conditionality lending
practices of the IMF is motivated by the geo-political and economic interest of American
hegemony. Since the IMF was created under the post-war conditions of American hegemony,
these scholars argue that SAP conditionalities will be harsher for borrowing governments
who are not geo-politically allied with the U.S. or whose economic policies are incongruent
with the dictates of the free market (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982; Cox 1981; Cox 1987;
Payer 1974). Therefore, according to Marxist theorists, the IMF’s preference is to reinforce
the geo-political and economic interest of American and corporate power (Magdoff 1978,
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2000). Functionalist theorists argue that the Fund’s SAP conditionality is largely motivated
by its Articles of Agreement, which forbids the institution from considering the political or
foreign policy orientations of recipient governments in shaping its lending practices. They
argue that SAP conditionalities are designed to solve problems that are associated with
countries’ BOP imbalances and are based on strict adherence to technical economic criteria.
And the preference of the IMF is to facilitate global financial coordination that is free from
the dictates of politics (Groom and Taylor 1975; Haas 1964; Mitrany 1976, 1948).
Writing in the tradition of the new institutionalism, Bartilow (1997) challenges
Marxist and functionalist theories on the basis that both approaches are overly simplistic in
their understanding of the factors that motivate the IMF’s preference in its lending practices.
Inspired by principal-agent theory, Bartilow (1997) argues that the design of SAP
conditionality is best understood in terms of the “institutional-political” preference of the
IMF. It is institutional in the sense that the Fund’s preference is shaped in part by its mission
and by its larger constituency of creditor states and commercial banks that supplement IMF
financing to recipient governments. The institutional nature of the Fund’s priorities is ranked
in terms of its first- and second-order preferences. Its first-order preference entails
sustaining funding for its operations from creditor states and design loan agreements with
stringent conditionalities, which will satisfy the interests of creditors and maintain the
confidence of capital markets (Feinberg 1989). If the domestic political constraints of loan
recipient governments make it unlikely that loan agreements with stringent conditionalities
will be accepted, then the Fund’s second-order preference is to sponsor an agreement with
moderate conditionalities to limit the contagious effect of countries’ debt crisis from
contaminating the global economy while ensuring creditors that the repayments of debt will
be orderly (Esman 2001, 240; Agenor et al. 1999).
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The Fund’s preference is political in the sense that its institutional preferences can
only be realized if recipient governments are reliable partners in the implementation of SAP
conditionalities. Bartilow (1997) has shown that during debt negotiations the IMF considers
the domestic political dynamics of recipient governments and assesses how these dynamics
may strengthen or weaken the implementation of SAP conditionalities. If IMF negotiators
assess that the domestic opposition to the government is hostile to IMF sponsored
economic reforms, and if they also assess that in the event that the opposition assumes
power that prior loans obligations will not be honored, then the Fund is likely to choose its
second-order preference by sponsoring loan agreements with moderate conditionalities. In
doing so the negative externalities of SAPs are minimized for the purpose of strengthening
the popular legitimacy of the borrowing government with whom the Fund sees as a partner
in the implementation of SAP conditionalities.

3.3 Civil War, Ethnicity, and the Policy Preferences of Recipient Governments
When governments fail to provide basic goods and services, rebellion and civil war
are likely to ensue (Goldstone 1994). This grievance model (Gurr 1968; MacCulloch 2004)
emphasizes how relative deprivation motivates people to carry out armed resistance against
the state. Psychological factors such as frustration and anger that are often derived from the
gap between expectation and reality, which is a product of relative deprivation,21 increase the
probability for armed civil conflict. While inequality can lead to individualistic deprivation,
which is a “feeling of deprivation that develop out of a comparison of one’s own situation to
others” (Tyler and Lind 2002, 45), the theory that is advanced in this study emphasizes

21

Runciman (1966) is among the first scholars to consider the concept of relative deprivation.
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group deprivation, which are “feelings of deprivation that develop out of a comparison of
the situation of one’s group relative to another group” (Tyler and Lind 2002, 45).
However, while grievance is important, it is not sufficient for the mobilization of
armed civil conflict. To initiate armed struggle against the state, rebel leaders must first solve
the collective action problem (Lichbach 1994; Moore 1995; Gates 2002). As Olson (1971)
notes, group size is an important element in solving the problem of collective action. A small
group is more likely to overcome the collective action problem because its size eliminate the
likelihood that group members will free ride. However, increasing the size of the group or
increasing the number of groups increases the collection action problem as some members
or groups will be tempted to free ride on the efforts of others, thus reducing the ability of
the various groups to coordinate against the state (Moore 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).
The ethnic characteristics of polities affect the outbreak of armed civil conflict
because of their effects on grievance and the collective action problem. Grievance is the
motivation for rebellion and the problem of collective action establishes the opportunity for
rebellion. Ethnic fractionalized polities reduce the risk of armed civil conflict since the
consociational nature of governance (Lijphart 1969, 1968) that is reflected in these
governments makes them less likely to repress and exploit other ethnic communities, thus
reducing depravation and grievance (Collier 2001). Moreover, ethnic fractionalized polities
reduce opportunities for armed civil conflict because they increase the problem of collective
action. In highly fractionalized polities, ethnic communities will be tempted to free ride and
increase the coordination cost of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler
2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).
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Ethnic dominant polities are more likely to increase the probability of armed civil
conflict since the power of the dominant ethnic group that is reflected in these governments
provides the group with both the incentive and capability to repress and exploit ethnic
minorities, hence increasing ethnic grievance – the motive for armed civil conflict (Collier
2001). Ethnic dominant polities also increase opportunities for armed civil conflict because
they reduce the collective action problem by lowering the coordination cost for ethnic
minorities to organize armed resistance against the state (Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Hence, governments whose polities are characterized by
high levels of ethnic dominance increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict.
However, the ethnic characteristics of recipient governments not only affect the
onset of armed civil conflict, but they also shape governments’ policy preferences in
negotiations with the IMF. The primary preference of governments that face chronic
economic crisis that are rooted in mounting debt is to secure external financing from the
IMF. Some studies have shown that ethnic fractionalization is negatively associated with
economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina et al.
2003). Ethnically diverse societies are more likely to adopt sub-optimal public policies
because ethnic diversity increases the number of rent-seekers and the level of corruption
(Mauro 1995). Ethnic fractionalized polities are, therefore, likely to reduce governments’
policy consensus on economic reform and as such the preference of these governments is to
secure IMF financing where the attached conditionalities are relatively weak. Securing an
IMF loan agreement with weak SAP conditionalities increases the likelihood of ratification in
constituencies that are increasingly fragmented and rent seeking. And in the absence of an
IMF agreement with relatively weak conditionalities, governments whose polities are
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characterized by ethnic fractionalization will prefer not having an agreement as opposed to
receiving IMF financing for a program that cannot be ratified.
However, the number of rent-seekers and the tendency for governments to adopt
sub-optimal public policies are reduced in ethnic dominant societies. Ethnic dominant
polities increase governments’ policy consensus on economic reform and, consequently
these governments are more likely to accept tougher SAP conditionalities in exchange for
IMF financing. This is because ethnic group dominance within the institutions of
government increases the likelihood that the IMF agreement will have the necessary political
support to ensure ratification. In essence, governments whose polities are characterized by
ethnic dominance are more likely to prefer receiving IMF financing with stringent
conditionalities as opposed to no agreement because ethnic group dominance within the
apparatus of the state increases the likelihood that the IMF agreement will be ratified.

3.4 Two-Level Games: SAPs, Ethnicity, and Armed Civil Conflict
SAP conditionalities are ratified and implemented when the policy preferences or the
win sets of recipient governments and the IMF overlaps. Scholars who write in the tradition
of bargaining theory often refer to the convergence of policy preferences as the “contract
zone” or the bargaining range (Jonsson 2002). International relations theorists refer to policy
convergence as “win sets”, which is “the set of all possible Level I agreements that would
‘win’ – that is gain the necessary majority among [recipient governments’] constituencies –
when simply voted up or down” (Putnam 1988, 437).
Since IMF SAPs are implemented in polities that are characterized by ethnic politics,
the ethno-political characteristics of recipient governments not only shape their policy
preference but also determine the size of their win-sets. Figure 3.1 briefly demonstrates the
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mechanisms linking SAPs and ethnic fractionalization to armed civil conflict. Polities that are
ethnically fractionalized are more likely to have legislatures that are also fractionalized. High
degrees of legislative fractionalization breeds rent seeking and policy discord regarding
economic reform, which weaken recipient governments at Level II. As a result these
governments will have smaller win sets relative to those of the IMF, as they are less likely to
secure domestic ratification for tentative SAP agreements made at Level I. However, the
small win sets of these governments strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF as
they are more likely to forgo an IMF program if they are unable to secure ratification at
Level II. It is not in the Fund’s institutional interest to have negotiations with

Figure 3.1: Mechanisms Linking SAPs and Ethnic Fractionalization to Armed Civil Conflict

Level I Negotiation
IMF vs. Ethnically Fractionalized
Polities
Level I Outcome
Level I Outcome
Mild Conditionality
Level II Implementation
Shared Burden across Ethnic Groups
Level II Outcome
Decreased Probability of Armed Civil Conflict

debtor countries end in no agreement as the contagious effects of the debt crisis could have
devastating consequences for the global economy. Debtor defaults on loans would
financially threaten capital markets and their inability to trade would damage economic
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growth and promote recession in other countries (Agenor et al. 1999) . Under these
circumstances the Fund is likely to choose its second-order preference by making
concessions and moderate the scope of SAP conditionalities to help facilitate ratification in
legislatures that are fractionalized (Lehman and McCoy 1992). 22 In doing so, the IMF’s
policy preference converges with the preference of these recipient governments. Moreover,
since high levels of ethnic fractionalization is likely to breed policy discord on economic
reform, this also increases the probability that governments will find it difficult to effectively
implement even mild SAP conditions and when attempts are made to implement loan
conditions, they are more likely to be done in ways that share the burden of economic
austerity across different ethnic communities, all of which reduce economic induced
grievance and the likelihood of armed civil conflict. This discussion generates the following
hypothesis.
H1: IMF SAPs reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict when they are implemented in
polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic fractionalization.

Figure 3.2 shows different scenarios in ethnically dominant countries. Policy
consensus on economic reform that is shared by a dominant ethnic group within the
institutions of the state makes recipient governments strong at Level II. Consequently, these
governments will have larger win sets relative to those of the IMF, as they are more likely to
secure domestic ratification for SAP agreements made at Level I. The large win sets of these
governments, however, weaken their bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF. The Fund is less

Recall from the discussion of the critics of the IMF that the argument here provides greater
theoretical precision in understanding the bargaining conditions that give rise to the claims by
Eichengreen (2002, 55) that the IMF is under strong political pressure to lend and “rarely ever says
no”.
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likely to offer concessions and moderate SAP conditionalities since ethnic dominance within
the state all but ensures that its program will be ratified. Under this scenario, the IMF’s
policy preference converges with the preference of the recipient government. By offering the
recipient government financing with stringent conditionalities, the Fund realizes its firstorder preference and maximizes the interests of its constituency of international creditors.
Recipient governments whose polities are characterized by ethnic dominance are more likely
to accept stringent SAP conditionalities in exchange for IMF funding because not only are
there few obstacles to ratification, but ethnic group dominance reduce policy discord on
economic reform, which increases the likelihood that stringent SAP conditionalities will be
effectively implemented in ways that disproportionately shift the burden of economic
austerity onto ethnic minorities. There are numerous examples of how ethnic politics affects
Figure 3.2: Mechanisms Linking SAPs and Ethnic Dominance to Armed Civil Conflict
Level I Negotiation
I Outcome
IMF vs.Level
Ethnically
Dominant Polities
Level I Outcome
More Stringent Conditionality
Level II Implementation
Burden Disproportionately Placed on Ethnic
Minority Groups
Level II Outcome
Increased Probability of Armed Civil Conflict
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the implementation of SAP conditionalities. For example, Mexico’s Chiapas rebellion in the
1990s is widely attributed to the ways in which the Mexican government implemented SAP
austerity conditions in ways that disproportionately burdened the country’s minority
indigenous people (Singh 1999). The “IMF riots” in Ecuador is also attributed to the
government’s implementation of SAP conditionalities, which slashed state subsidies and
social services that indigenous Indians disproportionately depend on (Brysk 2001, 216-217).
After concluding negotiations with the IMF in 1991, apartheid South Africa’s white minority
government implemented the fiscal conditions of the SAP in ways that imposed a regressive
valued added tax that was disproportionately borne by the country’s black population, which
subsequently led to a two-day national strike (Bond 2003; Bond 2001).
The policy convergence of the IMF and recipient governments whose polities are
characterized by ethnic dominance is likely to increase the onset of armed civil conflict. First,
ethnic dominance increases the likelihood that SAP conditionalities will be ratified and
effectively implemented in ways that shift the burden of austerity onto ethnic minorities,
which increase ethnic grievances and relative deprivation. Second, ethnic dominant polities
reduce the collection action problem and make it easier for ethnic minorities to coordinate
armed resistance against the state (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
2005). All of which increase the motivation and opportunity for armed civil conflict. This
theoretical discussion generates the following hypothesis.
H2: IMF SAPs increase the probability of the onset of armed civil conflict when they are implemented into
polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic dominance.

Copyright © Yanyu Ke 2014
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Chapter 4
Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Countries and Programs in This Study
In this study I build a dataset that is based on my coding of SAP indicators. The IMF
programs are coded via the use of the IMF online country information, which includes
Letters of Intent, press releases, news brief, program reviews, and staff reports, and the
Monitoring of Fund Arrangement (MONA) database (IMF 2013a, 2013b).23 Following Polity
IV’s principle, I exclude countries whose population is less than five hundred thousand from
the dataset. Since the IMF Letters of Intent is available online starting with the year 1992,
the time period in this research is from 1992 to 2009, the last year that data is available to the
public from the IMF. A possible limitation of this research is that 18 years of data may not
produce sufficient variation to study the effects of SAPs on armed civil conflict. However,
if the interaction between SAP implementation and the characteristics of countries ethnic
politics explains the conditions under which the onset of armed civil conflict is likely in some
countries but not in others, then future research should examine this relationship by
extending the study’s temporal domain beyond 2009.

Countries in the Study
There are 162 countries and 342 IMF programs in the dataset. Table 4.1 presents
countries with SAPs in terms of regions, types, and years. There are one hundred countries
23 The country information on the website of the Fund includes letters of intent, which describe the
policies the government intends to implement in order to receive the IMF loans. Besides the Letters
of Intent, I also use news brief, press release, program reviews, and MONA data to do the coding
given that sometimes the Fund does not upload the Letters of Intent online for certain programs.
For example, there are no Letters of Intent available for Egypt during this period. Hence MONA
data and press release provide complementary information.
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with SAPs. The fourth column of the Table shows that the total number of years that a
country receives SAPs ranges from 1 to 17 years.24 During the period of study, the longest
IMF program has continued for seventeen years while the average duration of SAPs is five
years.

Table 4.1 Countries (Population More Than 500 Thousand) with SAPs
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia

Region
South Asia
Eastern Europe
North Africa and The Middle
East
Latin America and The
Caribbean
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and The
Caribbean
Eastern Europe

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Latin America and The
Caribbean
Bulgaria
Eastern Europe
Burkina
Sub-Saharan Africa
Faso
Burundi
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cambodia
Southeast Asia
Cameroon
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa
Central
Sub-Saharan Africa
African
Republic
Chad
Sub-Saharan Africa
Colombia
Latin America and The
Caribbean

SAPs
PRGF
ESAF / PRGF / EFF
SBA / EFF

Years
3
12
3

SBA / EFF

13

SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / EFF /
PRGF
PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF

12
8
4
16
12

SBA

6

SBA

7

SBA / EFF
ESAF / PRGF

13
16

PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF

5
7
15
6
8

SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA / EFF

12
7

Since the “years” measures the duration of SAPs, a country which receives SAPs at the end of the
time period, i.e. 2009, will be coded 0 year. For example, when Comoros received an IMF program in
2009, the year would not be coded 1 until 2010.
24
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Table 4.1

(continued)

Country
Congo, DR
of
Congo,
Republic of

Region
Sub-Saharan Africa

SAPs
PRGF

Sub-Saharan Africa

SBA / ESAF / PRGF

8

Costa Rica

Latin America and The
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa

SBA

2

ESAF / PRGF

5

Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe

SBA / EFF
SBA

5
1

Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and The
Caribbean
Latin America and The
Caribbean
North Africa and The Middle
East
Latin America and The
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa

SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA

8
6

SBA

3

SBA / EFF

3

SBA

7

ESAF

2

Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and The Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa

SBA
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / EFF
PRGF / ESAF
SBA/ ESAF/ PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF

Cote
d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Djibouti
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial
Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
GuineaBissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya

Latin America and The Caribbean
Latin America and The Caribbean
Latin America and The Caribbean
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Southeast Asia
North Africa and The Middle East
Latin America and The Caribbean
North Africa and The Middle East
Central Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
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ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
SBA
SBA / EFF
SBA
EFF
SBA / EFF
SBA / EFF
ESAF / PRGF

Years
3

8
8
9
7
12
11
2
15
4
12
6
13
4
1
6
4
4
10
7
12

Table 4.1

(continued)

Country
Korea
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lesotho
Liberia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Mozambiqu
e
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan

Region
East Asia
Central Asia
Southeast Asia
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and The Caribbean
Eastern Europe
East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

SAPs
SBA
SBA / ESAF/ PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
SBA / PRGF
PRGF /EFF
SBA / EFF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
SBA / EFF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF / SBA
ESAF / PRGF

Years
3
15
8
10
6
1
7
10
13
13
17
17
3
13
12
13

South Asia
Latin America and The Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia

7
15
15
1
12

Panama
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan

Latin America and The Caribbean
Oceania

ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA
SBA / ESAF / EFF /
PRGF
SBA / EFF
SBA

Latin America and The Caribbean
Latin America and The Caribbean
Southeast Asia
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
South Asia
Central Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa and The Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Latin America and The Caribbean
Central Asia

SBA
SBA / EFF
SBA / EFF
SBA
ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / EFF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
SBA / PRGF / EFF
SBA / PRGF / ESAF
ESAF / PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / EFF
SBA
SBA

5
16
6
12
11
12
5
12
1
2
10
10
4
11
12
9
10
2
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4
3

Table 4.1

(continued)

Country
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen

Region
Latin America and The Caribbean
Southeast Asia
North Africa and The Middle East

Zambia
Zimbabwe

Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa

SAPs
SBA
SBA / ESAF / PRGF
SBA / EFF / ESAF /
PRGF
ESAF / PRGF
SBA / ESAF / EFF

Years
1
7
5
14
5

In addition, Table 4.2 shows countries without SAPs. There are 62 such countries in the
dataset.

Table 4.2: Countries (Population More Than 500 Thousand) without SAPs
Country
Angola
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Belarus
Belgium
Bhutan
Botswana
Canada
Chile
China
Comoros
Cyprus
Denmark
Eritrea
Fiji
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
India
Iran

Region
Sub-Saharan Africa
Oceania
Western Europe
North Africa and The Middle East
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
North America
Latin America and The Caribbean
East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Oceania
Western Europe
Western Europe
Western Europe
Western Europe
South Asia
North Africa and The Middle East
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Table 4.2 (continued)
Country
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Luxemburg
Malaysia
Mauritius
Morocco
Myanmar
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Oman
Portugal
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States

Region
Western Europe
North Africa and The Middle East
Western Europe
East Asia
North Africa and The Middle East
North Africa and The Middle East
North Africa and The Middle East
Western Europe
Southeast Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa and The Middle East
Southeast Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
Oceania
Western Europe
North Africa and The Middle East
Western Europe
North Africa and The Middle East
North Africa and The Middle East
Southeast Asia
Eastern Europe
Oceania
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and The Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
Western Europe
North Africa and The Middle East
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia
Latin America and The Caribbean
North Africa and The Middle East
Central Asia
North Africa and The Middle East
Western Europe
North America
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Table 4.3 shows countries with and without IMF programs broken down by regions.
Sub-Sahara African countries constitute 36% of countries with SAPs. This is followed by
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe, which comprise 20% of
the 100 countries with SAPs respectively. The countries of the former Soviet Bloc in Eastern
Europe, the Baltic rim (i.e. Latvia, Estonia, etc.), and the region of Caspian Sea (i.e.
Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc.) are coded under the category of Eastern Europe.

Table 4.3: Breakdowns of Regions with and without SAPs
Region

Country With SAPs
Number
Frequency
2
2%
5
5%

Country Without SAPs
Number Frequency
2
3.23%
5
8.06%

All Country
Number Frequency
4
2.47%
10
6.17%

East Asia
Southeast
Asia
South Asia
5
5%
2
3.23%
7
4.32%
Central
4
4%
1
1.61%
5
3.09%
Asia
Oceania
1
1%
4
6.45%
5
3.09%
North
6
6%
13
20.97%
19
11.73%
Africa and
the Middle
East
Sub36
36%
10
16.13%
46
28.40%
Saharan
Africa
Latin
20
20%
3
4.84%
23
14.20%
America
and the
Caribbean
Eastern
20
20%
3
4.84%
23
14.20%
Europe
Western
1
1%
17
27.42%
18
11.11%
Europe
North
0
0%
2
3.23%
2
1.23%
America
Total
100
100%
62
100.00%
162
100.00%
Note: The countries of former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, Baltic rim (i.e. Latvia,
Estonia, etc.), and the region of Caspian Sea (i.e. Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc.) are coded
under the category of Eastern Europe
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IMF Programs in This Study
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of type of SAPs from 1992 to 2009. The program
duration of the Stand-by-Arrangements (SBA) is between one to two years. The program
duration of the Extended Fund Facilities (EFF) is three years. ESAF means enhanced
structural facility, which was first established in 1987, is intended to address the BOP
problems of low-income countries. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), is
aimed at reducing poverty was recently replaced by Extended Credit Facility (ECF).25 As
Figure 4.1 demonstrates, PRGFs accounted for more than half - 57.41% - of all SAPs during
the period of study. SBAs accounted for 28.39% of all SAPs. EFFs and ESAFs are the lessfrequently-adopted programs accounting for 5.68% and 8.52% of SAP programs
respectively.26
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of IMF programs across years. The variation and
the median duration of PRGFs are greater than the other types of SAPs. More important,
this study contributes to extant research by developing better measurement of SAP
implementation. Unlike previous research which measures SAP years, I pay more attention
to the degree of implementation of SAPs and I have used original IMF sources to develop
the dataset. Following Ivanova et al. (2006), I measure SAP implementation in terms of the
number of program waivers that the IMF grants to recipient governments. Increases in the
number of waivers are indicative of the lack of program implementation. Since this indicator
captures the extent to which SAP conditionalities are actually being implemented, it is a vast

ECFs are taken as PRGFs in the research since in most time period of this dataset, the Fund uses
the term of PRGF.
26 A few programs are combinations of ESAF-EFF, PRGF-EFF, or PRGF-ESAF. I collapse the
programs into ESAF and PRGF.
25

45

improvement over the proxy indicator that is featured in the extant literature. I discuss the
details of the SAP indicators following the estimation procedure in the next section.
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Figure 4.1 The Distributions of Types of SAPs
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4.2 The Estimation Procedure
Following the estimation procedure that is featured in existing research on the
political economy of IMF lending, this research employs a series of two-stage models to test
the theory that is advanced in this study (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 2004, 2009, 2006;
Vreeland 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). The use of these estimation methods
makes it possible to disentangle the impact of SAPs on armed civil conflict from recipient
countries’ prior attributes that may also have an impact on the onset of armed civil conflict
(Collier 1991). Single stage estimators that are featured in existing cross-national studies of
armed civil conflict (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005) assume a unidirectional causal relationship
and cannot address the possibility that SAP loan agreements and the implementation of the
attached conditionalities are endogenous to the onset of armed civil conflict. Given this
problem, the application of single stage estimators will generate inconsistent parameter
estimates (Gujarati 1995), making it necessary to use two-stage models to address issues of
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endogeneity, selection and randomization (Achen 1986; Heckman 1988; Przeworski and
Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2002, 2003).
However, while there is consensus in the literature on the importance of two-stage
estimators in studying the IMF, different types of estimators have been utilized. These range
from the Heckman Selection estimator (Vreeland 2003), two-stage estimator with the use of
predicted values (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007) to the bivariate probit estimator (Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). The Heckman estimator addresses selection effects by combining
estimates of two equations. The first equation examines the selection mechanism, and the
second equation estimates the correlation between the selection equation and the regression
coefficients from the first equation (Heckman 1988). However, following Abouharb and
Cingranelli (2007, 86) and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) the Heckman model is not
utilized in this study because the dependent variable in the first stage equation (entering into
an SAP loan agreement) is different from the dependent variable in the second stage
equation (the onset of armed civil conflict).
The econometric literature describes the nature of the relationship between the
receipt of an SAP loan agreement and the onset of armed civil conflict as fully observed.
This means that the onset of armed civil conflict is possible in countries regardless of
whether they enter or did not enter into an SAP loan agreement. There are many countries
that did not enter into an SAP agreement but experience the onset of armed civil conflict.
These cases highlight the nature of a fully observed relationship. On the other hand, a
partially observed relationship is one where the dependent variable in the second stage is
conditional on the dependent variable occurring in the first stage (Abouharb and Cingranelli
2007, 85-86). For example, students must first enter into an academic program before they
can subsequently graduate or dropout. States must first enter into wars before they can win
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or lose them. Companies must first enter the market place before they can subsequently
realize profits or losses (Heckman 1979). The onset for armed civil conflict is not
conditional on countries’ entering into an SAP agreement. Therefore, the methodological
consequences of a fully observed as opposed to a partially observed relationship means that
the Heckman Selection estimator where the dependent variable in the second stage is
conditional on the occurrence of the dependent variable in the first stage are not present in
the relationship that is analyzed in this study. It is for this reason that the Heckman
estimator is not used in this study. The theoretical argument that is advanced in this study
suggests that the process of entering into an SAP loan agreement and the subsequent impact
on the onset of armed civil conflict are linked in ways that are fully observed. To adequately
analyze the fully observed nature of the data and to ensure the robustness of the finding of
this research, this study utilizes a number of two-stage estimators that are featured in the
existing literature.
Following Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007), in the chapters 5 and 6, the data is first
analyzed via a two-stage estimator that includes the predicted value from the first stage
equation. The first stage equation estimates the probability of entering into an SAP loan
agreement. Predicted values are generated from this first stage equation, which denotes the
selection effects of entering into an SAP loan agreement. The predicted value (the IMF
selection effect) is included in the second stage equation, which estimates the onset of armed
civil conflict. The underlying logic of this technique is to control for the effect of possible
selection bias (in the first-stage equation) on the onset of armed civil conflict (in the secondstate equation). In this research I include variables in the first-stage equation (the IMF
selection effect) that are repeatedly utilized in previous research (Abouharb and Cingranelli
2007; Vreeland 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). However, since the two-level game
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metaphor informs the theory of this study, I introduce two additional political variables –
political constraints and legislative fractionalization – that capture the level of domestic constraints
that not only affect the likelihood of SAP ratification but also determine the relative win-sets
of borrowing governments vis-à-vis the IMF, which ultimately affect the probability of
entering into an IMF loan agreement.
There are, however, limitations with the two-stage (predicted values) technique. First,
the inclusion of the IMF selection effect variable from the first stage equation into the
second stage equation could produce standard errors that are not reliable. Second, while the
inclusion of the IMF selection effect variable accounts for endogeneity between entering
into an SAP agreement and the onset of armed civil conflict, the technique does not account
for the possible endogeneity between one of the study’s key variable – implementation of SAP –
and the onset of armed civil conflict.
Following Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer (2010), I address some of these
methodological limitations and in doing so assess the robustness of the study’s findings by
also analyzing the data via a bivariate probit estimator. The bivariate probit estimator
consists of a system of two univariate probit estimators that are simultaneously linked.
Estimates are produced for two potentially correlated binary outcomes. These are the binary
decisions of governments to enter or not to enter into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF
and the binary outcome for the onset of armed civil conflict. The assumption of the bivariate
probit estimator is that the random error terms in the univariate probit equations are
correlated. And correlation between the error terms suggests that the effects of unobserved
variables in the model are not random. Bivariate probit corrects any correlation that exists
between the error terms and eliminates the effect that the nonrandom selection of countries
that enter into SAP loan agreements have on the onset of armed civil conflict.
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The

difference that remains in estimating the probability of armed civil conflict between
countries that entered into SAP agreements with the IMF and those that did not, can be
credited to the effect of the IMF’s SAP. In correcting for endogeneity, selection and
randomization the standard errors that are produced by the bivariate probit estimator are
more reliable than those produced by the two-stage (predicted values) technique. However,
the bivariate probit estimator still does not account for the possible endogeneity between the
implementation of SAP and the onset of armed civil conflict.
Finally to address the limitations of the two-stage (predicted values) and bivariate
probit models, the data is also analyzed via an instrumental variable probit (ivprobit)
estimator. The advantages of the ivprobit estimator is that it not only addresses endogeneity
between entering into an SAP agreement and the onset of armed civil conflict, but also
endogeneity between the study’s measure of SAP implementation and the onset of armed
civil conflict. To address these problems the ivprobit estimator that is utilized includes some
novel features. Since the predicted probability of entering an SAP loan agreement (the IMF
selection effect) from the first stage equation is included in the model, the ivprobit estimator
takes advantage of the replication properties of the Jackknife procedure to produce reliable
standard errors (Wu 1986). I include in the model the variable – government corruption – that
instrument for the variable SAP implementation. I argue that government corruption is
correlated with SAP implementation, but uncorrelated with the onset of armed civil
conflict.27 There have been a number of instances where IMF loans have ended up in the
personal bank accounts of government officials and the SAP conditions were never
implemented. For example, in 1980 the IMF loaned Haiti $22 million and within weeks, $20
million was withdrawn from the government's bank accounts. Approximately $4 million was
27

The correlation coefficient between government corruption and armed civil conflict is -.12.
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reported to have been diverted to Haiti's secret police - the notorious Tonton Macoutes, and
the remaining $16 million disappeared into Duvalier's personal accounts without any attempt
to implement the conditions that the loan supported (Schubert 2009). In 1997 the IMF froze
lending to the Kenyan regime of Daniel arap Moi citing the pervasive corruption in
implementing the expected program conditionalities (Dunphy 1997). Government
corruption is an index that ranges from 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean). The variable is
adopted from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI 2013).
The remainder of this chapter discusses the variables used in the first stage equation.
This is followed by a discussion of the variables used in the second stage equation, which
test the study’s central hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Ghana and
Rwanda – countries that are illustrative historical examples of the theory that is advanced in
the study.

4.3 The First-Stage Equation Variables
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the first-stage (the selection stage) is the probability of
entering into an SAP loan agreement, which is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a country has
entered into an SAP agreement in any given year or coded 0 if the country has not. The data
for this variable was coded from the IMF’s online country information, which includes
Letters of Intent, program review, staff reports, and press releases, and the Monitoring of
Fund Arrangements (MONA) database (IMF 2013a, 2013b). What factors explain the
probability of entering into an IMF loan agreement? The existing literature has shown that
economic and political attributes of recipient countries affect the likelihood of initiating an
SAP agreement (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell,
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Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). Table 4.4 summarizes the operationalization of the economic and
political variables that predict countries entering into an SAP loan agreement.

Table 4.4 Control Variables in the First Stage Equation - Entering into an SAP Loan
Agreement
Variable

Operationalization

Source

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates
are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
The sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as a percentage in a country’s GDP, log value
Consumer price index, annual percentage
Total external debt owed to nonresidents repayable in
foreign currency, goods, or services as a percentage
of Gross National Income (GNI)

WDI

Regime type measured by Polity2, ranging from -10
(most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic)
The presence of armed civil conflict

Polity IV

The probability that two deputies picked at random
from the legislature will be from different political
parties.
The number of independent branches of government
(executive, lower and upper legislative chambers)
with veto power over policy changes.

DP12012

Economic
Variables
GDP growth
Trade openness
(log)
Inflation
External debt

Political
Variables
Democracy
Presence of
Armed Civil
Conflict
Legislative
Fractionalization
Political
Constraint

WDI
WDI
WDI

UCDP /
PRIO

POLCON
Data set

Economic Variables
Existing research finds that GDP growth has a negative impact on the likelihood of
entering into an SAP agreement. Countries that experience high levels of growth are less
likely to enter into a SAP loan agreement with the IMF (Bird and Rowlands 2001; Vreeland
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2003; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). Abouharb and
Cingranelli (2007) find that countries that are highly integrated into the global economy are
less likely to enter into an SAP agreement with the IMF. The level of trade openness captures
this variable, which is measured in terms of the total sum of countries’ exports and imports
as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP).
Prior research shows that the level of inflation, which is measured by the consumer
price index, affects the likelihood of entering into an SAP agreement. Given its institutional
mission to stabilize and arrest the contagious effects of countries’ debt, IMF programs
attempt to reduce the level of inflation, which is a by-product of recipient countries’ BOP
crisis (Vreeland 2003). Therefore, along with GDP growth and openness to global trade, the
level of inflation in recipient countries is included in the first-stage equation. The level of
external debt, which measures central governments’ external debt as a percentage of Gross
National Income (GNI)28 is also included in the first-stage equation. Existing research shows
that the burden of external debt has a positive impact on countries entering into an SAP
agreement (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007).
The data that measures the economic variables were taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators online database (World Bank 2013).

Political Variables
The variable democracy is included in the first-stage equation. Scholars argue that since
democracies, relative to autocracies, are more integrated into the global economy they are
more sensitive to market pressures and consequently they are more likely to enter into an
SAP program to achieve economic stability (Adsera and Boix 2002). Leeds (1999) and
28

Gross National Income (GNI) was previously called Gross National Product (GNP) by the Bank.
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Martin (2000) argue that democratic accountability and the institutionalization of
cooperation allow democracies as opposed to autocracies to send clear and credible signals
regarding their willingness to cooperate. The political characteristics of democratic regimes
relative to autocracies increase the certainty of other actors in the international system
regarding the likelihood that democratic leaders will implement international agreements
(Martin 2000). These political characteristics are not limited to democracies in advanced
industrial countries but as Dollar and Svensson (2000) have shown they also extend to
democracies in developing countries who are more likely to implement the SAP conditions
of international financial institutions.
The arguments of all these scholars suggest that democracies are more likely to enter
into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF. The Democracy variable is adopted from the Polity
IV database (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010). The variable is a 21-point continuous
indicator that ranges from -10 (consolidated autocracy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). The
incidence of armed civil conflict, which measures the degree to which recipient countries are
prone to conflict, is also included in the first-stage equation. Some scholars argue that
countries that are least prone to civil conflict are more likely to enter into an SAP agreement
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). The variable is measured in terms of the Presence of Armed
Civil Conflict in recipient countries of IMF loans. It is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if
there are any ongoing armed civil conflicts in a year or 0 without any conflicts. The variable
is adopted from the UCDP/PRIO database (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
The theory that is advanced in this study is couched in the context of the two-level
game metaphor. The study’s theory emphasizes how the nature of recipient governments’
domestic politics affects their international bargaining with the IMF, which ultimately shapes
the strength of SAP conditionalities that are intended for implementation. I argue that
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recipient governments, whether their polities are characterized by ethnic fractionalization or
ethnic dominance, will receive loan agreements from the IMF albeit for different reasons
and with conditionalities that differ in scope. And this explains why SAPs are associated
with armed civil conflict in some countries but not in others. The implementation of weak
SAP conditionalities under conditions of ethnic fractionalization is expected to reduce the
likelihood of armed civil conflict while in ethnic dominant polities the implementation of
SAPs that are robust in scope is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of armed civil
conflict. I have argued in Chapter 3, that while domestic constraints and impediments to
SAP ratification will be greater in polities that are ethnically fractionalized, these constraints
will strengthen the government’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF, which will ultimately
weaken SAP conditionality. On the other hand, polities that are characterized by ethnic
dominance are likely to face fewer domestic impediments to SAP ratification. Consequently,
these regimes will be in a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF and are more likely to
receive SAP conditionalities that are stringent. The variables political constraints and legislative
fractionalization are included in the first-stage equation as they capture the relative domestic
political constraints under which recipient governments negotiate with the IMF.
The measure of political constraints identifies the number of independent branches of
government with veto power over policy changes in 234 countries in the years 1800 to 2012.
Each additional veto point or a branch of government that is controlled by a party different
from other branches provides a diminishing effect on governments’ ability to implement
policy change. As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of
political constraints increases. The variable is adopted from the Political Constraint Index
data set (Henisz 2002). The variable legislative fractionalization measures the probability that two
deputies that are randomly picked will be from different political parties. The data is adopted
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from the Database of Political Institutions (DP1) and covers the period 1975 to 2012 (Beck et al.
2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Keefer 2010, 2012). It is expected that governments who
negotiate under conditions of high levels of political constraints and legislative fractionalization are
likely to enter into an SAP agreement because IMF conditionalities will be sufficiently mild
to secure ratification.

4.4 The Second-Stage Equation Variables
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the second stage is the onset of armed civil conflict. This
indicator is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates the onset of armed civil conflict in
each country-year and 0 indicates no occurrence of armed civil conflict. It is important to
note that this variable is different from the presence of armed civil conflict, which is utilized
in the study by Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007). The onset of armed civil conflict refers to
the outbreak of new-armed civil conflict, while the presence of civil conflict can simply be
the continuation of an existing civil conflict. The dependent variable is adopted from the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed
Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al. 2002). UCDP/PRIO defines armed civil conflict as “a
contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of
armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two
parties, at least one is the government of a state” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-619; Strand
2006).
The Correlates of War (COW) project uses 1000 battle-related deaths as its threshold
for civil war. Following Gleditsch et al. (2002, 617), the COW civil war data was not utilized
in this study due to its practical and statistical limitations. In practice the high threshold of
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1000 battle-related deaths per year eliminates longstanding armed civil conflicts such as
Basque separatist conflict and Northern Ireland conflict from being included in the COW
database. Second, because of this high threshold statistical analyses of civil conflict in
relatively short time periods will lack enough data. In their summary of this argument
Gleditsch et al. (2002, 617) note:
“While it may seem intuitively reasonable to include the Basque conflict, for instance,
it has not accumulated enough deaths to qualify by even the most inclusive of the
COW thresholds, 1,000 battle-deaths for the entire conflict. The Northern Ireland
conflict, which broke out in 1969, exceeded 25 annual battle deaths every year during
the period 1971–93, and again in 1998, has claimed more than 3,000 casualties
altogether, but does not qualify for the stricter COW threshold of more than 1,000
deaths in a single year. Apart from the apparent anomaly of excluding such wellknown conflicts from a dataset on armed conflict, there is a statistical reason why a
lower threshold is useful. As multivariate models of conflict become more fully
specified, there are simply ‘not enough wars’ for statistical analyses over shorter
periods of time. Extending the analysis to a very long time period in order to get
enough data raises several problems: Are the theoretical explanations equally
reasonable for the whole period? Do variables like ‘degree of democracy’ and
‘economic development’ means the same thing in 1825 as in 1985? Dividing the
material into periods of more reasonable length, on the other hand, may produce
insignificant results. Lowering the threshold for inclusion will yield more conflicts
and thus more flexibility (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 617).”

The Primary Explanatory Variables
The interaction term SAP implementation*ethnic fractionalization - is created to test the
first hypothesis, 29 which predicts that under conditions of ethnic fractionalization, SAP
implementation will reduce the likelihood of armed civil conflict. The interaction term SAP
implementation*ethnic dominance - is also created to test the second hypothesis,30 which predicts

29 Since the variation in SAP conditionality may have different effects on the probability of armed
civil conflict, four additional interaction terms are also created to test the robustness of the study’s
first hypothesis. These variables are: SAP conditions*ethnic fractionalization, SAP structural conditions*ethnic
fractionalization, SAP fiscal conditions*ethnic fractionalization, and SAP financial conditions*ethnic
fractionalization.
30 Given the possibility that variation in SAP conditionality may have different effects on the
probability of armed civil conflict, four additional interaction terms are also created to test the
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that under conditions of ethnic dominance, SAP implementation will increase the likelihood
of armed civil conflict.

Ethnic Fractionalization
The variable ethnic fractionalization is adopted from the Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization (ELF) dataset coded by Fearon and Laitin (2003, 78), which measures the
“probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups”. This variable ranges from 0.004 to 1. The greater the value of this variable
indicates high levels of ethnic fractionalization.
The main issue concerning the measurement of ethnic diversity is the definition and
operationalization of ethnic groups. Traditionally scholars relied on language and national
origin as the major criteria for defining ethnic groups. For example, Easterly and Levine
(1997) adopted this method to measure ethnic diversity in their research on economic
growth and ethnic division. However, a serious problem arises when we define ethnicity
mainly by language and origin. Some groups, such as the Jews, are deemed as ethnic groups
without speaking the same language (Fearon 2003, 200). Hence the ELF dataset defines
ethnicity based on the criteria which include not only language and national origin, but also
shared culture and history, homeland, and members’ consciousness of their identity (Fearon
2003, 201).

robustness of the study’s second hypothesis. These variables are: SAP conditions*ethnic dominance, SAP
structural conditions*ethnic dominance, SAP fiscal conditions*ethnic dominance, and SAP financial conditions*ethnic
dominance.
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Ethnic Dominance
The variable ethnic dominance indicates how dominant the largest ethnic group is in a
country. It is also adopted from the ELF dataset of Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variable
measures the “share of the population belonging to the largest ethnic group” (Fearon and
Laitin 2003, 78). This variable ranges from 0.4% to 99.8%. While Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
employ a dummy variable based on the major ethnic group to indicate ethnic dominance,
this research prefers the continuous variable measuring the population percentage of the
largest ethnic group for a better interpretation of the interactive terms. Nonetheless, I still
use a dummy variable of ethnic dominance as alternative measurement in the robustness
checks.

SAP Implementation
Proxy indicators are used in existing research to measure SAP implementation. One
such proxy measures the amount of funds drawn from the IMF as a proportion of the
amount of funds that could be drawn in a particular year. If recipient governments drew less
than 80% of this total, then they were evaluated as not fully implementing the provisions of
the SAP loan agreement (Killick 1996). This measure has been heavily criticized for being
limited on a number of dimensions (Bird and Willett 2004). The essential limitation of this
proxy is that it assumes that the partial draw down was a function of the loan recipient
government’s non-compliance with the IMF’s program conditionalities. However, in some
instances loan recipient governments may not use the entire loan because of significant
improvements in the economy or in other instances governments will negotiate SAP
programs for precautionary reasons and have no intentions of drawing down the loan
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009). In some cases even when loan recipient governments have
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not implemented the program, the IMF will disburse the loan because it believes that
significant progress has been made or it may disburse the loan for political reasons (Bird and
Willett 2004; Stone 2004).
Given the limitations of this measure there has been a bourgeoning consensus on the
use of an alternative proxy indicator that measures SAP implementation in terms of the
number of years that a country is under an IMF program (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007,
2009; Vreeland 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). However, since many aspects of
IMF conditionalities are never fully implemented by loan recipient governments (Killick
1996; Dollar and Svensson 2000; Dreher and Jensen 2007), the number of years that a
country is under an IMF program is not the same as the number of years that the program
was actually implemented. While the proxy does not capture whether or not recipient
governments fully implement the conditionalities of an IMF program, partial implementation
of a program may still be sufficient to generate grievance, relative deprivation and ultimately
armed civil conflict (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009).
While there is merit to this argument, to adequately test the theory that is advanced
in this study requires developing a measure of SAP implementation that has greater
precision. 31 Following Ivanova et al. (2006) and Pop-Eleches (2009), the IMF program
reviews are used to code and measure SAP implementation in terms of the number of program
waivers that the IMF grants to loan recipient governments when there are deviations during
the implementation of SAP conditionalities. 32 Increasing number of waivers indicates the

31 In addition to the central explanatory variable that is developed in this study, the number of years
that a country is under an IMF program is also used to test the robustness of the empirical results.
32 There are three categories of SAP conditions. The first is prior actions (PAs), which represent the
measures the borrower must adopt prior to the approval of the loan. The second is performance
criteria (PC), denoting the policies, which must be made before the disbursements of each loan. The
third is structural benchmarks (SBs). Therefore, the most important conditions for the
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lack of program implementation. The SAP implementation variable ranges from -16 (no
program implementation) to 0 (full program implementation). The index is constructed by
counting the number of SAP program waivers from IMF’s program reviews, staff reports,
press releases, and the MONA database (IMF 2013a, 2013b).33 In this dataset 41% of all
IMF programs were fully implemented and 59% were partially implemented or altogether
suspended. Since this variable captures the extent to which SAP conditionalities are actually
being implemented, it is a significant improvement over existing indicators that is featured in
the extant literature.

The Number of SAP Conditions
To test the robustness of the theory that is advanced in this study, the number of SAP
conditions is an alternative measure that is developed by coding the IMF’s Letters of Intent (Woo
2013). Since this variable does not fully capture the extent to which countries actually
implement the conditions, it therefore suffers from the same limitations as the indicator that
measures the number of years that a country is under an IMF program. However, like
Vreeland (2003) and Abouharb and Cingranelli (2009), I argue that while the variable does
not capture whether or not recipient governments fully implement the conditionalities,
partial implementation may still be sufficient to generate grievance, and relative deprivation –
essential ingredients for armed civil conflict. The number of SAP conditions tests whether
increases in the number of economic reforms, under conditions of ethnic fractionalization
and ethnic dominance, affect the likelihood of armed civil conflict. The variable is an

implementation of PCs, which require waivers (IEO 2007). To code the variable SAP waivers, I use
information from IMF Country Report, which presents specific waivers of performance criteria.
33 IMF program implementation ranges from -16 (no program implementation), -15 (program
slippage or program suspension), -14 (program delays), -13 (the maximum number of program
waivers) and 0 (no waivers or full program implementation).
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aggregate of the total number of conditionalities within an IMF program. I code the variable
from IMF’s Letters of Intent (IMF 2013a). For countries entering into IMF SAPs, these
conditions range from a minimum of 6 to a maximum of 53, with a mean of 23.

Disaggregating SAP Conditionalities
To further investigate the robustness of this study’s theory, the measure SAP
conditionalities test whether variation in SAP conditionalities, under conditions of ethnic
fractionalization and ethnic dominance, affect the likelihood of armed civil conflict. The
variable is constructed form the IMF’s Letters of Intent by disaggregating SAP conditionalities
into three areas: structural conditions, fiscal conditions, and financial conditions. The variable SAP
structural conditions represents policy measures intended for structural reforms such as wage
cuts, privatization, and deregulation. The variable SAP fiscal conditions represents policy
measures that are intended to reform the public sector by reducing government debt and
increasing the ratio of government revenues to GDP. The variable SAP financial conditions
represents policy measures that are intended to reform countries’ financial sectors through
strengthening bank systems, rearranging the currency board, and addressing interest rates
flexibility.
Similar to the measure - the number of SAP condition, these variables do not fully
capture the extent to which countries actually implement the various SAP conditions.
Consequently, they suffer from the same limitation as the indicator that measures the
number of years that a country is under an IMF program. However, regardless of the
imprecision in operationalizing these variables, I argue as do Vreeland (2003) and Abouharb
and Cingranelli (2009), that partial implementation of these conditions may still generate
grievance and relative deprivation – the seeds for armed civil conflict. At best the operational
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imprecision in the construction of these variables will likely underestimate their impact on
armed civil conflict and thus produce conservative estimates.

Control Variables
Table 4.5 summarizes control variables that are used in the second-stage equation
that predicts the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. Civil war scholars have
consistently identified GDP per capita (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars), GDP growth, trade
openness, population density, mountainous terrain, regime durability, democracy, democracy squared, primary
commodity exporter and oil exporter to exert an effect on the probability for the onset of armed
civil conflict.
Table 4.5: Control Variables in the Second-Stage Equation - The Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict
Variable
GDP per capita
(log)
GDP growth
Trade openness
(log)
Population density
Percent
mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy
squared
Primary
commodity
exports
Oil exporter

Operationalization
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by midyear
population, log value, in constant 2000 US dollars
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates
are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
The sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as a percentage in a country’s GDP, log value
People per square kilometers of land area

Source
WDI

Estimated percentage mountainous terrain, log value

Fearon and
Laitin (2003)

The duration of the country being autocratic or
democratic respectively
Regime type measured by Polity2, ranging from -10
(most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic)

DPI

Squared value of Polity2

WDI
WDI
WDI

Polity IV
Polity IV

GDP percentage of merchandise exports in food,
fuel, and ores and metal exports

WDI

Dummy, coding 1 when over 1/3 export revenues
from fuel

Fearon and
Laitin (2003)
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Civil war scholars have demonstrated that declining levels of per capita GDP
(economic development) and economic growth increase grievance (MacCulloch 2004; Hegre,
Ostby, and Raleigh 2009) and decrease state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003), which
increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict. Furthermore, economic development affects
the opportunity for rebellion. High levels of per capita GDP make recruitment difficult for
rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Civil war scholars have shown that high levels of
integration into the global economy, which is measured by the variable trade openness reduce
relative deprivation and grievance and hence reduce the likelihood of armed civil conflict (de
Soysa 2002; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005). It is also shown that high levels of population density
increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict since the abundance of human resources
makes recruitment easier for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). These variables are taken from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) online database (World Bank 2013).34
Civil war scholars argue that geographical factors also affect the likelihood of armed
civil conflict. The variable, percent mountainous terrain, is expected to increase the likelihood of
armed civil conflict since it decreases states’ capability to suppress dissent and provides
rebels with relatively secure bases and areas from which to attack and retreat from
government forces (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). This variable was
adopted from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variable regime durability, which measures the
stability of regimes, also affects the likelihood of armed civil conflict. Increasing levels of
regime durability decrease the likelihood of armed civil conflict (Abouharb and Cingranelli
2007). This variable was adopted from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et
al. 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Keefer 2010, 2012).
Population density is calculated by population/land. Indicators of population and land are all from the
WDI.

34
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The level of democracy affects the likelihood of armed civil conflict. Democracy is
adopted from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010). It is a 21-point
continuous variable ranging from -10 (consolidated autocracy) to 10 (consolidated
democracies). The variable also captures political authority structures that are often referred
to as anocracies. Polity measures for incoherent autocracies range from -6 to 0, and measures
for incoherent democracies range from 1 to 6. However, there is an inverted-U relationship
between the level of democracy and armed civil conflict (Muller and Seligson 1987; Hegre et
al. 2001; Goldstone et al. 2010). Consolidated autocracies and consolidated democracies are
less likely to experience armed civil conflict, while armed civil conflict is far more prevalent
amongst anocracies – incoherent autocracies and incoherent democracies (Hegre et al. 2001;
Mason 2003; Gates et al. 2006). In addressing this problem, civil war scholars include in their
models the variable Democracy squared, which is the squared value of democracy.
In explaining the determinants of armed civil conflict, civil war scholars include in
their models the variable, primary commodity exports, which proxies greed. According to the
greed model, countries that are rich in natural resources are more likely to experience armed
civil conflict because the abundance of natural resources provides economic incentive to
rebel and capture rents that come from the country’s natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler
1998; de Soysa 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004;
Collier 2007). 35 There are six categories of primary commodities based on the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC): 1) SITC 0 -- food and live animals; 2) SITC 1 –
beverages and tobacco; 3) SITC 2 – crude inedible materials except fuels; 4) SITC 3 –

Since SAP conditionalities affects countries’ exchange rate, primary commodity exports will also be
affected. Therefore, including primary commodity exports in the model may underestimate the effect
of SAPs on armed civil conflict. However, the correlation test shows that the correlation coefficients
between SAP variables and primary commodity exports range from 0.12 to 0.14. The low correlation
assures that controlling for primary commodity exports will not underestimate the predictive effects.

35
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mineral fuels, etc. 5) SITC 4 – animal and vegetable oils, fats, and waxes; 6) SITC 68 –
nonferrous metals such as silver and copper (Fearon 2005, 491). The variable primary
commodity exports, is created as an aggregate of countries’ primary commodity exports of food,
fuel, ores and metals exports (World Bank 2013).36 The data was calculated from indicators
taken from the WDI online database. However, existing research report mixed findings on
primary commodity exports’ effect on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. While Fearon
and Laitin (2003) find that the variable has no statistically significant effect on armed civil
conflict, other researchers find that the variable is positively associated with armed civil
conflict (de Soysa 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Since Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that
oil exports has a positive effect on civil war onset, I follow their model specification and
include oil exporter into the second stage equation. The variable is a dummy variable and is
coded 1 for oil exporting countries and 0 otherwise.37

4.5 The Statistical Models
The theoretical model can be rewritten as a system of binary regression equations. As
discussed earlier, various two-stage probit estimators are used to analyze the data. The
second stage equations test the first and second hypotheses, which are the interactive effects
of SAP implementation*ethnic fractionalization, and SAP implementation *ethnic dominance on the
onset of armed civil conflict. These are followed by the study’s control variables. Since the
dependent variables at both stages are dichotomous and the data are cross-national and over
time, there is the possibility of temporal dependence in the observations. To control for the

To measure greed, which is looting as a motivation for rebellion, primary commodity exports is
calculated as a percentage of GDP.
37 Oil exporter is a country whose revenues from fuel exports is more than a 1/3 of its export
(Fearon and Laitin 2003).
36
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temporal dependence, cubic splines are utilized in all the models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998). The main models are as follows:
First Stage Equation
Entering into an SAP Agreement = α + β1GDP growth + β2trade openness
+β3inflation + β4external debt
+ β5armed civil conflict presence
+β6democracy
+β7Government political constraint
+ β8Legislative fractionalization + ε
Second Stage Equation: Ethnic Fractionalization
Onset of Armed Civil Conflict = α +β1SAP implementation + β2ethnic
fractionalization
+β3SAPimplementation*ethnic fractionalization
+β4Predicted Value (IMF Selection Effect)
+ Control Variables +ε
Second Stage Equation: Ethnic Dominance
Onset of Armed Civil Conflict = α + β1SAP implementation + β2ethnic dominance
+ β3SAPimplementation*ethnic dominance
+ β4Predicted Value (IMF Selection Effect)
+ Control Variables +ε
4.6 Illustrative Historical Analysis
While large-N quantitative analysis is able to establish statistical inference between
the study’s central explanatory variables of interest, in chapters 7 & 8, I explore in more
detail the causal mechanisms between SAPs, ethnicity, and the probability of armed civil
conflict by using Ghana and Rwanda as comparative illustrative examples of my theory. With
more than 100 linguistic and cultural groups (Berry 1994) and an ethno-linguistic
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fractionalization score of 0.85, Ghana is highly ethnically fractionalized. The implementation
of SAPs into Ghana’s ethnic fractionalized polity is not associated with armed civil conflict.
By contrast, in Rwanda, Hutu dominance over the Tutsi and Twa (Pygmy) ethnic groups
accounts for 84% of the population. And the country’s ethno-linguistic fractionalization
score of 0.18 is indicative of low ethnic fractionalization. However, the implementation of
SAPs into Rwanda’s ethnic dominant polity is associated with armed civil conflict.
In addition to exploring in more detail the causal mechanisms between the central
explanatory variables, the historical analyses will also provide opportunity to examine
alternative theoretical explanations that account for the variation of armed civil conflict in
Ghana and Rwanda. Juxtaposed to the theory that I have advanced in this study, the
historical analysis will allow me to evaluate the explanatory power of alternative theories.

Copyright © Yanyu Ke 2014
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Chapter 5
IMF SAPs, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Armed Civil Conflict

5.1 Introduction
This study uses the metaphor of the Two-Level game to integrate theories of civil
war, ethnic politics, and the politics of structural adjustment to explain variation across
countries where the implementation of SAP conditionality is associated with the outbreak of
armed civil conflict in some countries but not in others. In this chapter, I will discuss the
results that test the hypothesis: IMF SAPs reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict
when they are implemented in polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic fractionalization.
This chapter is organized as follows: I will first discuss the results from the first-stage
equation that predicts the probability of countries entering into an SAP agreement with the
IMF. This is followed by a discussion of the results from the second-stage equation that
predicts the probability of armed civil conflict once countries implement the conditions that
are attached to SAP loan agreements. And as discussed in chapter 4, three different twostage econometric estimators are used to test the hypothesis. I then use alternate measures of
SAP implementation which disaggregate SAP conditionality to test the theory. I present the
summation of main findings following the discussion of alternative measures. Then I
conduct the robustness checks of the empirical results. And since the theory is robust to
these alternative measures the discussion of these results is placed in the end of the chapter.

5.2 First-Stage Equation: Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement
The first-stage results from the two-stage probit estimator predicting which
governments will enter into an IMF SAP loan agreement can be found in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: First-Stage Estimates Predicting Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement
Model 5.1a
(Temporal dependence
not controlled)

Model 5.1b
(Temporal
dependence
controlled)

Economic and Financial
Factors
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Inflation
External Debt

Political Factors
Presence of armed civil conflict
Democracy
Government political
constraints
Legislative fractionalization

Temporal Dependence

-.025***
(.008)
-.158*
(.082)
-.000
(.000)
.002***
(.001)

-.028***
(.008)
-.143*
(.085)
-.000
(.000)
.001**
(.001)

-.202*
(.106)
.017 *
(.009)
-.276
(.261)
.516***
(.193)

-.185*
(.110)
.018*
(.009)
-.316
(.270)
.456**
(.198)

Years since last SAP initiation

.275**
(.124)
Constant
-.550
-.821**
(.370)
(.386)
N
1504
1504
2
38.24
91.67
LR 
.000
.000
Prob >  2
Pseudo R-Squared
.028
.067
Log pseudolikelihood
-694.026
-638.738
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors are parentheses.

Columns 5.1a and 5.1b, respectively, present the results without and with temporal
dependence. In either model, all of the economic and political variables with the exception
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of inflation and government political constraints are statistically significant. Countries that
experience high levels of GDP growth and openness to international trade are less likely to
enter into an SAP agreement with the IMF. This is not surprising since countries who
experience high levels of economic growth and have instituted liberalized trade policies
(Lawrence 1996) are less likely to generate public sector deficits or external balance of
payments deficits, which would require financial intervention from the IMF. However, as
expected, countries with increasing external debt are more likely to enter into an IMF SAP
loan agreement, confirming conventional wisdom that the IMF is a lender of ‘last resort’ for
many countries caught in the debt crisis. Countries that are experiencing armed civil conflict
are less likely to enter into an IMF SAP agreement, which logically suggest that states place a
higher priority in responding to domestic security threats than they do in responding to
economic challenges that are associated with debt.
Democracies are more likely to enter into an IMF SAP loan agreement to resolve
debt crises. This finding is consistent with the theoretical predictions of some international
relations scholars. These theorists argue that since democracies are more likely to make
credible commitments, they are more likely to enter into an SAP agreement with the IMF to
resolve financial problems associated with debt (Martin 2000; Leeds 1999; Dollar and
Svensson 2000). This finding is also consistent with the predictions of globalization theorists.
These theorists argue that democracies are more likely to enter into an SAP agreement
because democratic leaders preside over economies that are highly integrated into the global
economy and, relative to autocracies, these leaders face greater pressure from capital markets
to expedite the necessary economic reforms to restore investor confidence and resolve
market uncertainties that are associated with debt (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008).
As I argued in chapter 3, countries with fractionalized legislatures are more likely to
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enter into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF because the very nature of their
fractionalization gives them a bargaining advantage in negotiations with the Fund. An SAP
agreement with stringent conditionalities is unlikely to be ratified by a fractionalized
legislature. Consequently, the IMF is likely to revert to its second-order institutional
preference and will offer a loan program with mild conditionalities that attempt to limit the
contagious effects of countries’ debt crisis while facilitating ratification in a fractionalized
legislature. Therefore, this increases the probability that governments whose legislatures are
fractionalized will enter into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF.38

5.3 Second-Stage Equation: Predicting the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
The second stage results can be found in Table 5.2. Column 5.2a presents the base
model results without the IMF’s financial intervention. High levels of ethnic fractionalization
increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict in the base model. This is consistent with the
finding of Regan and Norton (2005). The reason could be that the cost of punishment for
participating in armed civil conflict in ethnically fractionalized countries is relatively low.
Hence ethnic fractionalization increases the incentives of participating in armed civil conflict
(Esteban and Ray 2008).39 Furthermore, population density, countries that are oil exporters,
and countries with mountainous terrain all increase the probability for the onset of armed

See Appendix 2 for the first difference of significant variables in the first stage.
Note that there is no consensus on the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and armed
civil conflict. Although ethnic fractionalization could increase incentives of joining armed civil
conflict, it is possible that ethnic fractionalization could make rebellion against governments more
difficult because the coordination cost of rebellion across ethnic groups is relatively high and the
pool for rebel recruitment is restricted (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Hence it is understandable that some research finds there is no
significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004).
38
39
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Table 5.2: Second-Stage Estimates Predicting the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under
Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization
Model 5.2a
Base Model

Model 5.2b
SAP Implementation
-.087**
(.044)
.068**
(.029)
.224
(.545)
-.179*
(.097)
.027
(.023)
-.379**
(.151)
.000
(.000)
.125*
(.068)
-.009
(.012)
.031
(.021)
-.000
(.004)
-.006
(.004)
.782***
(.298)
-.037
(.144)
-2.782**
(1.083)
1.728
(1.065)
943
69.99
.000

SAP implementation*
Ethnic fractionalization
SAP implementation
Ethnic fractionalization
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter
Years since last armed
civil conflict onset
IMF selection effects
Constant

.953***
(.279)
-.205***
(.068)
.036**
(.017)
-.359***
(.120)
.000***
(.000)
.085*
(.046)
.006
(.004)
.016
(.014)
-.002
(.003)
-.010***
(.003)
.746***
(.229)
-.053
(.108)
.981
(.668)
1949
96.83
.000

N
Wald  2
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
.192
.258
Log pseudolikelihood
-227.571
-134.200
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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civil conflict – findings that are consistent with existing research (Fearon and Laitin 2003;
Fearon and Laitin 2000). For population density, this finding confirms that the
concentration of population provides rebels with necessary people resources. With respect
to oil exporter, the finding is consistent with previous research that armed civil conflict is
more likely to break out in countries when their export revenues coming from oil exceed one
third (de Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; Humphreys 2005).
High levels of economic growth also increase the probability for the onset of armed civil
conflict. While this finding maybe inconsistent with our intuitive expectations, it is important
to note that countries may experience armed civil conflict when economic growth increases
(Gallman 1992). 40 Moreover, Collier (2007) has argued that slow or moderate levels of
economic growth may also increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict, which suggest that
the variable maybe curvilinear.
By contrast, High levels of per capital GDP and openness to international trade
reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. Economic globalization could
increase government capacity and reduce opportunity costs of armed civil conflict (de Soysa
2002). Primary commodity exporting countries are less likely to experience the onset of
armed civil conflict – a finding that is consistent with the mixed results that this variable has
produced in the literature (Fearon 2005). 41 All other variables fail to rise to the level of
statistical significance.42

For example, economic growth in the United States increased before the onset of civil war
(Gallman 1992).
41 Note there is no consensus on the impact of primary commodity exports on armed civil conflict.
While some studies find there is no significant relationship between primary commodity exports and
armed civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002), other studies find curvilinear relationship
between them (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; de Soysa 2002; Hegre 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
And Reynal-Querol (2002) finds the positive relationship existing only for non-ethnic civil conflict.
See Ross (2004) for a nice review.
42 See Appendix 3 for the first difference of the significant control variables in the second stage.
40
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Column 5.2b presents the results of the IMF’s financial intervention in ethnically
fractionalized polities. The study’s hypothesis is supported by the results. SAP implementation
(the constitutive element of the interaction term) increases the probability for the onset of
armed civil conflict. However, the fact that the coefficient for the interaction term - SAP
implementation*Ethnic fractionalization – is statistically significant and negative, this increased
effect diminishes with the implementation of SAPs. Figure 5.1 graphs the marginal effect of
SAP implementation on the onset of armed civil conflict. I use technique developed by
Boehmke (2008) to graph the marginal effect in this research. The solid sloping line indicates
how the marginal effect of SAP implementation on the onset of armed civil conflict changes
with increasing levels of ethnic fractionalization. 95% confidence intervals around the line
allow us to determine the conditions under which SAP implementation has a statistically
significant effect on the onset of armed civil conflict. And they have a statistically significant
effect whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are both above (and
below) the zero line. And as theoretically predicted the increased effect of SAP
implementation (the constitutive element of the interaction term) declines as ethnic
fractionalization increases. Once the level of countries’ ethnic fractionalization surpasses
79%, SAP implementation decreases the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict.
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Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization

In Table 5.2.1 I present the first difference of the interaction impact between SAP
implementation and ethnic fractionalization on armed civil conflict onset by employing
CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) to do the calculation. The interaction
variable means the effect of SAP implementation on the onset of armed civil conflict is
conditional on the value of ethnic fractionalization. I use the mean of ethnic fractionalization
(0.48) and the index of 0.8 (the marginal-effect threshold indicated by Figure 5.1) to
demonstrate the SAP impact. As Table 5.2.1 shows, in non-oil exporting countries, the
impact of SAP implementation (moving from its minimum to maximum value) on the onset
of armed civil conflict is 16% when ethnic fractionalization is at its mean (0.48). When
ethnic fractionalization is 0.8 (around the threshold), the impact of SAP implementation on
the onset of armed civil conflict is decreased to -0.3%, which is consistent with the theory’s
prediction that SAP implementation in highly ethnically-fractionalized countries is less likely

77

to lead to the outbreak of armed civil conflict. On the whole, the percentage change of
probabilities is -102%. In oil-exporting countries, the reduction of probabilities is 114%
(from 0.065 to -0.009).

This means SAP implementation in countries with an ethnic

fractionalization index of 0.8 is one time less likely to have the onset of armed civil conflict
compared to SAPs in countries with an average ethnic fractionalization. Again, the statistical
results confirm the hypothesis that SAP implementation decreases the likelihood of the
onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic fractionalization increases.

Table 5.2.1 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Implementation
and Ethnic Fractionalization on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit Model.
Model 5.2b SAP
Implementation
(oil exporter=0)
.48
.80
(mean)
(threshold)
.16
-.003

Model 5.2b SAP
Implementation
(oil exporter=1)
.48

Ethnic
.80
Fractionalization
First Difference:
.065
-.009
SAP
implementation
First Difference
-102%
-114%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Implementation from its minimum
to maximum with Ethnic Fractionalization moving from its mean to its threshold while
holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at their
means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1 (the
right column).

5.4 Estimates from the Bivariate Probit Model
To address the limitations of the two-stage (predicted values) probit model, I analyze
the data via a bivariate probit estimator. Table 5.3 presents the bivariate probit estimates for
SAP implementation on the onset of armed civil conflict under conditions of ethnic
fractionalization. Estimates for the first-stage equation - Entering into an IMF SAP Loan
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Table 5.3: Bivariate Probit Estimates: SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization

SAP Implementation
The Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
SAP implementation*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP implementation

-.078*
(.046)
.036
(.035)
.299
(.609)
-.180
(.094)
.041*
(.022)
-.327**
(.150)
.001
(.000)
.109
(.068)
-.008
(.011)
.028
(.020)
.000
(.004)
-.006
(.004)
.827***
(.281)
.822
(1.076)

Ethnic fractionalization
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity exports
Oil exporter
Constant
Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement
GDP growth

-.035***
(.012)
-.245**
(.118)
-.001
(.000)
.003**
(.001)

Trade openness (log)
Inflation
External debt
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Table 5.3 (continued)
SAP Implementation
-.372*
(.207)
.021*
(.011)
-.283
(.327)
.704**
(.284)

Armed civil conflict incidence
Democracy
Government political constraints
Legislative fractionalization

Constant

-.555
(.536)
943
-460.036

N
Log pseudo-likelihood

Wald test of rho=0:
 2 (1) = 4.275
Probability >  2 = .039
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering over countries. Temporal dependence variables included in the analysis but not
reported.

Agreement are consistent with those reported in the previous two-stage (predicted values)
probit model. GDP growth, openness to international trade, and the presence of armed civil
conflict reduce the likelihood of entering into an IMF SAP loan agreement. External debt
and democracies increase the likelihood of entering into an SAP loan agreement with the
IMF. And consistent with the results reported in the two-stage (predicted values) probit
model, fractionalized legislatures increase the likelihood of countries entering into an IMF
SAP agreement. This finding is again consistent with the argument that factionalized
legislatures gives governments a bargaining advantage in debt negotiations with the IMF.
Estimates for the second-stage equation – the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict supports
the hypothesis. While ethnic fractionalization and SAP implementation (the constitutive
elements of the interaction term) fail to rise to the level of statistical significance, the
coefficient for the interaction variable SAP implementation*Ethnic fractionalization is statistically
80

significant and negative. Openness to international trade reduces the probability for the
onset of armed civil conflict while oil-exporting countries increase the likelihood of armed
civil conflict.
The Wald likelihood ratio test indicates that

0, which means that the null

hypothesis that the error terms for the first-stage and second-stage equations are
uncorrelated can be rejected. This indicates that the bivariate probit estimator is appropriate
for correcting the endogenous relationship between entering into an IMF SAP loan
agreement and the onset of armed civil conflict.

5.5 Estimates from the IV Probit Model
While the bivariate probit estimator has its advantages, I am still concerned that one
of the main variables – SAP implementation – is endogenous with the onset of armed civil
conflict. To address this possibility, as discussed in chapter 4, I analyze the data using an IV
probit model in which I use Government Corruption as an instrument for SAP implementation.
And since the predicted value from the first-stage equation (IMF selection effects) is
included in the model to account for endogeneity between the onset of armed civil conflict
and entering into an SAP loan agreement, I incorporate the replication properties of the
Jackknife procedure to produce efficient standard errors. Table 5.4 presents estimates that
once again support the hypothesis. SAP implementation (the constitutive element of the
interaction term) increases the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. But since the
interaction term - SAP implementation*Ethnic fractionalization – is significant and negative, the
increased effect of the constitutive element diminish with increasing levels of ethnic
fractionalization. While ethnic fractionalization (the other constitutive element of the
interaction term) reduces the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict, most of the
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control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. The Wald test of exogeneity
of the instrumented variable is insignificant and indicates no rejection of the null hypothesis
that there is no endogeneity between SAP implementation and the onset of armed civil
conflict, suggesting that the IV probit model is appropriate to estimate the data.
Table 5.4: IV Probit Estimates: SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization
SAP Implementation
SAP implementation * Ethnic fractionalization
-.485**
(.093)
SAP implementation
.325***
(.058)
Ethnic fractionalization
-.4.533***
(1.376)
GDP per capita (log)
-.027
(.116)
GDP growth
.016
(.019)
Trade openness (log)
-.178
(.195)
Population density
.000
(.000)
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
.015
(.073)
Regime durability
.002
(.010)
Democracy
-.018
(.024)
Democracy squared
-.001
(.003)
Primary commodity exports
-.004
(.003)
Oil exporter
.453
(.310)
IMF selection effects
-1.488
(1.159)
Constant
3.759***
(0.815)
N
943
Wald test of exogeneity:
 2 (1) = 3.44
Probability >  2 = .103
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. Temporal
dependence variables included in the analysis but not reported.
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5.6 Alternative Measures: Aggregating and Disaggregating SAP Conditionalities
In this section I test the hypothesis by using alternate measures of SAP
implementation. I consider whether variation in the type of SAPs under conditions of ethnic
fractionalization will reject the hypothesis or whether such variation or alternate
measurement specifications will have different effects on the onset of armed civil conflict.
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the second-stage of the two-stage (predicted values)
probit model of the interactive effects of SAP conditions and ethnic fractionalization on the
onset of armed civil conflict. Model 5.5a presents estimates for the total number of SAP
conditions that recipient governments are expected to implement and models 5.5b, 5.5c and
5.5d, respectively, present estimates for the number of Structural, Fiscal and Financial
conditionalities. And with the exception of Fiscal conditions, the results support the
hypothesis and are consistent with the results that use the more precise measure – SAP
implementation. In model 5.5a, increases in the total number of SAP conditions and ethnic
fractionalization (the constitutive elements of the interaction term) both increase the
probability for the onset armed civil conflict. However, the fact that the coefficient for the
interaction term - SAP Conditions*Ethnic fractionalization – is statistically significant and
negative, the increased effect of the constitutive elements diminish as ethnic fractionalization
increases.
This pattern repeats itself for Structural, and Financial conditionalities and is
demonstrated by the marginal effect of the various SAP conditions on the onset of armed
civil conflict as shown in figures 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.2c. In figure 5.2a, increases in the total
number of SAP conditions decrease the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict
when ethnic fractionalization is greater than 90%. In figure 5.2b, increases in the total
number of structural conditions decrease the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict
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Table 5.5: Second Stage of the Two-Stage (predicted values) Probit Estimates: SAP
Conditions and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic
Fractionalization

SAPconditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP conditions

Model 5.5a SAP
Total Number
of SAP
Conditions
-0.041*
(0.023)
.035**
(.015)

Model 5.5b
SAP Structural
Conditions

SAP structural
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP structural
conditions
SAP fiscal
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP fiscal conditions

Model 5.5c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

-.067*
(.040)
.060**
(.025)
-.139
(.089)
.092
(.056)

SAP financial
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP financial
conditions
Ethnic
fractionalization
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared

Model
5.5d SAP
Financial
Conditions

-.353*
(.205)
.258**
(.113)
1.714***
(.528)
-.124
(.092)
.024
(.023)
-.352**
(.148)
.001**
(.000)
.137*
(.070)
-.006
(.012)
.028
(.020)
-.001
(.004)

1.638***
(.508)
-.137
(.093)
.024
(.023)
-.355**
(.150)
.001**
(.000)
.132*
(.070)
-.006
(.012)
.029
(.020)
-.002
(.004)
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1.503***
(.473)
-.149*
(.090)
.025
(.022)
-.329**
(.148)
.001*
(.000)
.156**
(.071)
-.005
(.011)
.032
(.021)
-.002
(.004)

1.617***
(.459)
-.135
(.089)
.029
(.023)
-.352**
(.143)
.001*
(.000)
.143**
(.070)
-.006
(.012)
.027
(.021)
-.001
(.004)

Table 5.5 (continued)
Model 5.5a SAP
Total Number
of SAP
Conditions

Model 5.5b
SAP Structural
Conditions

Model 5.5c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

Model
5.5d SAP
Financial
Conditions

-.007*
-.007*
-.007*
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
.751***
.758***
.732**
(.290)
(.290)
(.290)
Years since last armed
.074
.066
.083
civil conflict onset
(.156)
(.156)
(.157)
IMF selection effects
-2.852***
-2.911***
-2.725
(1.043)
(1.048)
(1.007)
Constant
.079
.250
.272
(1.031)
(1.016)
(1.041)
N
969
969
969
2
71.28
77.12
69.91
Wald 
.000
.000
.000
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
0.257
0.259
0.245
Log pseudolikelihood
-135.318
-134.941
-137.435
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

-.007
(.004)
.734**
(.294)
.087
(.155)
-2.724***
(1.036)
.145
(.989)
969
64.89
.000
0.252
-136.274

Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter

Figure 5.2a: The Marginal Effect of the Total Number of SAP Economic Conditionalities
and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization
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Figure 5.2b: Marginal Effects of SAP Structural Conditionalities and the Onset of Armed
Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization

Figure 5.2c: Marginal Effects of SAP Financial Conditionalities and the Onset of Armed
Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization

when ethnic fractionalization is greater than 95%. In figure 5.2c, increases in the total
number of financial conditions decrease the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict
when ethnic fractionalization is greater than 75%.
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In all the models, the control variables population density, mountainous terrain and
oil exporting countries all increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset. Openness to
international trade consistently reduces the likelihood of armed civil conflict while GDP percapita reduces the likelihood for the onset of armed civil conflict in the model for Fiscal
conditions.
Table 5.5.1 presents the first difference of the interaction effect between SAP
conditions and ethnic fractionalization. In non-oil exporting countries, when ethnical
fractionalization is 0.48 (mean), the impact of SAP conditions (moving from minimum to
maximum value) on the onset of armed civil conflict is 5.7%. But the impact is reduced to
0.5% in countries with an ethnic fractionalization index of 0.9 (around the threshold
identified in Figure 5.2a). Overall, the percentage change of probabilities is -91% (from 0.057
to 0.005). In oil exporting countries, the reduction of probabilities is 93% (from 0.166 to
0.011). This is to say, the likelihood that SAP conditions in countries with an ethnic
fractionalization index of 0.9 have armed civil conflict onset is roughly 90% less than those
in average ethnically fractionalized countries.
Table 5.5.2 presents the first difference of the interactive impact between SAP
structural conditions and ethnic fractionalization. In non-oil exporting countries, the effect
of SAP structural conditions (moving from minimum to maximum value) on the onset of
armed civil conflict is 9.3% when ethnic fractionalization is 0.48 (mean). However, the effect
is decreased to 1.2% when ethnic fractionalization is 0.95 (around the threshold identified in
Figure 5.2b). As a whole, the percentage change of probabilities is 87% (from 0.093 to 0.012).
In oil exporting counties, the reduction of probabilities is 90% (from 0.234 to 0.023). This
means the effect of SAP structural conditions on the outbreak of armed civil conflict in
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highly ethnically fractionalized countries (with an index of 0.95) is about 90% less than those
in average ethnically fractionalized countries.

Table 5.5.1 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Conditions and
Ethnic Fractionalization on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit Model.
Model 5.5a
SAP Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.48
(mean)
.057

Model 5.5a SAP
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.48

Ethnic
.90
.90
Fractionalization
(threshold)
First Difference:
.005
.166
.011
SAP Conditions
First Difference
-91%
-93%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Conditions from its minimum to
maximum with Ethnic Fractionalization moving from its mean to its threshold while
holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at their
means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1 (the
right column).

Table 5.5.2 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Structural
Conditions and Ethnic Fractionalization on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage),
Probit Model.

Ethnic
Fractionalization
First Difference:
SAP Structural
Conditions

Model 5.5b
SAP Structural
Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.48
(mean)
.093

Model 5.5b SAP
Structural
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.48

.95
(threshold)
.012
.234

.95
.023

First Difference
-87%
-90%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Structural Conditions from its
minimum to maximum with Ethnic Fractionalization moving from its mean to its threshold
while holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at
their means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1
(the right column).
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Table 5.5.3 presents the first difference of the interaction effect between SAP
financial conditions and ethnic fractionalization. In non-oil exporting countries, the impact
of SAP financial conditions (moving from minimum to maximum value) on the onset of
armed civil conflict is 3.4% in ethnically fractionalized countries with an index of 0.48
(mean). But when ethnic fractionalization is 0.75 (around the threshold identified in Figure
5.2c), the impact is decreased to 0.4%. Overall the reduction of probabilities is 88% (from
0.034 to 0.004). In oil-exporting countries, the reduction of likelihoods is 85% (from 0.104
to 0.016). All of this means the impact of SAP financial conditions on the outbreak of armed
civil conflict in countries with an ethnic fractionalization index of 0.75 is about 90% less
than those in average ethnically fractionalized countries.

Table 5.5.3 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Financial
Conditions and Ethnic Fractionalization on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage),
Probit Model.
Model 5.5d
SAP Financial
Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.48
(mean)
.034

Model 5.5d SAP
Financial
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.48

Ethnic
.75
.75
Fractionalization
(threshold)
First Difference:
.004
.104
.016
SAP Structural
Conditions
First Difference
-88%
-85%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Financial Conditions from its
minimum to maximum with Ethnic Fractionalization moving from its mean to its threshold
while holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at
their means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1
(the right column).
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Given that the number of SAP conditions does not tell us precisely to what extent
the conditionalities are implemented, the statistical significance of most of the SAP
condition variables confirms the argument that partial implementation could still have
impact on recipient countries, though the effects of SAP conditions are less significant than
those of SAP implementation. More important, disaggregating the variable of SAP
conditionality gives us an opportunity to compare the effects of SAP policy in different areas.
While structural conditions and financial conditions have significant effects in recipient
countries, fiscal conditions are insignificant.
A possible explanation could be that implementing fiscal conditions brings about
higher political costs. Research shows that SAP implementation is strongly affected by
recipient governments’ political calculations. If the political costs of implementing certain
SAP policy are greater than the political benefits, recipient governments have strong
incentives of noncompliance (Akonor 2006). Fiscal conditions that focus on reducing
government debt and increasing government revenues (such as cutting expenditures and
raising tax rates) are most likely to be poorly implemented in borrowing countries. For
example, in the 1990s the Ghanaian government had great difficulty in implementing its
fiscal targets, but it had no problem of meeting the targets of financial conditionality
(Hutchful 2002, 216-217). Also, recipient governments only have limited resources to carry
out SAP policy. Compared to structural conditions which emphasize privatization and
deregulation and financial conditions which aim at reforming banks and interest rate system,
fiscal conditions may consume more resources and thus rank low in the governments’ order
of preference among all the areas of SAP policy.
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5.7 Bivariate Probit Estimates for the Alternative Measures
Using the alternate measure of SAP implementation, Table 5.6 presents bivariate
probit estimates that provide additional test of the hypothesis. Model 5.6a presents estimates
of the total number of conditions that recipient governments are expected to implement and
models 5.6b, 5.6c and 5.6d, respectively, present estimates for the number of Structural,
Fiscal and Financial conditionalities. Estimates for the first-stage equation - entering into an
IMF SAP loan agreement – is consistent with all the previous econometric models used in this
chapter. In all models GDP growth and openness to international trade reduce the
probability that governments will enter into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF. The
presence of armed civil conflict reduces the probability of entering into an SAP agreement in
models 5.6c and 5.6d, respectively. In all models, high levels of external debt, democracies
and governments with fractionalized legislatures are more likely to enter into an SAP
agreement with the IMF. All other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance.
With the exception of models 5.6c and 5.6d (fiscal and financial conditions),
estimates for the second-stage equation - the onset of armed civil conflict - are also consistent with
estimates produced by the two-stage (predicted values) probit model and supports the
hypothesis that is tested in this chapter. In all models, ethnic fractionalization (the
constituent element of the interaction term) increases the probability of armed civil conflict.
However, in models 5.6a and 5.6b, since the coefficients for the interaction terms - SAP
conditions*ethnic fractionalization and SAP structural conditions*ethnic fractionalization –
are statistically significant and negative, the increased effect diminishes as SAP conditions are
implemented. In all models, oil exporting and densely populated countries with mountainous
terrain increase the probability of armed civil conflict. And consistent with previous finding
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in this chapter, GDP growth increases the probability of armed civil conflict in only model
5.6d. In all models, openness to trade reduces the probability for armed civil conflict and
with the exception of model 5.6d; primary commodity exporting countries reduce the
probability of armed civil conflict. And again, in all models the Wald likelihood ratio test
indicates that the null hypothesis that the error terms for the first-stage and second-stage
equations are uncorrelated can be rejected. This suggests that estimating the data via the
bivariate probit model is appropriate to correct the endogenous relationship between
entering an SAP agreement and the onset of armed civil conflict.
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Table 5.6: Bivariate Probit Estimates: SAP Conditions and the Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization
Model 5.6a
Total
Number of
SAP
Conditions
The Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict
SAP conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP conditions

Model 5.6b
SAP
Structural
Conditions

Model 5.6c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

-.042*
(.024)
.026
(.017)

SAP structural
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP structural conditions

-.071*
(.042)
.047*
(.027)

SAP fiscal
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP fiscal conditions

-.154
(.101)
.048
(.067)

SAP financial
conditions*Ethnic
fractionalization
SAP financial conditions
Ethnic fractionalization
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared

Model 5.6d
SAP
Financial
Conditions

-.380
(.234)

1.816***
(.530)
-.102
(.088)
.036
(.022)
-.278*
(.150)
.001**
(.000)
.143**
(.069)
-.007
(.011)
.019
(.020)
-.001
(.004)

1.774***
(.515)
-.100
(.088)
.035
(.022)
-.276*
(.152)
.001***
(.000)
.140**
(.069)
-.007
(.011)
.018
(.020)
-.001
(.004)
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1.574***
(.481)
-.133
(.085)
.034
(.021)
-.278*
(.146)
.001**
(.000)
.148**
(.069)
-.007
(.011)
.023
(.019)
-.001
(.004)

.187
(.136)
1.720***
(.476)
-.102
(.086)
.038*
(.023)
-.276*
(.146)
.001**
(.000)
.152**
(.069)
-.007
(.011)
.019
(.020)
-.001
(.004)

Table 5.6 (continued)

Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter

Constant

Model 5.6a
Total
Number of
SAP
Conditions
-.007*
(.004)
.836***
(.284)

Model 5.6b
SAP
Structural
Conditions

Model 5.6c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

Model 5.6d
SAP
Financial
Conditions

-0.007*
(0.004)
.847***
(.285)

-.007*
(.004)
.843***
(.285)

-.007
(.004)
.819***
(.284)

-.731
(.980)

-.729
(.973)

-.306
(.981)

-.735
(.955)

Entering into an IMF SAP
Loan Agreement
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Inflation
External debt
Armed civil conflict
incidence
Democracy
Government political
constraints
Legislative
fractionalization
Constant
N
Log pseudo-likelihood
5.6a: Wald test of rho=0:
5.6b: Wald test of rho=0:
5.6c: Wald test of rho=0:
5.6d: Wald test of rho=0:

-.020*
(.012)
-.333***
(.109)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.274
(.174)
.024**
(.011)
-.094
(.320)
.445*
(.257)
-.128
(.499)
969
-503.243

 2 (1)
 2 (1)
 2 (1)
 2 (1)

-.021*
(.012)
-.330***
(.109)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.262
(.170)
.024**
(.011)
-.093
(.321)
.445*
(.258)
-.144
(.496)
969
-503.237
=4.540
=4.960
=5.028
=4.751

-.020*
(.012)
-.346***
(.110)
-.003
(.003)
.004***
(.001)
-.327*
(.181)
.024**
(.011)
-.107
(.320)
.444*
(.256)
-.056
(.505)
969
-503.414

-.020*
(.012)
-.338***
(.110)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.292*
(.176)
.024**
(.011)
-.091
(.320)
.437*
(.257)
-.099
(.501)
969
-503.321
=.033
=.026
=.025
=.029

Prob >  2
Prob >  2
Prob >  2
Prob >  2
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering over countries. Temporal dependence variables included in the analysis but not
reported.
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5.8 Main Findings Summation
After using different econometric estimators, the empirical findings in this chapter
consistently support the hypothesis that IMF SAPs reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil
conflict when they are implemented in polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic fractionalization.
The large-n empirical support for this hypothesis corroborates instances where the ethnically
induced legislative weakness of governments strengthens their bargaining position in SAP
negotiations with the IMF. These governments were then able to secure concessions on
both program conditions and program implementation, all of which served to reduce the
likelihood of armed civil conflict.
For example, Kenya’s ethnically fractionalized polity was an essential element in the
government’s ability to secure not only moderate SAP conditions during its 1980 to 1984
loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, but also considerable concessions when
it failed to implement many aspects of the program. Paul Mosley notes that the “dominance
of racial issues in economic policy making” (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991, 301) partly
explains the conditionality concessions that the Kenyan government received from the IMF
and the World Bank. In terms of trade liberalization, the Kenyan government was given a
‘free hand’ in the actual phasing of the liberalization process. In terms of agricultural pricing
policies, the SAP conditionalities required the government to set prices that were equivalent
to world prices. However, while the Kenyan government complied with this condition, it
had long been the policy of the government and so there was no meaningful stringency that
was attached to this condition (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991, 287-288).
Mosley concludes that Kenya is an example of a government that lacked the political
inclination to implement even mild SAP conditions and ultimately got away with a high level
of slippage in implementing program conditionalities. By the end of the adjustment period
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only four of the nine conditions had been fully implemented, two were partially
implemented and three were not. The World Bank estimated a slippage rate of 44%. This
rate of slippage is significant since the gravity of Kenya’s debt crisis and the country’s
difficulty in securing alternate sources of financing should have made the government
compliant with the cross-conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank (Mosley, Harrigan,
and Toye 1991, 289). However, given the fact that SAP negotiations took place under
domestic conditions of high levels of ethnic fractionalization, I argue that the Fund’s lending
to Kenya was motivated by its second-order institutional-political preference (Bartilow 1997),
which was to offer an SAP program that could both address and limit the contagious effect
of Kenya’s debt while sufficiently moderating the scope of SAP conditionalities to facilitate
ratification through the country’s ethnically fractured legislature. The nature of the IMF’s
institutional-political preference that shaped its lending practices towards the Kenyan
government explains why Kenya’s slippage in its program implementation went largely
unpunished (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991, 289), which consequently reduced the level
of economic deprivation, ethnic grievance and the probability of armed civil conflict.

5.9 Robustness Checks: SAP Years and Ethnicity
To further test the robustness of the hypothesis I also utilize the standard measure of
SAP implementation – the number of years that a country is under an IMF program as well
as an alternate measure of ethnic fractionalization, adopted from the Atlas Narodov Mira’s,
which was published by Soviet ethnographers in 1964. This measure relies on language to
define ethnic groups and at times included groups that were distinguished by race and
national origin (Fearon 2003, 196). I coded SAP years from IMF’s online country
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information and the MONA database (IMF 2013a, 2013b). The data of alternative
measurement of ethnic fractionalization is from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Table 5.7 presents estimates of the interactive effects of SAP years and the alternate
measure of ethnic fractionalization on the onset of armed civil conflict. The hypothesis is
again supported by the results. SAP years and ethnic fractionalization (both constitutive
elements of the interaction term) increase the probability of armed civil conflict onset. But
since the coefficient for the interaction term - SAP Years*ETHNICFRACAL – is
statistically significant and negative, the increased effects of the constitutive elements
diminish with the number of years that countries participate in an SAP under conditions of
ethnic fractionalization. Figure 5.3 graphs the marginal effect of the number of years that
countries are under an IMF SAP loan agreement on the onset of armed civil conflict. The
increased effect of the constituent elements declines as ethnic fractionalization increases.
Once the level of countries’ ethnic fractionalization surpasses 78%, increases in the number
of years that countries’ are under an SAP program decrease the probability for the onset of
armed civil conflict.
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Table 5.7: Second Stage of the Two-Stage (predicted values) Probit Estimates: SAP Years
and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization
SAP Years
SAP years*ETHNICFRACAL (alternative
-.188**
indicator of ethnic fractionalization)
(.085)
SAP years
.142***
(.052)
ETHNICFRACAL
1.616***
(.436)
GDP per capita (log)
-.075
(.113)
GDP growth
.020
(.026)
Trade openness (log)
-.426***
(.144)
Population density
.001*
(.000)
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
.083
(.055)
Regime durability
-.001
(.015)
Democracy
.024
(.022)
Democracy squared
-.002
(.004)
Primary commodity exports
-.005
(.004)
Oil exporter
.737**
(.318)
Years since last armed civil conflict onset
.018
(.161)
IMF selection effects
-2.759***
(1.061)
Constant
.199
(1.124)
N
1159
2
100.59
Wald 
.000
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
.253
Log pseudolikelihood
-160.828
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of SAP Years and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under
Conditions of Ethnic Fractionalization

5.10 Robustness Checks Summation
Regardless of the econometric models used to estimate the data or the incorporation
of alternate measurement specifications of the central explanatory variables the hypothesis
found repeated confirmation. Variation in SAP measurement did not produce different
effects for the onset of armed civil conflict. Instead such variation provided repeated
confirmation that under conditions of ethnic fractionalization the implementation of SAP
conditionalities reduces the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. On the whole,
SAPs in highly ethnically fractionalized countries are about one time less likely to have the
onset of armed civil conflict than those in average ethnically fractionalized countries.

Copyright © Yanyu Ke 2014
99

Chapter 6
IMF SAPs, Ethnic Dominance, and Armed Civil Conflict

6.1 Introduction
The empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter supports the hypothesis
that under conditions of ethnic fractionalization the implementation of IMF SAP loan
agreements reduces the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. This chapter
presents results that test the hypothesis: IMF SAPs increase the probability for the onset of armed
civil conflict when they are implemented in polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic dominance.
In discussing these results this chapter is similar to chapter 5 in its organizational structure.
One notable exception is that since estimates from the first of the two-stage (predicted
values) probit model have already been discussed in chapter 5 it is redundant to discuss them
again. Instead, the discussion of the empirical results will begin by discussing the results
form model’s second-stage, which predicts the onset of armed civil conflict.
6.2 Second-Stage Equation Estimates: Predicting the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
The second stage results for SAP implementation in ethnic dominant countries can
be found in Table 6.1. Column 6.1a presents the base model results without the financial
intervention of the IMF. Ethnic dominance reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of armed
civil conflict. The reason could be that the punishment cost of joining armed civil conflict is
relatively high in ethnically dominant countries. Moreover, GDP per-capita, openness to
international trade and primary commodity exporting countries also reduce the probability
for the onset of armed civil conflict. Densely populated countries and countries with
mountainous terrain and oil exporting countries increase the probability for the onset of
armed civil conflict. Not only are these results consistent with those reported in the previous
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Table 6.1: Second-Stage Estimates Predicting the Onset of Armed Civil conflict under
Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
Model 6.1a
Base Model

Model 6.1b
SAP Implementation
.086**
(.042)
-.033
(.028)
.073
(.536)
-.215**
(.096)
.025
(.022)
-.426***
(.152)
.000
(.000)
.114*
(.066)
-.006
(.012)
.035*
(.021)
.000
(.004)
-.006
(.004)
.793***
(.297)
-.045
(.144)
-2.949**
(1.094)
2.290**
(.917)
943
67.02

SAP implementation*
Ethnic dominance
SAP implementation
Ethnic dominance
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter
Years since last armed
civil conflict onset
IMF selection effects
Constant
N
Wald  2

-.733***
(.283)
-.231***
(.067)
.035**
(.017)
-.371***
(.119)
.000**
(.000)
.080*
(.045)
.007
(.004)
.016
(.014)
-.002
(.003)
-.010***
(.003)
.740***
(.227)
-.062
(.108)
2.176***
(.597)
1949
90.69

.000
.000
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
.183
.248
Log pseudolikelihood
-229.955
-135.997
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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chapter, but also they are consistent with those reported in the extant civil war literature
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005, 1998), which suggests that the study’s empirical
investigation rests on a robust statistical platform. All other variables fail to rise to the level
of statistical significance.
Column 6.1b presents the results of the IMF’s financial intervention in ethnic
dominant polities. The hypothesis is supported by the results. While SAP implementation
and ethnic dominance (the constitutive elements of the interaction term) fail to rise to the
level of statistical significance, the coefficient for the interaction term - SAP
implementation*Ethnic dominance – is statistically significant and positive.
Figure 6.1 graphs the marginal effect of SAP implementation on the onset of armed
civil conflict under conditions of ethnic dominance. Once the level of countries’ ethnic
dominance surpasses 38%, SAP implementation increases the probability for the onset of
armed civil conflict. The control variables GDP per capita, openness to international trade
and the IMF selection effect (the predicted value from entering into an IMF SAP loan
agreement) reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. Countries with
mountainous terrain and oil exporting countries increase the probability for the onset of
armed civil conflict. All other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance.
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Figure 6.1: Marginal Effect of SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil conflict
under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance

Table 6.1.1 presents the first difference of the interaction impact of SAP
implementation and ethnic dominance on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. Recall that
the impact of SAPs on the onset of armed civil conflict is conditional on the value of ethnic
dominance. I use the ethnic dominance index of 0.40 (around the threshold identified in
Figure 6.1) and its mean 0.64 to demonstrate the effect. In non-oil exporting countries, the
impact of SAP implementation (moving from minimum to maximum value) is 0.2% in
countries that ethnic dominance is 0.40. However, the SAP impact increases to 1.5% in
countries that ethnic dominance is 0.64 (mean). The increase of probability is 650% (from
0.002 to 0.015). In oil exporting countries, the increase of likelihoods is 757% (from 0.007 to
0.06). In other words, SAP implementation in average ethnically dominant countries is about
seven to eight times more likely to have the outbreak of armed civil conflict than SAPs in
countries that ethnic dominance is 0.40. Overall, the results confirm the hypothesis that IMF
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SAPs increase the probability of the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic dominance
increases.

Table 6.1.1 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Implementation
and Ethnic Dominance on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit Model.

Ethnic
Dominance

Model 6.1b SAP
Implementation
(oil exporter=0)
.40
.64
(threshold)
(mean)

Model 6.1b SAP
Implementation
(oil exporter=1)
.40

.64

First Difference: .002
.015
.007
.060
SAP
implementation
First Difference
650%
757%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Implementation from its minimum
to maximum with Ethnic Dominance moving from its threshold to its mean while holding
all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at their means’
product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1 (the right
column).

6.3 Estimates from the Bivariate Probit Model
In addressing the limitations of the two-stage (predicted values) model, I analyze the
data via a bivariate probit estimator. Table 6.2 presents the bivariate probit results for SAP
implementation on the onset of armed civil conflict under conditions of ethnic dominance.
The estimates for the equation - Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement - are also consistent
with those reported in the Two-Stage (predicted values) Probit model. GDP growth,
openness to international trade, and the presence of armed civil conflict reduce the
likelihood of entering into an IMF SAP loan agreement. External debt, democracies and
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Table 6.2: Bivariate Probit Estimates of SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
SAP Implementation
The Onset of Armed Civil Conflict
SAP implementation*Ethnic dominance

.074*
(.044)
-.052*
(.030)
-.039
(.589)
-.213**
(.092)
.039*
(.022)
-.366**
(.150)
.000
(.000)
.096
(.067)
-.006
(.011)
.032
(.020)
.000
(.004)
-.006
(.004)
.834***
(.279)
1.420
(.863)

SAP implementation
Ethnic dominance
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity exports
Oil exporter
Constant
Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement
GDP growth

-.035***
(.012)
-.249**
(.118)
-.001
(.000)
.003**
(.001)
-.383*
(.211)
.021*
(.011)

Trade openness (log)
Inflation
External debt
Armed civil conflict incidence
Democracy
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Table 6.2 (continued)
SAP Implementation
-.282
(.326)
.705**
(.284)
-.54
(.539)
943
-461.999

Government political constraints
Legislative fractionalization
Constant
N
Log pseudo-likelihood

 2 (1) = 4.246
Wald test of rho=0:
Probability >  2 = .039
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering over countries. Temporal dependence variables included in the analysis but not
reported.

countries with fractionalized legislatures increase the likelihood of entering an SAP
agreement. Estimates for the equation - the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict - support the
hypothesis. While SAP implementation (the constituent element of the interaction term)
reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict and ethnic dominance (the other
constituent element in the interaction term) is not statistically significant, the coefficient for
the interaction variable SAP implementation*Ethnic dominance is significant and positive. While
the control variables GDP growth and oil exporting countries increase the probability for
the onset of armed civil conflict; GDP per capita and openness to international trade reduce
the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. Since wealthy countries and countries
that are open to international trade flows reduce the probability for the outbreak of armed
civil conflict, these findings confirm relative deprivation theories of civil war (Macours 2006;
Runciman 1966). And similar to the results that are reported in the previous chapter, the
Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis that the error terms for the first and second stage
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equations are uncorrelated can be rejected. This suggests that entering into an IMF SAP loan
agreement is endogenous to the onset of armed civil conflict.

6.4 Estimates from the IV Probit Model
While the bivariate probit estimator has its advantages over the two-stage (predicted
values) probit model, estimates in the previous chapter showed that the variable – SAP
implementation – is endogenous with the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict. And as discussed in
chapter four, I address this problem by analyzing the data via an instrumental variable probit
estimator in which Government Corruption instruments for SAP implementation. Since the
predicted value from the first stage equation - Entering into an IMF SAP Loan Agreement - (the
variable IMF selection effect) is included in the model to account for endogeneity between
the onset of armed civil conflict and entering an SAP agreement, I employ the replicating
properties of the Jackknife procedure to produce efficient standard errors.
In table 6.3 the hypothesis that is tested in this chapter is again supported by the
estimates produced by the IV Probit model. SAP implementation (the constitutive element of
the interaction term) decreases the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict while
ethnic dominance (the other constituent element of the interaction term) increases the
likelihood for the onset of armed civil conflict. However, since the interaction term - SAP
implementation*ethnic dominance – is significant and positive, the decreased effect of SAP
implementation diminish with increasing levels of ethnic dominance. In both models most of
the control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. With the exception of
GDP per-capita and openness to international, which both reduce the probability for the
onset of armed civil conflict, all other control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical
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Table 6.3: IV Probit Estimates of SAP Implementation and the Onset of Armed Civil
Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
SAP Implementation
.529***
(.093)
-.366***
(.058)
5.513***
(1.337)
-.266**
(.083)
.021
(.017)
-.351**
(.171)
-.001
(.000)
.023
(.063)
.004
(.010)
.020
(.020)
-.001
(.003)
-.002
(.003)
.242
(.361)
-1.206
(1.260)
-1.206
(1.552)
943

SAP implementation* Ethnic dominance
SAP implementation
Ethnic dominance
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity exports
Oil exporter
IMF selection effect
Constant
N

 2 (1) = 3.51
Wald test of exogeneity:
Probability >  2 = .061
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. Temporal
dependence variables included in the analysis but not reported.
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significance. And again as in previous models, the Wald test of exogeneity of the
instrumented variable is statistically significant, indicating that the null hypothesis that there
is no endogeneity between SAP implementation and the onset of armed civil conflict can be
rejected.

6.5 Alternate Measures: Aggregating and Disaggregating SAP Conditionalities
In this section I test the hypothesis by using alternate measures of SAP
implementation. As in the previous chapter, I consider whether variation in the type of SAP
conditionality under ethnic dominance will reject the hypothesis or whether such variation or
alternate measurement specifications will have different effects on the onset of armed civil
conflict.
Table 6.4 presents estimates of the second-stage of the two-stage (predicted values)
probit model of the effects of SAP conditionalities on the probability for the onset of armed
civil conflict under conditions of ethnic dominance. Model 6.4a presents estimates for the
total number of SAP conditions that governments are expected to implement and models
6.4b, 6.4c and 6.4d, respectively, present estimates for the number of Structural, Fiscal and
Financial conditions that are attached to the IMF’s SAP loan agreements. And with the
exception of Fiscal conditions, the results support the hypothesis. In model 6.6a, while the
total number of SAP conditions (the constitutive element of the interaction term) fail to
reach statistical significance, ethnic dominance (the other constitutive element) decreases the
probability for the onset armed civil conflict. However, the coefficient for the interaction
term – Total Number of SAP Conditions*Ethnic Dominance – is statistically significant and
positive.
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Table 6.4: Second Stage of the Two-Stage (predicted values) Probit Estimates: SAP
Economic Conditions and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic
Dominance

SAP conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP conditions

Model 6.4a.
Total Number
of SAP
Conditions
.039*
(.021)
-.011
(.014)

Model 6.4b
SAP
Structural
Conditions

SAP structural
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP structural conditions

Model 6.4c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

.065*
(.038)
-.015
(.024)

SAP fiscal
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP fiscal conditions

.125
(.090)
-.061
(.062)

SAP financial
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP financial conditions
Ethnic dominance
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared

Model 6.4d
SAP
Financial
Conditions

.406*
(.209)

1.416***
(.493)
-.162*
(.091)
.022
(.022)
-.393***
(.149)
.001*
(.000)
.126*
(.068)
-.004
(.012)
.032
(.020)
-.001
(.004)
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-1.356***
(.481)

-1.178***
(.446)

-.185
(.156)
-1.341***
(.433)

-.173*
(.092)
.022
(.023)
-.397***
(.151)
.001*
(.000)
.121*
(.068)
-.004
(.012)
.033
(.020)
-.001
(.004)

-.187**
(.088)
.023
(.022)
-.366**
(.148)
.001
(.000)
.144**
(.069)
-.003
(.011)
.036
(.021)
-.002
(.004)

-.177**
(.088)
.027
(.023)
-.393***
(.145)
.001
(.000)
.129*
(.069)
-.004
(.012)
.032
(.021)
-.001
(.004)

Table 6.4 (continued)

Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter
Years since last armed
civil conflict onset
IMF selection effects
Constant
N
Wald  2

Model 6.4a.
Total Number
of SAP
Conditions
-.007*
(.004)
.775***
(.290)
.064
(.156)
-3.032***
(1.054)
2.355***
(.902)
969
69.25

Model 6.4b
SAP
Structural
Conditions
-.007*
(.004)
.783***
(.290)
.076
(.156)
-3.088***
(1.059)
2.444***
(.912)
969
76.46

Model 6.4c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions
-.007*
(.004)
.751***
(.291)
.074
(.157)
-2.879***
(1.017)
2.276***
(.877)
969
65.68

.000
.000
.000
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
0.246
0.249
0.234
Log pseudolikelihood
-137.225
-136.736
-139.433
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Model 6.4d
SAP
Financial
Conditions
-.007
(.004)
.741**
(.292)
.082
(.155)
-2.903***
(1.048)
2.361***
(.881)
969
62.07
.000
0.242
-137.935

A similar pattern is observed for Structural, and Financial conditionalities and is
demonstrated by the marginal effect of the various SAP conditions on the onset of armed
civil conflict as shown in figures 6.2a, 6.2b and 6.2c. In figure 6.2a, increases in the total
number of SAP conditions increase the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict when
ethnic dominance is greater than 30%. In figure 6.2b, increases in the total number of
structural conditions increase the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict when
ethnic dominance is greater than 25%. In figure 6.2c, increases in the total number of
financial conditions increase the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic
dominance is greater than 45%. In all the models, the control variables population density,
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mountainous terrain and oil exporting countries all increase the likelihood for the onset of
armed civil conflict. With the exception of model 6.4d, primary commodity exports and
openness to international trade consistently reduce the likelihood of armed civil conflict. In
all models, the IMF selection effects (predicted value from the first stage equation) reduce
the likelihood for the onset of armed civil conflict while GDP per capita reduces the
likelihood for the onset of armed civil conflict in the model for Fiscal conditions.

-.04

Marginal Effect of SAP conditions
on armed civil conflict onset
-.02
0
.02
.04

Figure 6.2a: The Marginal Effect of the Total Number of SAP Economic Conditionalities
and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
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Dashed lines give 90% confidence interval.
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Marginal Effect of SAP structural conditions
on armed civil conflict onset
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Figure 6.2b: Marginal Effects of SAP Structural Conditionalities and the Onset of Armed
Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
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Figure 6.2c: Marginal Effects of SAP Financial Conditionalities and the Onset of Armed
Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
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Table 6.4.1 presents the first difference of the interaction impact of SAP conditions
and ethnic dominance on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. In non-oil exporting countries,
the impact of SAP conditions (moving from minimum to maximum value) on the onset of
armed civil conflict is 0.7% in countries that ethnic dominance is 0.30 (around the threshold
identified in Figure 6.2a). When ethnic dominance is 0.64 (mean), the impact of SAP
conditions is increased to 5.2%. Overall the increase of probability is 643% (from 0.007 to
0.052). In oil exporting countries, the increase of probability is 680% (from 0.02 to 0.156).
That is to say, SAP conditions in average ethnically dominant countries are roughly six or
seven times more likely to have the onset of armed civil conflict than SAPs in countries that
ethnic dominance is 0.30.

Table 6.4.1 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Conditions and
Ethnic Dominance on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit Model.

Ethnic
Dominance

Model 6.4a
SAP Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.30
(threshold)

.64
(mean)

Model 6.4a SAP
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.30

.64

First Difference: .007
.052
.020
.156
SAP Conditions
First Difference
643%
680%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Conditions from its minimum to
maximum with Ethnic Dominance moving from its threshold to its mean while holding all
other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at their means’
product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1 (the right
column).
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Table 6.4.2 presents the first difference of the interaction impact between SAP
structural conditions and ethnic dominance on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. In nonoil exporting countries, the effect of SAP structural conditions (moving from minimum to
maximum value) on the onset of armed civil conflict is 1.4% in countries that ethnic
dominance is 0.25 (around the threshold identified in Figure 6.2b). When ethnic dominance
increases to its mean 0.64, the effect of SAP structural conditions is also increased to 8.3%.
As a whole, the increase of probabilities is 493% (from 0.014 to 0.083). In oil exporting
countries, the increase of probabilities is 567% (from 0.033 to 0.22). This means SAP
structural conditions in average ethnically dominant countries are roughly five or six times
more likely to have the outbreak of armed civil conflict than SAPs in countries that ethnic
dominance is 0.25.

Table 6.4.2 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Structural
Conditions and Ethnic Dominance on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit
Model.

Ethnic
Dominance

Model 6.4b
SAP Structural
Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.25
(threshold)

.64
(mean)

Model 6.4b SAP
Structural
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.25

.64

First Difference: .014
.083
.033
.220
SAP Structural
Conditions
First Difference
493%
567%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Structural Conditions from its
minimum to maximum with Ethnic Dominance moving from its threshold to its mean
while holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at
their means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1
(the right column).
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Table 6.4.3 presents the interaction effect between SAP financial conditions and
ethnic dominance on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. In non-oil exporting countries, the
impact of ethnic financial conditions (moving from minimum to maximum value) on armed
civil conflict onset is 0.6% in countries that ethnic dominance 0.45 (around the threshold
identified in Figure 6.2c). When ethnic dominance increases to 0.64 (mean), the impact of
SAP financial conditions is increased to 2.8%. Overall the increase of likelihoods is 367%
(from 0.006 to 0.028). In oil exporting countries, the increase of probability is 429% (from
0.017 to 0.09). That is to say, SAP financial conditions in average ethnically dominant
countries are about four times more likely to have the outbreak of armed civil conflict than
countries that ethnic dominance is 0.45.

Table 6.4.3 First Difference: the Impact of the Interaction between SAP Financial
Conditions and Ethnic Dominance on Armed Civil Conflict Onset (Second Stage), Probit
Model.

Ethnic
Dominance

Model 6.4d
SAP Financial
Conditions
(oil exporter=0)
.45
(threshold)

.64
(mean)

Model 6.4d SAP
Financial
Conditions
(oil exporter=1)
.45

.64

First Difference: .006
.028
.017
.090
SAP Financial
Conditions
First Difference
367%
429%
Change
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving SAP Financial Conditions from its
minimum to maximum with Ethnic Dominance moving from its threshold to its mean
while holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable is held at
their means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1
(the right column).
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In sum, SAP conditionalities, the partial measurement of SAP implementation, also
lead to significant impact on the outbreak of armed civil conflict in borrowing countries.
Moreover, the effects of SAP conditions vary in terms of structural, fiscal, and financial
policy. While most of SAP conditions have significant effects in ethnically dominant
countries, SAP fiscal conditions are not significant. This finding again confirms the effect of
SAP fiscal conditions in ethnically fractionalized countries. As I explain it in the previous
chapter, the possible reason could be that SAP fiscal policy, which is aimed at reducing debts
and increasing government revenues, is the most difficult to be implemented in recipient
countries. This implies that borrowing countries have to rank SAP conditionalities in order
of preference when they only have limited resources to carry out IMF policy.

6.6 Bivariate Probit Estimates for Alternative Measures
In Table 6.5 the bivariate probit model is used to test the hypothesis by considering
whether variations in SAP conditionalities, under conditions of ethnic dominance, will have
different effects on the onset of armed civil conflict. Model 6.5a presents estimates of the
total number of SAP conditions that recipient governments are expected to implement and
models 6.5b, 6.5c and 6.5d, respectively, present estimates for the total number of Structural,
Fiscal and Financial conditionalities.
Estimates for the first-stage equation - entering into an IMF SAP loan agreement – is
consistent with all the previous econometric models used in this chapter. In all models GDP
growth and openness to international trade reduce the probability that governments will
enter into an SAP loan agreement with the IMF. The presence of armed civil conflict
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Table 6.5: Bivariate Probit Estimates: SAP Economic Conditionalities and the Onset of
Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance
Model 6.5a
Total
Number of
SAP
Conditions
Armed Civil Conflict Onset
Equation
SAP conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP conditions

Model 6.5b
SAP
Structural
Conditions

Model 6.5c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

.039*
(.022)
-.021
(.015)

SAP structural
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP structural conditions

.066*
(.039)
-.031
(.026)

SAP fiscal
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP fiscal conditions

.129
(.103)
-.116
(.078)

SAP financial
conditions*Ethnic
dominance
SAP financial conditions
Ethnic dominance
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy

Model 6.5d
SAP Financial
Conditions

.415*
(.239)

-1.505***
(.492)
-.137
(.086)
.034
(.022)
-.315**
(.150)
.001**
(.000)
.131*
(.068)
-.005
(.011)
.021
(.020)

-1.481***
(.515)
-.134
(.087)
.034
(.022)
-.315**
(.152)
.001**
(.000)
.128*
(.067)
-.005
(.011)
.021
(.020)
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-1.253***
(.453)
-.167**
(.083)
.033
(.021)
-.311**
(.146)
.001*
(.000)
.135**
(.067)
-.005
(.011)
.026
(.019)

-.276
(.186)
-1.433***
(.447)
-.141*
(.085)
.036
(.022)
-.314**
(.148)
.001**
(.000)
.137**
(.068)
-.005
(.011)
.022
(.020)

Table 6.5 (continued)

Democracy squared
Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter
Constant
Entering an SAP Agreement
Equation
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Inflation
External debt
Armed civil conflict
incidence
Democracy
Government political
constraints
Legislative
fractionalization
Constant
N
Log pseudo-likelihood
6.5a: Wald test of rho=0:
6.5b: Wald test of rho=0:
6.5c: Wald test of rho=0:
6.5d: Wald test of rho=0:

Model 6.5a
Total
Number of
SAP
Conditions
-.001
(.004)
-.007*
(.004)
.865***
(.284)
1.607*
(.840)
-.020*
(.012)
-.334***
(.110)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.278
(.177)
.024**
(.011)
-.093
(.320)
.444*
(.258)
-.124
(.501)
969
-505.522

 2 (1)
 2 (1)
 2 (1)
 2 (1)

Model 6.5b
SAP
Structural
Conditions

Model 6.5c
SAP Fiscal
Conditions

Model 6.5d
SAP Financial
Conditions

-.001
(.004)
-0.008*
(0.004)
.877***
(.285)
1.572*
(.856)

-.001
(.004)
-.007*
(.004)
.871***
(.286)
1.720**
(.795)

-.001
(.004)
-.007*
(.004)
.834***
(.283)
1.551*
(.837)

-.020*
(.012)
-.331***
(.109)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.265
(.172)
.024**
(.011)
-.091
(.321)
.444*
(.258)
-.142
(.497)
969
-505.428
=4.456

-.020*
(.012)
-.348***
(.110)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.333*
(.184)
.024**
(.011)
-.106
(.319)
.442*
(.257)
-.048
(.507)
969
-505.659
Prob >  2

-.020*
(.012)
-.339***
(.110)
-.003
(.003)
.005***
(.001)
-.297*
(.179)
.024**
(.011)
-.090
(.320)
.435*
(.257)
-.094
(.503)
969
-505.307
=.035

=4.862

Prob >  2

=.028

=5.009

Prob >  2

=.025

=4.656

Prob >  2 =.031
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Temporal
dependence variables included in the analysis but not reported.
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reduces the probability of entering into an SAP agreement in models 6.5c and 6.5d,
respectively. In all models, high levels of external debt, democracies and governments with
fractionalized legislatures are more likely to enter into an SAP agreement with the IMF. All
other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance.
With the exception of model 6.5c (fiscal conditions), estimates for the second stage
equation - the onset of armed civil conflict - are also consistent with estimates produced by the
two-stage (predicted values) probit model and supports the hypothesis. In all models, ethnic
dominance (the constituent element of the interaction term) decreases the probability for the
onset of armed civil conflict. However, in models 6.5a, 6.5b, and 6.5d the coefficients for the
interaction terms – Total Number of SAP conditions*ethnic dominance, and SAP structural
conditions*ethnic dominance and SAP financial conditions*ethnic dominance – are
statistically significant and positive. In all models, oil exporting and densely populated
countries, and countries with mountainous terrain increase the probability of armed civil
conflict. Increases in GDP per-capita reduce the probability of armed civil conflict in models
6.5c and 6.5d, respectively. Again, these findings are consistent with those reported by
previous econometric models used in this chapter. As reported in the previous chapter the
Wald likelihood test, in all the models, indicates that the error terms for the first-stage and
second-stage equations are uncorrelated and therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected.
This again confirms that estimating the data via the bivariate probit model is appropriate to
correct endogeneity between entering an SAP agreement and the onset of armed civil
conflict.
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6.7 Main Findings Summation
Empirical evidence from different econometric estimators supports the hypothesis
that IMF SAPs increase the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict when they are implemented in
polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic dominance. To be sure, there are alternate
theoretical explanations of how IMF SAP loan agreements increase the likelihood for the
onset of armed civil conflict. Patronage-crisis explanations argue that the conditionalities that
are attached to IMF SAP loan agreements increase the probability of armed civil conflict
because they reduce recipient governments’ ability to pay patronage to their clients. In his
analysis of this phenomenon among Sub-Saharan African countries, Stedman (1996, 243)
argues that “economic conditionality cut at the heart of the patrimonial state.” Since SAP
austerity measures severely cut public sector spending, this results in the state’s inability to
provide side payments to their clients. Some scholars argue that IMF induced reductions in
patronage weakens the state, making it more vulnerable to political crisis due to its increased
inability to manage grievances that stem from the negative effects of SAP conditionalities
(Herbst 1990), which increases the probability of social unrest and armed civil conflict.
Other scholars argue that SAP conditionalities severely restrict the expansion of domestic
lines of credit, which limits patronage flows to government officials (Fearon 1988), which
undermines regimes’ internal support and weaken their ability to repel insurgent challengers.
The causal mechanism that links the reduction of state patronage to the onset of
armed civil conflict remains largely unclear. Is it the reduction of patronage to government
officials that triggers the probability for armed civil conflict? Or is it the reduction of
patronage to clients outside the state that increases the probability for armed civil conflict? If
the former were the case, then it is also plausible to expect that IMF conditionalities would
make recipient governments more transparent and therefore, reduce, not increase the
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probability of armed civil conflict. If the latter is the case, then the reduction of state
patronage means that more resources under the IMF program are available for private sector
investment, which is likely to increase per-capita income, an outcome that most likely
reduces the probability of armed civil conflict. Moreover, patronage-crisis explanations do
not account for variation across countries where civil war does not occur in state where IMF
SAP conditionalities reduce the size of the public sector.
The theory that is advanced in this study provides a stronger and empirically
supported explanation of the causal mechanisms under which the implementation of SAP
conditionalities will increase the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict in some
countries but not in others.

6.8 Robustness Checks: SAP Years and Ethnicity
The number of years that a country is under an IMF program and an alternate
measure of ethnic dominance is used to provide the robustness test of the hypothesis. I use
Fearon and Laitin (2003)’s ethno-linguistic data to calculate an alternate indicator for ethnic
dominance. The variable takes the value of 1 if one single ethnic-linguistic group comprises
55% of the population or greater.43 In Table 6.6, estimates for the second-stage equation
support the hypothesis. While ethnic dominance (the constitutive element of the interaction
term) decreases the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict and SAP Years (the
other constitutive element) is not statistical significant, the coefficient for the interaction
term - SAP Years*Ethnic Dominance – is statistically significant and positive. Figure 6.3
graphs the marginal effect of the number of years that countries are under IMF loan
programs on the onset of armed civil conflict for changing levels of ethnic dominance. Once
43

A similar approach is taken by Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
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the level of countries’ ethnic dominance surpasses 55%, increases in the number of years
that countries’ are under an SAP program increase the probability for the onset of armed
civil conflict. The control variables openness to international trade, the IMF selection effect
(the predicted value from the first stage equation) and primary commodity exporting
countries reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict. Oil-exporting countries
and countries with mountainous terrain increase the probability for the onset of armed civil
conflict. All other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance.
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Table 6.6: Second Stage of the Two-Stage (predicted values) Probit Estimates: SAP Years
and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under Conditions of Ethnic Dominance

SAP Years
.090*
(.046)
-.005
(.036)
-.609***
(.198)
-.133
(.090)
.014
(.021)
-.359**
(.142)
.001
(.000)
.099*
(.054)
-.003
(.011)
.029
(.018)
-.002
(.004)
-.007*
(.003)
.684***
(.256)
.013
(.130)
-3.365***
(1.028)
1.754**
(.872)
1159
88.12
.000

SAP years*Ethnic dominance (dummy)
SAP years
Ethnic dominance (dummy)
GDP per capita (log)
GDP growth
Trade openness (log)
Population density
Percent mountainous terrain (log)
Regime durability
Democracy
Democracy squared
Primary commodity exports
Oil exporter
Years since last armed civil conflict onset
IMF selection effects
Constant

N
Wald  2
Prob >  2
Pseudo R squared
.228
Log pseudolikelihood
-166.142
Note: * P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Temporal dependence variables included in the analysis but not reported.
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Figure 6.3: Marginal Effect of SAP Years and the Onset of Armed Civil Conflict under
Conditions of Ethnic Dominance

6.9 Robustness Checks Summation
This section considered whether the finding is robust enough to support the
hypothesis. Regardless of the econometric model used to estimate the data or including into
the alternate measurement specifications, the hypothesis found repeated confirmation. SAP
years did not produce different effects on the probability for the onset of armed civil conflict.
Instead the measurement of SAP years provided repeated confirmation that under
conditions of ethnic dominance the implementation of SAP policy increases the probability
for the onset of armed civil conflict. In non-oil exporting countries, SAP implementation in
countries with average ethnic dominance is seven times more likely to have the onset of
armed civil conflict than those in countries with low ethnic dominance. In oil-exporting
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countries, SAP implementation with average ethnic dominance is eight times more likely to
have the onset of armed civil conflict than those with low ethnic dominance. For SAP
conditions, the likelihood of having the onset of armed civil conflict in counties with average
ethnic dominance is four to seven times greater than in countries with low ethnic dominance.
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Chapter 7
Structural Adjustment Programs and Absence of Armed Civil Conflict
in A Highly Ethnically Fractionalized Country: Ghana

7.1 A Review of Theory and Introduction
The theory in Chapter 3 argues that the effect of SAP implementation on the
outbreak of armed civil conflict is conditional on the ethnic characteristics of borrowing
countries. From a two-level game perspective, the IMF is more likely to agree on less
stringent conditionality with ethnically fractionalized countries because these regimes have
relatively smaller win-sets with the Fund. It is more difficult for ethnically fractionalized
countries to reach consensus on economic reform because of the greater number of rent
seekers and the tendency to adopt sub-optimal public policies.
However, the weak domestic position of the recipient government resulted from
ethnic fractionalization grants it stronger bargaining position at the international level when
facing the IMF. When the Fund realizes that the ethnically fractionalized government will
have a hard time selling stringent conditionality to its domestic public, it has to adopt its
second-order preference to avoid no agreement. Thus the IMF could limit the contagious
effects of countries’ debt crisis and ensure the repayments of the debt. In so doing, the IMF
offers the borrowing country moderate conditionality for carrying out SAPs. Hence the
policy preferences of the IMF and the recipient government converge and the ethnically
fractionalized country will get less stringent conditionality. Furthermore, due to its weak
domestic position, the ethnically fractionalized government is more likely to implement the
conditionality across different ethnic groups so that the burden of austerity will be shared.
All of these reduce relative deprivation and the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset. This
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is the first hypothesis in Chapter 3: IMF SAPs reduce the probability for the onset of armed civil
conflict when they are implemented in polities that are characterized by high levels of ethnic fractionalization.
Quantitative analyses in Chapter 5 confirm the first hypothesis. This chapter
intends to deepen our understanding of the causal mechanism via using the method of
historical analyses to examine the ethnicity of Ghana and its structural adjustment programs
with the IMF. Due to its significant improvement on macroeconomic indicators, Ghana has
been a model country praised by the IMF since it entered into SAPs with the Fund and Bank
in 1983. Critics argue that Ghana’s economic performance is a result of huge inflow of
foreign aid (Boafo-Arthur 1999, 52).44 Nonetheless, with the average aid per capita ratio of
$35 in Africa (excluding Nigeria) in mind, Ghana’s aid per capita ratio was just $27.5 in 1987,
although it increased significantly from $13.3 in 1981 (Herbst 1993, 132).
As a highly ethnically fractionalized country, one thing that stands out for Ghana’s
SAP experience since 1983 is the absence of armed civil conflict. Ghana has been regarded
as one of the most peaceful countries in Africa (Ghana 2011a).45 To be sure, Ghana is not a
paradise in which all kinds of ethnic violence are absent. There have been inter- or intraethnic violence in Ghana, particularly in its northern region, if we define ethnic conflicts as
“people mobilise to fight other people on the basis of ethnic identity” (Sulemana 2009, 112).
However, the ethnic violence in the northern region dos not meet the criteria of armed civil
conflict defined in this study, in which one side involved in the conflict must be the
government of a state (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-619; Strand 2006). Most inter- or intraethnic violence in Ghana’s northern region are caused by issues of land ownership,
chieftaincy rivalry, or demanding adjudication rights due to the colonial legacy (Boaten 1999;

The total amount Ghana received from external donors between 1983 to 1998 was around $8
billion (Appiah-Opoku 1998).
45 Ghana ranked 42 out of 153 countries in the 2011 Global Peace Initiative (Ghana 2011a).
44
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Jonsson 2007, 2009; Sulemana 2009).46 Those regional conflicts did not translate into armed
civil conflicts against the government (Jonsson 2009).
Specifically, Ghana avoids armed ethnic conflict when it began to implement SAPs
in the 1980s and started the democratic transition in the early 1990s (Asante and GyimahBoadi 2004). As aforementioned, ethnic rivalry and tensions, which can be intensified by
SAPs, do exist in Ghana (Adekanye 1995). For example, in the 1950s the independence
movement in Ghana was organized along different ethnic groups (Agyeman-Duah 1987).
And there has been irredentist tendency among the Ewe people, who have also been in
constant rivalry with the Ashanti (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). There have been clashes
between Kokomba farmers, Gonja people, and the Dagomba as well (Frimpong 1994;
Adekanye 1995, 364).47 However, Ghana has been successful in steering clear of armed civil
conflict during the implementation of SAPs and the process of democratization. The
absence of armed civil conflict in a highly ethnically fractionalization country implementing
SAPs makes Ghana a good case for the historical analysis.
In the following sections the study demonstrates that the highly ethnic
fractionalization in Ghana leads to the situation that the government always has to seek
other ethnic groups as alliance (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). That makes the
government relatively weak at the domestic level. Hence the government was able to gain
concessions from the Fund when negotiating SAP conditionality at the international level by
using the argument of avoiding possible domestic instability (Kraus 1991a; Martin 1991). On
the other hand, while the Fund’s first order preference is to offer the recipient governments
financing with stringent conditionality, it has learnt Ghana’s domestic hostility toward the
For example, the Dagbon conflict in 2002 was caused by intra-Dagbon rivalry for chieftaincy
(IRIN 2006).
47 The clash over land in 1994 was so severe that the Ghanaian government had to use army to
restore order (Adekanye 1995, 364).
46
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Fund from past experience during which Ghanaian government had to abort IMF programs
as a result of domestic opposition (Hutchful 2002). Therefore the Fund adopted its secondorder preference of avoiding no agreement and limiting contagious effect of debt crisis and
reached agreement with Ghanaian government on less stringent conditionality. Moreover,
the structural adjustment programs affect all the ethnic groups in Ghana. In other words, the
government implemented SAPs in a way that all the ethnic groups shared the burden of
SAPs. The government also set up some programs, such as the Programme of Actions to
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), as an attempt to reduce negative
effects of SAPs. Thus relative deprivation was relatively low. As a result there was no direct
ethnic grievance against the government (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
Given that the quantitative analyses cover the time period of 1992-2009, the
historical analysis of Ghana focuses on the 1980s, particularly for its entering structural
adjustment programs in 1983. I choose to emphasize Ghana in the 1980s due to the
following factors. First, the entrance into SAPs with IFIs in the 1980s marks a turning point
in Ghana’s experience of dealing with IFIs, compared to its aborted SAP attempts before
1983. The SAP negotiations in this period represent the origin of Ghana’s SAPs in later years,
and they paved the way for negotiating SAPs with IFIs after Ghana began the democratic
transition in 1992. Actually Ghana’s track record of implementing SAPs in the 1980s
strongly influences the IMF’s attitudes toward SAPs with Ghana in the 1990s and 2000s
(Akonor 2006). Hence this time period provides better illustration of the two-level game
metaphor in explaining the negotiations between Ghanaian government and the IMF.
Second, Ghana became a democratic regime from 1992, but Rawlings and his party won
two elections in 1992 and 1996 until they were defeated in 2000 (Akonor 2006). Although
technocratic interests had to submit to democratic interests in the process, financial
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technocrats from the old regime still dominated until the late 1990s (Hutchful 2002). This
assures the continuation of policy attitudes on both sides.
Third, the fact that the Rawlings government in the 1980s was an authoritarian
regime does not undermine the illustrative strength of the time period of 1980s. As the
theory in this research indicates, the Rawlings government in the 1980s could use its
domestic weakness, the ethnic fractionalization, to gain bargaining advantage at the
international level when negotiating with the IMF. When Ghana moved to democracy,
Ghanaian government should have more bargaining advantages at the international level due
to its democratic restraints at the domestic level. For instance, in 1997, Rawlings’s answer to
the question of program slippage, which was raised by the Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF, was simply “democracy” (Hutchful 2002, 218). In other words, democratic restraints
increase rather than decrease the theoretic power of ethnic fractionalization in a two-level
game. Fourth, Ghana had SAPs with both the IMF and the World Bank. Before 1986 the
Fund provided roughly 60% of the loans Ghana received, comparing to 14% given by the
Bank (Herbst 1993). It was the Fund’s opinion that dominated in the 1980s. And from late
1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank’s advice gained more weight (Martin 1991; Herbst
1993). Since this research examines the effect of IMF SAPs, focusing on the 1980s during
which the Fund dominates in the loan arrangement would be more appropriate for the
analysis.
In the following sections I first review the historical background of Ghana and its
ethnical composition. Then I examine IMF SAPs and ethnicity in Ghana from a two-level
game perspective. Given that theory suggested in this research is not the only factor which
could influence the onset of armed civil conflict, I also explore alternative explanations
suggested by the competing theoretical camp, the symbolic politics theory, which focuses on
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the role of factors like ethnic myths, ethnic hatred, and chauvinistic mobilizations. While
there have been ethnic myths and hatred existing between some ethnic groups, chauvinistic
mobilizations are generally absent because the government’s rhetoric has been ethnic
inclusiveness instead of ethnic discrimination. Rather than undermining the strength of this
study’s theory, the symbolic politics theory enhances our understanding of ethnic situations
in Ghana.

7.2 Historical Overview and Ethnicity in Ghana
Ghana, the country located in West Africa, has a population around 25 million in
2013 (CIA 2013). 48 The multi-ethnic Ghana gained independence from Britain in 1957
(Herbst 1993). Distorted colonial economy and continuous mismanagement in economy
policy since the independence led post-colonial Ghana to frequent military interventions in
civilian governments and deep economic crisis in the late 1970s (Rothchild 1991; Herbst
1993; Hutchful 2002). Table 7.1 shows political regimes in Ghana from 1957 to 1993, which
was characterized by three republics and five military regimes (Agyeman-Duah 1987; Berry
1994; Brydon and Legge 1996; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 1999). Since 1993 Ghana began the process
of democratization and entered into the Fourth Republic.
The years following independence was the First Republic led by Nkrumah. The
Nkrumah government adopted the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy to
achieve modernization (Hutchful 2002). The state’s intervention in the economy steadily
increased since the government applied import restrictions and overvalued its currency to
deal with foreign exchange crisis in 1961 (Herbst 1993). The ISI strategy and state-led
modernization failed to bring about economic growth in Ghana. Worse, domestic economic
Note that the population of Ghana was around 14 million in late 1980s (Ninsin 1991), and
increased to 20 million in year 2000 (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

48
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policy employed by three civilian governments and the corruption of military regimes were
to blame for the continuous decline of economic performance (Herbst 1993; Brydon and
Legge 1996; Hutchful 2002). For instance, GDP capita was reduced by 19.7% from 1970 to
1980 (Hutchful 2002). The average annual decline of real GDP per capita from 1976 to 1982
was 3.4% (Herbst 1993). Cocoa exports, which is the main export of Ghana, dropped by
40% from 1975 to 1981. The main culprit for this reduction of cocoa exports, despite
increasing cocoa world prices, was Ghana’s overvalued currency, which decreased Ghana’s
share of global cocoa market by 12% in the decade of the 1970s (Herbst 1993). At the same
time, all the major manufacturing and agricultural production declined sharply (Hutchful
2002, 6).
Table 7.1 Political Regimes from 1957 to 1993 in Ghana
Political Regimes
Independence
First Republic: Nkrumah Regime
The National Liberation Council (military regime)
Second Republic: Busia Years
The National Redemption Council (military regime)
Supreme Military Council
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Third Republic: Limann Years

Years
1957
1960-February 1966
1966-1969
1969-1971
1972-1975
1975-1979
June1979-September 1979
September 1979-December
1981
Rawlings Era
1982-January 1993
Source: Adapted from Berry (1994): Ghana: A Country Study.

It is noteworthy that Ghana’s economy at the time of independence was one of the
best performers in Africa. Its GDP per capita in 1957 was equivalent to that of South Korea.
But after the mismanagement of economic policy for more than twenty years, Ghana
dropped to a middle-ranking economy in Africa in 1982 (Herbst 1993). It was against this
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background that Flight Lieutenant Jerry Johan Rawlings seized power through the second
coup in December 31, 1981 and formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)
as the government center. The PNDC led by Rawlings started SAPs with the IMF since
1983 and continued the programs for the 1980s until Ghana began the democratic transition
and Rawlings was democratically elected again in 1993. Before I examine the PNDC and
IMF SAPs, it is necessary to briefly discuss the ethnicity in Ghana in order to gain a better
understanding of Ghanaian domestic politics.

Ethnicity in Ghana
Ghana is a highly ethnically fractionalized country with an ELF index of 0.85.49 Table
7.2 shows the ethnic composition in Ghana. It is noteworthy that although the Akan is the
largest ethnic group with a population percentage of 49.1%, it comprises of 19 sub-ethnic
groups with 14 of them having population percentage lower than 2%. Asante is the largest
sub-ethnic group in Ghana, with a population percentage of 14.8%. Actually it is the fact
that no single sub-ethnic group in Ghana exceeds 15% makes Ghana’s ethnicity highly
fractionalized (Gyimah-Boadi and Asante 2003; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The
problem for the Akan is that all of its sub-ethnic groups are not ethnically cohesive. As a
result of ethnic rivalry, many of Akan’s sub-ethnic groups usually side with non-Akan ethnic
groups in domestic politics, other than allied with the Asante, which is the largest among the

49

The alternative index of ethnic fractionalization gives Ghana an index of 0.71.
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Table 7.2 Ethnic Composition in Ghana
Ethnic
Groups
Akan

Sub-Ethnic Groups

Population

49.10%
Asante
Fante
Boron/Bono/Brong/Banda
Akyem
Akwapim
The other 14 groups with percentage
lower than 2%

14.80%
9.90%
4.60%
3.40%
2.90%
13.50%

Mole
Dagbani

16.50%
Dagomba
Dagarte (Dagaba)
Namnam (Nandom)
Kusasi
The other six groups with percentage
lower than 2%

4.30%
3.70%
2.40%
2.20%
3.90%

Ewe
Ga
Adangbe

Guan

Percentage

12.70%
8%
Adangbe
Ga
Ga-Dangme, not specified
With eighteen groups each lower than
2%

4.30%
3.40%
0.30%
4.40%

Gurma

3.90%
Kokomba
The other six groups with percentage
lower than 2%
With six groups each lower than 2%
With four groups each lower than 1%

2.70%
1.20%

Grusi
2.80%
Mande1.10%
Busanga
Others
1.50%
Source: Adapted from Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004): Ethnic Structure, Inequality and
Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana. Based on the 2000 census.
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Akan (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). For example, there has been historical tension
between the Asante and the second largest sub-ethnic group of the Akan, the Fante. The
two groups belonged to two empires in the 18th century (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
Hence one important feature of Ghanaian domestic politics is that no government can rule
without seeking other ethnic/sub-ethnic groups as alliance. For example, Hilla Limann’s
People’s National Party (PNP) won the 1979 presidential election because of “the party’s
ability to project itself as national party” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 64). The crossethnic coalitions in domestic politics are flexible and often shift in patterns (Ofuatey-Kodjoe
1999; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The languages of Ghana, as a reflection of its ethnic
fractionalization, are divided into ten sub-groups (Vehnamaki 1999). Although the people
who can speak Akan constitute a little bit over 50% of the population (Kropp-Dakubu 1988),
the real situation is more complicated give that there are more than 100 dialects in Ghana
(Vehnamaki 1999).50
It is noteworthy that demographic changes could affect the outbreak of civil conflict,
especially when the population growth is unequal between different ethnic or religious
groups (Goldstone 2002). For example, one factor contributing to the onset of Lebanese
civil war in 1975 was that Shia’s population grew faster than Sunnis and Maronites in the
preceding years, which broke the balance of power between different groups (Pape and
Feldman 2010, 197). Table 7.2.1 presents the changes of ethnic compositions in Ghana from
1960 to 2010. Given that there were no ethnic data published in Ghana’s 1970 and 1984
censuses (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004), the table presents major ethnic groups’
population percentages in 1960, 2000, and 2010 respectively. Ghana’s population grew from

Besides ethnic and language groups, the religious groups in Ghana are composed of Christians
(69%), Muslims (16%), and Animists. Many of Christians are the Akan and they live mostly in the
Southern Ghana. There are a lot of Muslims living in the North (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

50
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6,726,815 in 1960 to 24,223,431 in 2010. The population growth rates between 1970 and
2000 were from 2.4% to 2.7% (Ghana 2011b). Of the nine major ethnic groups, Akan and
Gurma grew a bit faster than other groups, while Ga Adangbe’s population percentage
decreased.

Table 7.2.1 Changes of Ethnic Compositions in Ghana (1960—2010)
Ethnic Groups
Akan
Mole Dagbani
Ewe
Ga Adangbe
Guan
Gurma
Grusi
Mande-Busanga
Others

Population
1960
44.1%
15.9%
13%
8.3%
3.7%
3.5%
2.2%
/
/

2000
49.10%
16.50%
12.70%
8%
4.40%
3.90%
2.80%
1.10%
1.50%

Percentages
2010
47.5%
16.6%
13.9%
7.4%
3.7%
5.7%
2.5%
1.1%
1.6%

Total Population
6,726,815
18,912,079
24,223,431
Source: Adapted from Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004): Ethnic Structure, Inequality and
Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana. Based on Ghana’s 1960 and 2000 censuses. And
from Ghana’s 2010 census (Ghana 2012).

Geography also makes some regions associated with certain ethnic groups, which
intensifies the sense of ethnic rivalry. Research shows the importance of how different
ethnicities are geographically dispersed. Ethnicity geography, or the geographical
concentration of ethnic groups could be linked to civil conflict and violence (Horowitz 1985;
Young 2002; Toft 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2011; Bhavnani and Choi 2012; Christin and Hug
2012). Figure 7.1 shows the ten administrative regions of Ghana. Figure 7.2 demonstrates
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the ethnic distribution. There are 28.7% of the Akan and 29.1% of the Mande-Busanga
living in the Ashanti region, 57.3% of the Ga-Adangbe in the Greater Accra region, 47.2%
of the Ewe in the Volta region, 55.8% of the Gurma and 31.5% of the Mole-Dagbani in the
Northern region, 27.2% of the Mande-Busanga in the Upper East region, 20.5% of Grusi in
the Upper West, 18.9% of Guan in the Eastern region, 16.2% of Akan in the Western and
14.1% of them in the Central region, and 10.9% of Gurma in the Brong-Ahafo, (Asante and
Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Because nearly half of the Ewe live in the Volta region, which shares
the border and common history under the UN Trusteeship with Togo, there is irredentist
tendency among the Ewe (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Economically speaking, the
southern part of Ghana is more developed than the northern part. All of which play a role in
Rawlings’ PNDC government and IMF SAPs. To which I turn the next section.

7.3 SAPs and Ethnicity: A Two-Level Game
The Rawlings Coup: Prelude to the SAPs with the IMF
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings came to power through the coup in December 31 1981. It
was the second coup Rawlings launched within two years. In June 1979 Rawlings led a coup
overthrowing the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and sentenced several leaders of the SMC
to death in the name of fighting corruption. However, Rawlings expressed no interest in
staying in power at that time and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) he
formed lasted only three months until September when the democratically elected Hilla
Limann took over from him (Herbst 1993; Berry 1994). The economic situation under the
Limann government did not get better. For example, cocoa exports, the pillar of Ghana’s
foreign exchange revenue, fell by 21% from 1979 to 1981/1982. The mineral production
index dropped by 8% from 1980 to 1981.The real producer price index declined by 33%
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from 1979 to 1981 (Kraus 1991a). As a matter of fact, Ghana’s economy was in the collapse
when Rawlings seized power via his second coup.
Given the grave economic crisis Rawlings and his PNDC military government had to
face, it was no wonder that the PNDC government’s rhetoric at the beginning was marked
by populism. It was the political populism and neo-Marxist ideology of the PNDC that
gained support from workers, college students, and left-wing intellectuals (Rothchild 1991;
Herbst 1993). During 1982, the PNDC government launched campaigns against corrupted
elites and adopted dependency theory to make economic policy (Gyimah-Boadi and
Rothchild 1982; Ahiakpor 1985; Chazan 1991). However, as the populist mobilization and
call for self-reliance did not improve the economy, Rawlings had to turn to pragmatism to
solve Ghana’s economic crisis (Rothchild 1991). During several national speeches in the late
1982 Rawlings repeatedly emphasized the dire economic situation of Ghana and implied the
need to change (Hutchful 2002). Finally, after an attempt to seek financial aid from the
Soviet Union failed, the PNDC government expelled the anti-IMF left camp and went to the
IMF (Hutchful 2002).

The SAP Negotiations and Ethnicity: The Game at Level I and II
The purge of anti-IMF radicals left the PNDC with only one member from the
north of the country. The ethnic composition of the PNDC after additions and departures
of members was five Akans and three Ewes (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The Akans is
not a homogenous ethnic group and its sub-ethnic groups often ally with non-Akans. For
example, the Asantes and the Fontes, the two largest sub-ethnic groups of the Akans, always
vote in different ways in elections due to their historical rivalry (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi
2004). Given the ethnic fractionalization among the Akans and Rawlings’ half-Ewe
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background,51 the PNDC was perceived as a Ewe-Volta-region-based government (Herbst
1993; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Therefore Rawlings’ base of support was narrow
either in terms of ethnic composition or political ideology (Herbst 1993).
Moreover, the PNDC members held no united attitudes towards SAPs and made
“contradictory statements” on negotiating with the IMF (Hutchful 2002, 37). The
disadvantage of Rawlings government, that was, its narrow base of support at Level II (the
domestic level), gave the PNDC bargaining advantage at Level I (the international level)
when it negotiated with the IMF. Ghanaian officials spoke of possible political instability
which may be resulted from severe SAP conditionality when they negotiated with the IMF
(Martin 1991, 239). And IMF officials acknowledged that IMF residents in Ghana had to
respond to Ghanaian officials’ requirement to be “more sensitive to social and institutional
constraints” (Hutchful 2002, 152). The Fund also noticed the pressure the government must
face from the history of Ghana’s failed attempts to carry out IMF programs. Thus the Fund
had to adopt its second-order preference to grant Ghana some concessions. As a result the
PNDC government got less stringent conditionality from the Fund (Kraus 1991a, 1991b;
Martin 1991). It is no wonder that “Ghana’s negotiators……were lauded for their
negotiating skills and their courage in ‘facing down’ the IMF (Hutchful 2002, 39).

The Negotiations
When the PNDC understood the futility of its populist measures to rescue its
economy and there were no feasible alternatives for financial assistance, it turned to the
BWIs to attract aid dollars. The PNDC’s Economic Advisory Committee prepared the
negotiations with proposals which included measures such as devaluation, increasing price of
51

Rawlings is half Ewe and “allegedly half Scottish (MRG 2007).
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cocoa, cutting government deficits, removing some subsidies, and charging fees for
education and health care (Kraus 1991a, 125). However, there were disputes between the
Fund and the PNDC when the IMF prepared the letter of intent. The Fund disregarded the
data provided by Ghana and came up with its own estimates on financial and fiscal figures in
late 1982 and early 1983 (Martin 1991). Of seven areas in disagreement, the Fund and the
PNDC each won in two areas. The disputes in the remaining three areas were solved by
improved economic performance in later years.
First, in the areas of removing subsidies and liberalizing trade, although the PNDC
government did not want to see price increase dramatically, the Fund preferred increasing
prices of fertilizer, gasoline, and consumer goods. The PNDC government finally
succumbed and removed subsidies gradually. In later negotiations, the government also
agreed on the liberalization of trade (Martin 1991).
Second, in the areas of exchange rate and monetary policy, while the Fund insisted
on tight credit ceilings in order to bring down inflation, the PNDC feared that stringent
policy would cause harm on private sectors. Moreover, the PNDC preferred an auction
mechanism for gradual devaluations (Martin 1991). The PNDC at last gained concessions
from the Fund in both areas by establishing an auction mechanism for devaluation and
getting relaxed monetary targets. Although the reasons contributing to the Fund’s
concessions partly lie on the Bank’s allying with the PNDC on certain issues, PNDC’s
argument for stability played an important role. For example, the PNDC argued that
stringent austerity policies would result in political instability in Ghana (Martin 1991, 239).
Given the domestic perception of the PNDC as a Ewe-based government and the highly
ethnic fractionalization in Ghana, the government with a narrow base of support would
definitely draw ferocious oppositions to negotiating SAP conditionality with the Fund. The
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PNDC members did not hold a united position on how to solve Ghana’s economic crisis.
While the technocrats sympathized with the IMF policy, the left-wing members hated the
intervention of BWIs in Ghana’s economic activity (Hutchful 2002). The unpopularity of
IMF conditionality resulted in an attempted coup in mid-1983 opposing Rawlings’ SAP
program with the IMF (Hansen 1987).
The IMF also learned the lessons from Ghana’s failed attempts to implementing the
Fund’s programs in the past. There were three attempts to devaluate Ghana Cedi in 1966,
1971, and 1978 respectively. The result of the 1966 devaluation was that the National
Liberation Council (NLC) led by military officers had to suspend its program with the IMF
after massive domestic protests. The 1971 devaluation and privatization policy led to the
overthrow of the second republic, the Busia government, by the army in the following year.
Then the military regime SMC again abandoned the devaluation policy in 1978 due to fierce
domestic oppositions (Herbst 1993; Boafo-Arthur 1999; Hutchful 2002). PNDC’s domestic
weakness gave it a strong bargaining position at Level II. The IMF had to adopt its secondorder preference of sponsoring SAPs with less stringent conditionality and containing the
contagious effect of economic crisis. Actually a success story of borrowing countries
implementing SAPs is in BWIs’ interest (Boafo-Arthur 1999).
The PNDC and the Fund also disagreed about privatizing state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), cutting budget deficits, and reducing imports. The PNDC did not accept the Fund’s
requirements of privatization, lower budget deficits, and cutting import levels until Ghana’s
economy improved in late 1980s (Martin 1991). Therefore the conditionality Ghana received
for its SAP with the IMF in 1983 was moderate. The Fund generally got 90%-95% of its
planned targets agreed with recipient governments in sub-Saharan African countries for its
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SAPs. By contrast, the proportion of agreed quantitative targets in Ghana’s SAPs was just
80%-85% (Martin 1991, 239).

The Convergence of Win-Sets: Agreement on SAPs
In 1983 the PNDC and the IMF reached agreement on the Economic Recovery
Program (ERP), which was later a part of Ghana’s structural adjustment programs. It is
noteworthy the conditions for this SAP were less than twenty (Martin 1991). From the
perspective of the Rawlings government, it was a “victory” that the PNDC managed to turn
its domestic weakness into bargaining strength when facing the IMF and gained concessions
(Annobil 1983; Hutchful 2002, 39). Besides the World Bank assistance of 65 million, Ghana
got the IMF loan of 359 million special drawing rights (SDR), which was added by a pending
inflow of further 120 million SDR (Rothchild 1991, 7). In addition, the Fund brought
strong financial and technical expertise to support Rawlings government’s programs (Kraus
1991b, 34).
The aim of the ERP, i.e. SAP, was to increase manufacturing productivity and
exports in order to achieve economic development (Rothchild 1991).The adjustment policies
included in the agreement were: reforming exchange rates via devaluation; increasing interest
rates to boost savings; imposing credit ceilings to fight inflation; raising prices of crops and
cocoa to strengthen agricultural output; improving transportation infrastructure; expanding
energy resources, and so on (Agyeman-Duah 1987; Kraus 1991b). Of all the adjustment
measures, the key element and the most difficult part was the exchange rate reform via
devaluation (Herbst 1993; Bello, Cunningham, and Rau 1999). Domestic opposition aside,
from 1983 on, Ghana has been under SAPs with the Fund and the Bank. Table 7.3 from
Martin (1991, 236) summarizes Ghana’s SAPs between 1983 and 1990 with the IMF. Within
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eight years of the 1980s, there were three Stand-by Agreements (SBAs) amounting to 500.3
million SDR, one Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the amount of 245.4 million SDR, one
Structural Adjustment Facility of 129.86 million SDR, and one Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility with a total of 368.1 million SDR. In the negotiations for the following
SAPs in the 1980s, Rawlings’ PNDC government was quite good at convincing the Fund to
“tailor conditions to national circumstances” (Martin 1991, 250). For example, the PNDC
managed to redesign the rules of foreign exchange auction and devaluate the currency at a
controlled gradual pace to reduce the negative impact. Although there were bitterness and
“adjustment fatigue” among PNDC officials when program slippage in 1986 led the Fund to
suspend the program loan disbursement, the Fund’s preference was to have the SAPs with
the PNDC implemented instead of aborted (Martin 1991, 249; Herbst 1993).
Table 7.3 IMF SAPs from 1983 to 1990 in Ghana
IMF SAPs

Years

Amount
(special drawing rights,
in million)
Stand-by Agreement
1983-1984
238.50
Stand-by Agreement
1984-1986
180.00
Stand-by Agreement
1986-1987
81.80
Extended Fund Facility
1987-1990
245.40
Structural Adjustment Facility
1987-1990
129.86
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
1988-1990
368.10
Sources: Martin (1991): Negotiating Adjustment and External Finance: Ghana and the
International Community, 1982-1989. See its Table 13.1 on page 236.

The Implementation of SAPs in Ghana
With the implementation of SAPs Ghana’s economic performance based on
macroeconomic indicators did improve. But there were a wide range of ensuing negative
effects on socioeconomic areas such as health and education. Given the ethnic
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fractionalization in Ghana and the narrow base of Rawlings’ government, all ethnic groups
in Ghana shared the burden of SAP negative impact. Although grievance resulted from SAP
implementation was pervasive, there was no direct ethnic hatred based on relative
deprivation against the government. Ethnic tensions could be high during some time, but
armed ethnic conflict aiming to overthrow the government was absent when the PNDC
implemented SAPs.
Ghana’s economy under IMF SAPs was a success story in terms of macroeconomic
indicators (Gibbon 1992) . For instance, exports were doubled in 1985 (Agyeman-Duah
1987). GDP grew around between 5% and 6% from 1984 to 1991. Inflation was tamed and
declined by 90% between the early 1980s and 1991 (Boachie-Danquah 1992; KonaduAgyemang 2000). Agricultural production increased by 3.6% and industrial output increased
by 10.3% in 1988. Domestic savings increased by 36% from 1987 to 1988. The budget was
balanced in 1986 and there was BOP surplus in 1987 (Rothchild 1991).
Macroeconomic improvement aside, the implementation of SAPs in Ghana led to
negative socioeconomic impact. The increase of minimum wage lagged far behind the extent
of devaluation (Agyeman-Duah 1987). Fees for social services such as primary health care
and school books were introduced or raised (Weissman 1990). There were increases of 150%
for water fees, 365% for postal tariffs, 1000% for electricity from 1983 to 1984 (Herbst 1991,
177). SAPs hit the urban poor particularly hard (Chazan 1991). With the cost of living rising
dramatically, around 50000-60000 workers were laid off when the PNDC government
carried out the civil service reform (Kraus 1991a; Bello, Cunningham, and Rau 1999). The
economy gained growth at the expense of uneven income distribution (Weissman 1990;
Chazan 1991; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). For example, 94% of gross cocoa income was
concentrated in one third of cocoa farmers, compared to two thirds of cocoa farmers who
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only received 6% of the income (Weissman 1990). The structural adjustment programs also
imposed the burden on external debt as its ratio to GDP increased by nearly 60% from 1980
to 1995 (Konadu-Agyemang 2000).
However, the Rawlings government implemented the SAPs in a manner that all
ethnic groups shared the burden of SAP costs. All groups in Ghana were affected by the
austerity measures (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Recall that the PNDC was perceived as
a Ewe-based regime. Nearly half of the Ewes live in the Volta region, but there was no
evidence that the Volta region was less affected by SAPs. More important, the IMF SAPs
focused on increasing cocoa exports, which without doubt benefited cocoa farmers (Chazan
1991). This means the main beneficiary of SAP cocoa policy is the Akans because nearly one
third of them live in the Ashanti region which grows most of cocoa in Ghana (Herbst 1993).
This is particularly important in terms of ethnic politics given that the rivalry between the
Ewes and the Asantes is consistently present in Ghanaian domestic politics (Asante and
Gyimah-Boadi 2004).52
Since one of SAP objectives was to improve primary commodity exports, regions in
the south that produce cocoa, timber, and minerals, such as the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo,
Accra, and Western regions, arguably benefited more from SAPs than historically
underdeveloped Northern, Upper West, and Upper East regions (Songsore 2001; Asante
and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). In other words, there were spatial disparities under SAPs
(Konadu-Agyemang 2000; Hutchful 2002). For the regional distribution of ethnic groups,
55.8% of the Gurma live in the Northern region, 27.2% of the Mande-Busanga live in the
Upper East region, and 20.5% of the Grusi live in the Upper West region. Nonetheless, the
population percentages for the Gurma, Grusi, and Mande-Bsuanga are only 3.9%, 2.8%, and
An example of the Asante vs Ewe rivalry is the Busia (who is an Asante) government dismissed all
but one senior Ewe officers in the Army (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
52
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1.1% respectively. The ethnic dimension of spatial disparities under SAPs may be more
salient for the Mole-Dagbani because they contribute to 16.5% of the population and 31.5%
of them live in the Northern region, 22% of them in the Upper East region, and 14.4% of
them in the Upper West region (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
In order to reduce spatial disparities and negative impact of SAPs, the Rawlings
government, which had a narrow base of support and needed alliance due to Ghana’s ethnic
fractionalization, launched the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1987 (Ninsin 1991; Rothchild 1991; Herbst 1993; Boafo-Arthur
1999; Hutchful 2002; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The PAMSCAD was aimed at
compensating the disadvantageous groups for SAP negative effects through projects related
to community service, employment assistance, and basic social services (Hutchful 2002).
Although there were criticisms of tight funding and unsatisfactory implementation due to
bureaucratic problems for the PAMSCAD (Ninsin 1991; Rothchild 1991; Hutchful 2002), it
is still noteworthy that with 84 million dollars committed to the PAMSCAD, the disadvanted
groups in the Northern and Upper East/West regions were the

targeted groups for

government assistance to address their grievances under SAPs (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi
2004). In addition, the Rawlings government introduced the Public Investment Programme
(PIP) which also intended to alleviate the grievances of the Northern and Upper East/West
regions by focusing on employment generation (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). One
compensation, for example, was to extend the electricity grid from Brong-Ahafo in the south
to the north (Anyemadu 1993; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Effective or not, the
Rawlings government at least sent a clear signal through these programs to the
disadvantageous groups that the government was responsive to their grievances and made

149

attempts to compensate them for their loss under SAPs either in a direct way or through
indirect spillover effects (Herbst 1993; Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
Furthermore, the narrow base of support forced the Rawlings government to adopt
flexible strategy in the implementation of SAPs. Changing the rule of the auction mechanism
for foreign exchange is an example of flexible implementation (Martin 1991). The PNDC
government also managed to implement SAPs at a gradual pace to mitigate fierce domestic
oppositions. With the implementation rate ranging between 55% and 63% (Toye 1992;
Haggard and Webb 1993; Vehnamaki 1999), the PNDC government did not lay off civil
servants until 1986 (Kraus 1991a). The dismissal of 29052 public-sector workers in 1989 was
also far below the IMF target of 45000 (Kraus 1991a). All of these explain the absence of
armed civil conflict in Ghana when the government implemented SAPs.

7.4 Alternative Explanations
The historical analysis of Ghana shows the domestic weakness resulted from highly
ethnic fractionalization gave the PNDC government the bargaining advantage to gain
concessions when it negotiated with the IMF on SAP conditionality and avoid armed
conflict when it implemented IMF SAPs. While the theory in this research belongs to the
rational choice school which focuses on the role of incomplete information, bargaining
issues, opportunity costs, and economic grievances or greed in influencing armed civil
conflict, the symbolic politics theory that represents the competing theoretical camp, i.e.
constructivism, emphasizes the impact of emotional motivations (Young 1979; Horowitz
1985; Kaufman 2001, 2006a). The symbolic politics theory argues that a few factors are
necessary and sufficient for the onset of armed civil conflict, which are ethnic myths, ethnic
fear, ethnic hatred, mobilization opportunity, security dilemma, and chauvinistic
150

mobilizations (Kaufman 2001, 2006a, 2006b; Grigorian and Kaufman 2007). Of all the
factors, ethnic myths are used to justify ethnic hatred. And symbols are employed in mass
mobilizations by serving as “emotionally charged shorthand reference to a myth” (Kaufman
2001, 16). From the perspective of the symbolic politics theory, ethnic myths, fear, and
hatred do exist between some ethnic groups in Ghana. Nevertheless, the opportunities of
chauvinistic mobilizations against the government are not usually present because Ghanaian
governments’ official rhetoric has been ethnic inclusiveness instead of institutional
discrimination.

Ethnic Myths, Fear, and Hatred
Most of inter- or intra-ethnic violence is concentrated in Ghana’s northern region,
which is sparsely inhabited by 17-20 ethnic groups (Pul 2003; Jonsson 2009; Sulemana 2009).
Ethnic stereotype, fear, and hatred did exist at least for four major ethnic groups in the
northern region: the Konkomba, Dagomba, Gonja, and Nanumba. The root of ethnic hatred
among these groups lies in the colonial policy of classifying ethnic groups in the north by
chieftaincy. The British colonial government regarded ethnic groups with hierarchical
structures superior to ethnic groups without chiefdom. 53 Hence ethnic groups without
chiefdom, such as the Konkomba, “were put under the jurisdiction and administration of
chiefly groups”, like the Dagomba, Gonja, Nanumba, and Mamprusi (Jonsson 2009, 509). In
order to govern the northern region by indirect rule, the colonial authority appointed the
chiefs as government officials from 1932 (Jonsson 2007). To make things worse, ethnic
groups without chiefdom were called minorities and chiefly groups called majorities,
regardless of the fact that the “minority group”, the Konkomba, had more population than
Ethnic groups without centralized political structures generally respect the role of their spiritual
figures (Jonsson 2007).
53
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“majority groups” such as the Gonja, Nanumba, and Mamprusi (Brukum 2002; Jonsson
2009).
Ethnic discrimination against “minorities” could be seen in the ethnic stereotype
held by chiefly groups which describes “minorities” as “slave” or “people with tails”
(Jonsson 2009, 515). The Konkomba traditionally lived in the eastern region of the north,
which was once British Togoland. Thus chiefly groups viewed the Konkomba as alien
(Jonsson 2007, 2009). The ethnic myth held by chiefly groups was that the Konkomba were
criminals from Togo finding a safe haven in Ghana (Boaten 1999). The myth of the
Konkomba as invaders and outsiders was demonstrated in leaflets in 1993 which forged the
Konkomba’s independence claims for “western Togoland” (Jonsson 2009, 514). For the
Konkomba, most of them are relatively affluent yam farmers (Boaten 1999). Their hatred
toward the chiefly groups was represented by the ethnic stereotype that the chiefly groups
were lazy but gained material benefits by taxing the Konkomba (Sulemana 2009). By contrast,
the ethnic stereotype held by the chiefly groups was that the Konkomba were landless
people since they were “invaders” (Jonsson 2007, 2009).

Chauvinistic Mobilization
Ethnic myths and hatred aside, the necessary factor of chauvinistic mobilizations for
the symbolic politics theory was not present given that the government’s rhetoric has been
ethnic inclusiveness. Thus the regional inter-ethnic hatred did not translate into mobilization
against the government. Certainly ethnic mobilization exists in Ghana’s politics. However,
note that Ghana is a highly ethnically fractionalized country. In order to win in national
politics, political parties always have to build multi-ethnic coalitions (Asante and GyimahBoadi 2004). Successive Ghanaian governments’ official rhetoric has been ethnic
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inclusiveness instead of institutional discrimination against certain ethnic groups. Beginning
from the first republic, the Nkrumah government prohibited political parties from
organizing along ethnic groups. In the second republic, the Busia government attempted to
ethnically manipulate the army by removing most of the Ewe officers. It was quickly
criticized as a “tribal government” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 73). The third republic
gained lessons from the second republic’s ethnic policy and had to balance the ethnoregional composition of its government. For the Rawlings government, the official rhetoric
of its populist revolution was social justice for all the people (Chazan 1991). There may be a
gap between official rhetoric and reality. However, the Rawlings government did attempt to
address the poverty of the north by establishing institutions to encourage direct political
participation in local affairs’ decision-making process. The PNDC government also
improved the infrastructure programs in the north (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 121122). More important, unlike Rwanda’s Hutu government which excluded its minority (the
Tutsi) from working in the public sector, the official principle for employment in the civil
service in Ghana, for example under the PNDC government, has been meritocracy rather
than institutionalized discrimination. Hence for both the government and ethnic groups in
the north, chauvinistic mobilizations against each other were not present.

7.5 Summation
The historical analysis of Ghana’s structural adjustment programs in the 1980s
shows that in a highly ethnically fractionalized country like Ghana, the government could
turn its domestic weakness resulted from ethnic fractionalization into bargaining advantage
at the international level when it negotiated SAPs with the IMF. Consequently the
government would gain concessions from the Fund and get relatively mild conditionality.
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Given the ethnic fractionalization Ghana’s ruling government had to seek alliance from
other ethnic groups. The government’s narrow base of support forced the government to
implement IMF SAPs in a manner that all ethnic groups shared the burden of austerity
policy. Furthermore, the government had to adopt flexible strategy to implement SAPs
gradually. Thus there was no direct ethnic grievance towards the government as a result of
SAP implementation. Certainly the role of ethnic fractionalization, bargaining issues, and
economic grievances from a two-level game perspective are not the only factors explaining
the absence of armed civil conflict when Ghana implemented SAPs. The symbolic politics
theory provides explanations from another perspective. While ethnic myths and hatred
existed between some ethnic groups in Ghana’s northern region, chauvinistic mobilizations
against the government were absent because the government’s rhetoric and policy have
focused on ethnic inclusiveness instead of institutionalized discrimination against certain
ethnic groups. Rather than undermining the theoretical strength of this study, the symbolic
politics theory enhances our understanding of armed civil conflict and Ghana’s ethnic
politics.
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Chapter 8
Structural Adjustment Programs and Armed Civil Conflict
in A Highly Ethnically-Dominant Country: Rwanda

8.1 A Review of Theory and Introduction
The theory in Chapter 3 argues that SAP effects on the outbreak of armed civil
conflict vary with recipient countries’ ethnic characteristics. In Chapter 7 I use Ghana as an
example to examine SAP effects on armed civil conflict in ethnically fractionalized countries.
While SAPs decrease the probability of armed civil conflict onset in highly ethnically
fractionalized countries, they impose positive impact on armed civil conflict in countries
characterized by high levels of ethnic dominance. Ethnically dominant countries are strong
at the domestic level and thus have larger win sets. The domestic strength of borrowing
governments weakens their bargaining position at the international level. The IMF is more
likely to insist on stringent conditionality to realize its first-order preference and satisfy its
constituency of international creditors. On the other hand, the borrowing governments
characterized by high levels of ethnic dominance are more likely to accept the stringent
conditionality and put the burden of implementing austerity measures disproportionately on
the shoulder of ethnic minorities. Hence the second hypothesis argues that IMF SAPs
increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset in countries with high levels of ethnic
dominance.
Quantitative models employed in Chapter 6 confirm the second hypothesis. In this
chapter I examine SAPs in Rwanda and the outbreak of armed civil conflict. As a Hutudominant country since its independence in 1962, Rwanda had been a model country in the
eyes of western development community until civil war broke out in 1990 and culminated in
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the genocide of 1994 (Uvin 1998, 46). However, Rwanda’s relatively well-managed economy
faced great challenges in the late 1980s due to food shortage and sharp declines in world
coffee prices. To solve the agricultural and economic crises, Rwanda had to enter into SAP
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank for financial assistance. Consistent with the
prediction of the theory, the Hutu-dominant government that was generally viewed as strong
and effective possessed a weak bargaining position at the international level. The
negotiations were “long and difficult” (Cart 1995, 475; Uvin 1998, 57). As a result, the
austerity measures Rwanda had to implement were really harsh.
In June 1990 Rwanda agreed to SAP conditionality imposed by the IMF and the
Bank and civil war broke out in October. Although the timing of civil war did not fully line
up with SAP implementation (the SAP conditions were not finalized and implemented until
November 1990), the fact that the rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), launched
the attack right after the government negotiated SAPs with the BWIs shows that entering
into SAPs sends a signal of debilitating government and could trigger armed civil conflict. In
other words, entering into SAPs in some cases is sufficient to lead to armed civil conflict in
recipient countries. The theory may underestimate SAP impact on armed civil conflict in
ethnically dominant countries. In the following sections I first review the historical
background of Rwanda and its ethnic politics. Then I examine SAPs and ethnicity in Rwanda
from a two-level game perspective. To fully investigate reasons contributing to the onset of
civil war, I also explore competing factors suggested by symbolic politics theory in explaining
ethnic war.
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8.2 Historical Overview and Ethnicity in Rwanda
Rwanda is “the land of thousand hills” (Waller 1993, 3).54 As a landlocked country in
central Africa, an area of 26,338 square kilometers and a population of 7 million in the early
1990s made Rwanda one of the most densely populated countries in Africa (Storey 1999;
Prunier 1995; Uvin 1998; Storey 2001).55 The land has been inhabited by three ethnic groups:
the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa (pygmy). In 2013 the World Factbook of CIA estimated
the Hutu comprise 84% of the population, the Tutsi 15%, and the Twa 1% (CIA 2013).
Note that the Rwandan government did not publish ethnic information in its 2002 census
after the 1994 genocide (Verpoorten 2005). Table 8.1 presents the changes of ethnic
compositions of Rwanda from 1978 to 1991. The population of Rwanda increased from
4,819,317 in 1978 to 7,099,844 in 1991. The annual growth rate of population was 3% from
1985 to 1990, which put a lot of pressure on environmental scarcity (Percival and HomerDixon 1996). As Table 8.1 indicates, the Hutu’s population percentage increased from 90%
in 1978 to 91.1% in 1991, while the Tutsi’s share decreased from 9.5% in 1978 to 8.4% in
1991. However, the Tutsi population may have been under-reported in the 1991 census
(Prunier 1995; Verpoorten 2005). First, some Tutsi self-identified as Hutu in the census to
avoid discrimination and persecution. Second, the Habyarimana government was allegedly
manipulative of the ethnic information to maintain a low quota for Tutsi’s public service and
school enrollment (Prunier 1995, 264; Verpoorten 2005, 332). Scholars’ estimation for
Tutsi’s population percentage was 12% in April 1994, in contrast to the official figure of 9%
(Prunier 1995, 264).

54
55

Most of the hills range from 4900 to 6500 feet (Uvin 1998, 185).
The population is around 12 million in 2013 (CIA 2013).
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Table 8.1 Changes of Ethnic Compositions of Rwanda, 1978-1991
Ethnic Groups

Percentage
Distribution
1978
1991
Hutu
90%
91.1%
Tutsi
9.5%
8.4%
Twa and Others
0.5%
0.5%
Total Population
4,819,317
7,099,844
Source: Adapted from U.S. Bureau of Census (1980, 125), Verpoorten (2005, 335), and
King (2013, 87).

As aforementioned, ethnicity geography has an impact on armed civil conflict. The
geographic concentration of ethnic groups is linked to civil conflict and violence (Horowitz
1985; Young 2002; Toft 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2011; Bhavnani and Choi 2012; Christin
and Hug 2012). For the two main ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Hut and Tutsi, there are
generally no regions exclusively inhabited by one ethnic group. In other words, the Hutu and
Tutsi are neighbors (Destexhe 1995; Akresh, Verwimp, and Bundervoet 2011, 785). Figure
8.1 shows the administrative regions of Rwanda in the 1990s. There were twelve provinces
before the Rwandan government reorganized them into five administrative regions after the
genocide. Table 8.2 presents the regional population distribution by ethnicity in 1991. Of the
eleven provinces presented in the table, only three provinces had a Tutsi population below
3%. All of the three provinces, Byumba, Gisenyi, and Ruhengeri, were located in the north
and northwest of the country. The population percentages of Tutsi in the three provinces
were 1.5% in Byumba province, 2.9% in Gisenyi province, and 0.5% in Ruhengeri province
respectively.
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Table 8.2 Regional Population Distribution by Ethnicity in Rwanda in 1991
Prefecture

Percentage
Distribution
Total Population
Hutu
Tutsi
Twa
Others
Butare
82.0
17.3
0.7
0.0
753,868
Byumba
98.2
1.5
0.2
0.0
775,935
Cyangugu
88.7
10.5
0.5
0.3
551,565
Gikongoro
86.3
12.8
0.8
0.1
465,814
Gisenyi
96.8
2.9
0.3
0.1
731,996
Gitarama
90.2
9.2
0.6
0.1
848,027
Kibungo
92.0
7.7
0.2
0.1
648,912
Kibuye
84.8
14.8
0.4
0.0
469,494
Rural Kigali
90.8
8.8
0.4
0.1
905,632
City Kigali
81.4
17.9
0.3
0.4
221,806
Ruhengeri
99.0
0.5
0.4
0.1
766,795
Total
91.1
8.4
0.4
0.1
7,099,844
Source: Verpoorten (2005, 335). See its Table 1 on page 335, based on Census of Rwanda
1991.

There is no academic consensus on the origins of the two major ethnic groups
Hutu and Tutsi, but the general understanding is that the Hutu arrived in Rwanda first and
the Tutsi may come from Ethiopia or northern Africa afterwards (Newbury 1988; Mullen
1995; Pottier 1995; Prunier 1995; Mamdani 1996; Hintjens 1999; Storey 1999).56 Despite the
difference in arrival time, the Hutu and the Tutsi speak the same language and share similar
cultural traditions (Destexhe 1995; Prunier 1995; Van Hoyweghen 2000; Pottier 2002; Storey
2012). Interethnic marriages are also common in Rwanda (Destexhe 1995; Prunier 1995).57
Table 8.3 shows political regimes from the eighteenth century to 1994 in Rwanda.
In the eighteenth century a Tutsi kingdom expanded its territory to include most part of
It seems the earliest group that arrived in the land of Rwanda is the forest inhabitants , the Twa
(Pottier 2002, 12).
57 Generally children born to interethnic marriages will be identified with their fathers’ ethnic group
(Destexhe 1995).
56
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Rwandan land. Nonetheless, some small Hutu kingdoms still remained in the northwest and
southwest of Rwanda until European colonists arrived in the late nineteenth century (Prunier
1995). German colonists ruled Rwanda from the late 1890s, but German impact on
Rwanda’s political life was negligible because they did not make any important plans
regarding Rwanda’s economic and political development (Mwakikagile 2012). During World
War I Belgium took over from Germany in Rwanda. The Belgian colonization began in 1916
and ended in 1962 when Rwanda finally gained independence (Prunier 1995; Hintjens 1999).

Table 8.3 Political Regimes from 1700s to 1994 in Rwanda
Political Regimes
The Tutsi Kingdom
German Colonization
Belgian Colonization (Tutsification)
Independence
First Republic (Hutu President Kayibanda)
Second Republic (Hutu President Habyarimana)
Sources: Waller (1993); Prunier (1995); Mwakikagile (2012).

Years
1700s – 1890s
1890s -1916
1916-1962
July 1 1962
1962-1973
July 1973 – April 1994

Belgian rule imposed the most significant impact on Rwanda’s ethnic politics given
that the colonial government adopted a “divide-and-rule” strategy resulted from racial
identification, which favored the Tutsi over the Hutu. Belgian colonists viewed the Tutsi
superior to the Hutu and the government policy was discriminated against the Hutu. During
the Belgian colonization political power was concentrated in hands of Tutsi elites (Prunier
1995; Mwakikagile 2012). From 1926 to 1933 the colonial government started to issue
identification cards based on racist stereotypes which regarded the physical features of Tutsi
as “tall, thin” and Hutu as “shorter and stockier” (Prunier 1995; Hintjens 1999; Pottier 2002;
Kaufman 2006b; Mwakikagile 2012). It is noteworthy that the physical differences between
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the Hutu and the Tutsi were artificially made and the ethnic distinction reflected social class
divisions (the Tutsi raising cattle and the Hutu farming the land) instead of racial differences
(Destexhe 1995; Prunier 1995; Hintjens 1999). As a matter of fact, Belgians had to adopt
personal property rather than physical differences as the criteria to issue identification cards
because it was too difficult to identify the Tutsi from the Hutu solely based on physical
features. People who owned more than ten head of cattle were categorized as the Tutsi
(Hintjens 1999; Barnett 2002).
Belgian ethnic policy broke the ethnic political balance maintained under the Tutsi
kingdom in which district chiefs were always one Hutu (responsible for farming), one Tutsi
(responsible for collecting taxes on cattle), and one army chief assigned by the king (Pottier
2002). The ethnic labels and institutional discrimination against the Hutu imposed by the
colonial government greatly heightened inter-ethnic tensions and hatred. Ethnic issues had
become increasingly salient in Rwandan political and economic life (Newbury 1998). Then
during the late 1950s’ independence movement in Rwanda, Belgium began to support the
Hutu at the expense of the Tutsi. Two reasons contributed to the change of policy in the
colonial government. First, racist ideology was no longer popular among the post-war
Belgian political officials. Second, the Tutsi elites supported pan-Africanism which was
viewed as anti-Western ideology in the Cold War (Waller 1993). Thus in the following
independence elections, the Hutu won as the majority of the population.
The independence elections from 1959 to 1962 were accompanied by inter-ethnic
killings and sent 600,000-700,000 Tutsi refugees into neighboring countries (Andersen 2000).
The first republic led by President Kayibanda claimed its legitimacy based on majority rule
and promoted a Hutu-ruling rhetoric. The Tutsi were institutionally discriminated against
under the new regime. For example, the Tutsi were not allowed to work in the government
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and their number of entering into higher education was tightly restricted (Prunier 1995;
Newbury 1998; Uvin 1998; Storey 1999). The Kayibanda years were characterized by
authoritarianism and corruption. In July 1973 the army chief Habyarimana launched a coup
d’état to depose Kayibanda. Since then Rwanda entered into the period of the second
republic led by Habyarimana until his assassination in 1994 (Waller 1993; Prunier 1995).

8.3 SAPs and Ethnicity: A Two-Level Game
The Habyarimana Years: Prelude to the SAPs
Unlike Kayibanda who was from the south of Rwanda, Habyarimana came from
northern Rwanda and relied on “Akazu” (meaning little house), a ruling clique formed by
relatives of Habyarimana’s wife, to manage the government. Since most of the “Akazu”
members were from northern Rwanda, the regime derived its legitimacy from historical
Hutu kingdoms in this region (Uvin 1998; Gasana et al. 1999; Hintjens 1999; Storey 2001).
The Habyarimana years before mid-1980s were regarded as stable and peaceful (Prunier
1995). Habyarimana attempted to reduce ethnic tensions by loosely implementing
Kayibanda’s discrimination policy (Newbury 1998). The Tutsi still faced official
discrimination in public sectors,58 but they can succeed in private sectors as long as they did
not “mess around with politics” (Prunier 1995, 74; Newbury 1998).
Moreover, Rwanda’s economic performance under the Habyarimana regime before
the mid-1980s was generally good compared to most African countries (Uvin 1998). It was
called “Switzerland of Africa” (Hintjens 1999, 244). The inflation in the late 1970s and early
The official discrimination against the Tutsi under the Habyarimana regime can be demonstrated
with the following facts: in the public sector, there were only one Tutsi officer in the army and one
Tutsi cabinet member. Also, only 2.9% of Parliament members were Tutsi (Prunier 1995, 75).
58
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1980s was controlled below 4% (Chossudovsky 1996). Its GDP per capita grew at an annual
2% rate in the 1970s and its average GDP per capita throughout the 1980s was USD317 (at
1995 dollars) (Ndikumana 2001). It is noteworthy that Rwanda’s GDP per capita in the mid1980s was as the same level as China’s (Prunier 1995, 78).
However, after the mid-1980s Rwanda witnessed an economic downturn. From
1985 to 1992, the real world price of coffee decreased by 72% (Storey 1999). Given that
coffee was farmed by 70% of Rwanda’s peasants and contributed to more than 80% of
Rwanda’s foreign exchange revenues, the collapse in world coffee price dealt a huge blow to
Rwanda’s economy. Its foreign exchange earnings decreased by 50% and its external debts
increased twice in the late 1980s (Chossudovsky 1996; Woodward 1996; Andersen 2000). In
1980 foreign debts constituted only 6% of Rwanda’s GNP. In 1990 due to the impact of
coffee crisis it increased to 32% (Uvin 1998). The Habyarimana government was unable to
pay farmers at previous coffee prices. As a result, farmers’ earnings decreased by 20%,
though the coffee production increased by 40% in the late 1980s (Waller 1993; Andersen
2000).
The dramatic decline of coffee prices was not the only economic crisis the
Habyarimana government had to cope with. There was also an agricultural crisis due to
chronic land pressure (Pottier 1993; Mullen 1995; Uvin 1998; Storey 2001). As
aforementioned, Rwanda was one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. Its
population density for farm land was 422 inhabitants per square kilometer in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the highest in Africa (Waller 1993, 18). From 1980 to 1989, Rwanda’s
population grew by 37%, and its practical population density increased by 35% at the same
time (Prunier 1995, 4). The lack of land combining droughts and sweet potato disease finally
led to food shortages (Uvin 1998; Andersen 2000; Storey 2001). It was against the backdrop
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of economic and agricultural crises that the Habyarimana government entered into SAP
negotiations with the Fund and the Bank.

SAPs, Ethnicity, and Onset of Civil War
Two-Level Game and SAP Packages
As an ethnically-dominant regime, the Habyarimana government was powerful in
Rwanda’s domestic politics. The regime’s official rhetoric emphasized its representation of
the majority of the population and the rural masses (Newbury 1998, 15). The government’s
dominance in Rwanda’s political and economic life reflected in areas including restricted
internal migration and labor activity (Uvin 1998). The powerfulness and effectiveness of the
Habyarimana government were well known among western development communities
(Hintjens 1999). The country under Habyarimana government was viewed as “well
organized” and ‘unified” (Ford 1993, 179; Uvin 1998, 46). In the eyes of BWIs, the country
was politically stable and effectively managed (Uvin 1998, 44).
From a two-level game perspective, the strength of the Habyarimana government at
Level II would put it in a weak bargaining position at Level I. The Fund and the Bank were
well aware of Habyarimana government’s domestic strength and were more likely to insist
on stringent conditionality to achieve their first-order preference. First, there had been a long
history for the BWIs dealing with Rwanda. The BWIs took an approving attitude towards
Rwandan government regarding its political stability before the civil war broke out (Storey
2001, 370). Second, the first mission sent by BWIs in order to help solve the economic crisis
arrived in Rwanda in November 1988 (Chossudovsky 1996, 939). And BWI reports reflected
their awareness of Rwandan government’s domestic strength by mentioning the “ethnic and
socioeconomic homogeneity of the country” (Uvin 1998, 44).
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The result was that the process of negotiating SAPs for the Habyarimana regime
was “long and difficult” (Cart 1995, 475; Uvin 1998, 57). When the Fund and the Bank
started to intervene in Rwanda’s economic crisis in late 1988, there were two plans to help
Rwanda. Plan A was mild in terms of conditionality and involved no strategic changes in
Rwanda’s economic policies. Nevertheless, the bargaining disadvantage at Level II left
Rwanda with “no choice” but to accept Plan B, the structural adjustment programs aiming at
large-scale macroeconomic reforms (Chossudovsky 1996, 939; 2003). Different from
Ghana’s negotiators who was “lauded for their negotiating skills and their courage in ‘facing
down’ the IMF” (Hutchful 2002, 39), Rwanda’s weak bargaining position at the international
level led to the question of “who rules Rwanda” raised at the domestic level (Pottier 2002,
22).
The ESAF program sponsored by the IMF amounted to SDR 30.6 million (Uvin
1998, 58).59 The conditions attached to the SAPs were stringent in terms of scope. First,
harsh devaluations of Rwandan franc had to be carried out. Unlike Ghana which gained
concessions from the IMF to establish an auction mechanism for currency devaluation,
Rwanda had to surrender its autonomy to the Fund. The Rwandan franc was devaluated
twice at steep rates, first time 50% followed by another 15% due to failure of the first
devaluation to increase coffee exports (Waller 1993, 33; Chossudovsky 1996, 939; Storey
1999, 47). 60 The sharp devaluations instantly increased inflation and decreased living
standards. For example, right after the first devaluation, the consumer price index rose
dramatically by 1800.2% (Chossudovsky 1996, 939). Opposite to the BWI forecast of 28%
59 The final disbursement of the amount was SDR 8.7 million. There was also US dollars 60 million
disbursed (out of committed US dollars 90 million) by the World Bank (Uvin 1998, 58; Storey 1999,
48). With other donors Rwanda received US dollars 216 million in 1990 and 375 million in 1991
(Andersen 2000, 448).
60 According to Chossudovsky (1996, 939), the first devaluation rate was 50%. For Waller (1993, 33)
the figure was as high as 67%. And for Storey (1999, 47) the rate was 40%.
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inflation in the first year of implementing SAPs, Rwandan citizens had to pay 50% more for
basic living goods and 67% more for medical needs (Waller 1993, 33).
Second, while Ghana managed to get the IMF relax monetary targets for its structural
adjustment programs, the monetary policy subscribed by Rwanda’s SAPs was very tight. The
Fund imposed strict requirements on rising interest rates and controlling credit ceiling.
(Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1996, 39; Storey 1999, 47). With respect to fiscal policy, Rwanda
was required to carry out wide-range fiscal reforms which included cutting government
expenditures, removing subsidies to coffee farmers and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and
increasing taxes by the rates between 6% and 10%. As a result, desperate coffee farmers
uprooted at least 3,00,000 coffee tress in 1992 due to the elimination of coffee subsidies
(Chossudovsky 1996, 939).
Third, the austerity measures of structural adjustment policy were stringent in terms
of privatization and deregulation. The government’s price control mechanism was
deregulated. Import restrictions were agreed to be aborted as part of the trade liberalization.
Most SOEs would be privatized. The requirement of privatization was so harsh that the pace
of privatization was fast rather than gradual (like Ghana). All the privatization was demanded
to take place by June 1991 and unemployment ensued. Moreover, free-market approaches
were introduced to deal with agricultural problems. And fees were charged for basic health
and education services (Storey 1999, 47-48). The stringent austerity measures greatly
destabilized local food markets and “health and education collapsed under the brunt of IMFimposed” SAPs (Chossudovsky 1996, 939). For instance, there were a 21% increase of
malaria cases after Rwanda implemented IMF SAPs because of cutting health expenditures
and there was an overall decline in school enrollment due to the introduction of school fees
(Chossudovsky 1996, 939). In summary, stringent austerity measures imposed by SAPs not
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only failed to solve Rwanda’ economic crisis but also aggravated ethnic tensions between the
Hutu and the Tutsi (Chossudovsky 1996, 2003). And all of which paved the way for the
outbreak of civil war.

Onset of Civil War
Civil war broke out on October 1, 1990 when the rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) which was formed in 1988, launched attacks from Rwanda’s northern border
with Uganda(Prunier 1995). Although the whole SAP package had not been finalized and
implemented until November 1990 (Andersen 2000, 448), the Habyarimana government
already agreed with the Fund and the Bank on many sections of the structural adjustment
programs in June (Hintjens 1999; Pottier 2002). In particular, decisions on the most difficult
part the SAP packages, the devaluation policy, was made up in September (Chossudovsky
1996; Storey 2001). Hence the theory may underestimate the impact of SAPs on the
outbreak of armed civil conflict in ethnically-dominant countries because civil war broke out
in Rwanda during the last stage of negotiations, a few weeks before the implementation.
Although the timing of civil war onset did not fully line up with SAP implementation, the
impact of SAPs on armed civil conflict can still be demonstrated in two aspects. First, the
RPF took the economic and political crises that the Habyarimana government was
undergoing as “a signal to start their attacks” (Andersen 2000, 444). In this sense negotiating
and entering into SAPs sends a salient signal of debilitating government and could trigger
civil war like implementing SAPs. The rebel leaders met with affluent Tutsi businessmen in
the summer of 1990 discussing political and economic affairs in Rwanda. They were
persuaded that any blow to the regime could succeed due to the weakening strength of the
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government in the face of crisis (Prunier 1995). There was no better signal than negotiating
SAPs that could show the fragility of the government during the crisis.
Second, the RPF may launch the preemptive attacks in anticipation of unfair burdens
which could be imposed on the Tutsi resulted from implementing SAPs. Given that the
discrimination against the Tutsi was institutionalized in the post-independence Rwanda, the
Tutsi’s experience with western-sponsored programs had been ethnical exclusion. For
example, Rwanda started the Mutara Agricultural Development Projects sponsored by the
International Development Association (IDA) between 1974 and 1987. The projects were
aimed at giving farmers land to exchange for their adoption of agricultural techniques
promoted by the development agency. However, “ethnic favoritism” was pervasive during
the 13 years of the projects (Uvin 1998, 121). The Tutsi was ethnically excluded from the
project benefits and it was the Hutu who gained from the projects in terms of infrastructure
and job creation (Lemarchand 1982; Uvin 1998).
Moreover, the RPF advocated for the return of the Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, which
involved the land issues. The Tutsi had every reason to worry about the land problems with
the implementation of SAPs due to the land concentration problem under the Habyarimana
regime since the 1980s. Land was concentrated in the hands of people who worked in the
government. Since the Tutsi was excluded from jobs in public sectors, the land was actually
concentrated in the hands of Hutu elites (Uvin 1998). It is noteworthy that anti-Tutsi
sentiment was especially strong in the northern region of Rwanda, in which the hometown
of President Habyarimana was located (Uvin 1998). Hence the Tutsi hold no optimism for
the land issues if the Habyarimana government implemented SAPs. The RPF’s appealing to
the Tutsi could be demonstrated from its recruitment during the implementation of SAPs.
At the beginning of civil war, the RPF had a force of around 2500 fighters (Prunier 1995, 93).
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As the war dragged on and the SAP was implemented at the same time, the RPF recruitment
increased to 5000 fighters in 1991, 12000 in 1992, and 25000 in 1994 (Prunier 1995, 117).
The direct cause of the growing rebel recruitment was the persecution of the Tutsi after the
RPF attacks. As a revenge, there was a massacre of 500-1000 Tutsi one week after the onset
of civil war (Andersen 2000, 444). The Habyarimana regime also increased repression of the
Tutsi (Storey 2001, 367). For instance, the government arrested more than 9000 Tutsi as a
response to the rebel attacks (Newbury 1998). Nonetheless, the rapidly growing recruitment
lasted until 1994, which overlapped with the implementation of SAPs. Uncertainty,
insecurity, and grievances felt on the Tutsi side during SAP implementation undoubtedly
contributed to the rebel recruitment.

8.4 Alternative Explanations
There are many factors contributing to the outbreak of armed civil conflict. With
respect to ethnic war, two early theories in international relations focus either on ancient
hatred between ethnic groups or the trend towards conflict during the transition to
modernization. However, the two theories cannot explain variations in the historical cases
(Kaufman 2006b).

So two competing theoretical camps, i.e. rational choice and

constructivism, attempt to explain the onset of civil war from different perspectives. For the
rational choice theory, the outbreak of civil war was the result of incomplete information,
bargaining issues, commitment problems, opportunity costs, and economic grievances or
greed. For constructivism, the onset of ethnic war builds on socio-psychological factors such
as relative status and emotions (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Kaufman 2006b). The theory in this
research which emphasizes the bargaining between the IMF and the government at Level I
and Level II, economic grievances due to the SAPs, and rational calculations of the
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government and the rebel group belongs to the rational choice camp. The symbolic politics
theory, which was briefly discussed in Chapter 7, represents the competing explanation from
the constructivist camp.
According to the symbolic politics theory, rationality alone cannot explain the onset
of ethnic war. Rather, emotional motivations play a very important role in ethnic war (Young
1979; Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001, 2006a). For armed civil conflict to break out between
ethnic groups (one side must be the government in this research), several factors must be
present: ethnic myths; ethnic fear of each other; mobilization opportunity; mass hostility;
chauvinistic mobilizations; and security dilemma (Kaufman 2001, 2006a, 2006b; Grigorian
and Kaufman 2007). In the symbolic politics theory, a myth is “a belief held in common by a
large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning” (Edelman 1971, 14;
Kaufman 2001, 16). It is irrelevant whether or not ethnic myths are true. Their role is to
justify the ethnic hatred and superiority. Symbols are needed for mass mobilization in ethnic
war. A symbol is “an emotionally charged shorthand reference to a myth” (Kaufman 2001,
16). Although the symbolic politics theory cannot explain the variation of ethnic policy in
Rwanda, it provides valuable insight into the onset of civil war in Rwanda in terms of ethnic
myths and fear.61 After all, ethnic hostility, security dilemma, and elite manipulation are all
necessary for the outbreak of armed civil conflict (Kaufman 1996, 2006a, 2006b). In this
sense, the symbolic politics theory enhances our understanding of civil war in Rwanda
instead of undermining the theory in this research because of the possibility of bridging the
rational choice theory with constructivism in explaining civil war.62

The symbolic politics theory is better at predicting Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 rather than its civil
war in 1990 (Kaufman 2006b).
62 See Fearon and Laitin (2000) for bridging the gap between rational choice and constructivism.
61
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Ethnic Myths in Rwanda
There had been a strong presence of ethnic myths in Rwanda’s social and political
life since colonial times. The Hutu and Tutsi all had collective myths on their ethnic identity.
Both groups’ narratives on their ethnic identity emphasized racial differences between the
Hutu and the Tutsi (Kaufman 2006b). Given that the Tutsi were the latecomer in the land of
Rwanda, the Hutu viewed the Tutsi as invaders (Newbury 1998; Hintjens 1999; Kaufman
2006b). The Hutu adopted ethnic narratives that regarded themselves as the “sons of the soil”
(Hintjens 1999, 254). Since the Belgian colonists used the racist ideology to grant power and
privilege to the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu, the Tutsi viewed themselves as superior to
the Hutu in terms of intelligence and hardworking ethics (Prunier 1995; Uvin 1998; Hintjens
1999; Kaufman 2006b).
The myth of Tutsi superiority was so deeply embedded in both groups’ psychology
that even the post-independence Hutu viewed the Tutsi as winners (Des Forges 1995;
Newbury 1998). For example, while the majority of successful businesspersons in Rwanda
were the Hutu, the popular narratives for both Hutu and Tutsi were that the Tutsi were
good at business, regardless of the fact that most Tutsi were peasants (Storey 1999). By
contrast, the Hutu adopted ethnic narratives that stress the “Hutu solidarity” to counteract
the myth of Tutsi superiority (Lemarchand 1970, 285; Kaufman 2006b, 71).

Ethnic Fear and Hatred in Rwanda
The institutional discrimination against the Hutu during colonial times and the
reverse discrimination against the Tutsi after the independence led to widespread hatred
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. For the Tutsi, the fear was persecution and genocide under
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a Hutu-dominant government. Since the 1960s, Hutu portrayed the Tutsi in an inhuman way
by calling the Tutsi “cockroaches” (Destexhe 1995, 28; Kaufman 2006b, 71-72). Given that
cockroaches must “be crushed” (Destexhe 1995, 28), Tutsi’ fear of Hutu was deep rooted.
Note that following Rwanda’s independence, there was the killing of about 30000 Tutsi
(Uvin 1997, 96; Kaufman 2006b, 72). And throughout the years the estimated number of
Tutsi refugees in neighboring countries reached around 600,000-700,000 (Andersen 2000).
During the Kayibanda government’s repression of Tutsi in the 1960s, around 18000 Tutsi
were killed. Meanwhile, murderers of Tutsi politicians got away and no prosecution was filed
(Prunier 1995, 56). With respect to the Hutu, their fear was losing power. Since Rwanda’s
neighboring country Burundi was still under the control of the Tutsi and there was mass
killing of the Hutu from 1965 to 1972 in Burundi (Kaufman 2006b), Hutu’s fear of Tutsi
regaining power in Rwanda was real and persistent.
While the symbolic politics theory is correct in elaborating the role of myth-andsymbol-based ethnic fear and hostility in the outbreak of civil war, it cannot explain the
timing of civil war onset in Rwanda. The rebel group, the RPF was formed in 1988, but it
launched the civil war in October 1990 during which the negotiation of the SAPs was at its
last stage. In light of the factor of chauvinistic mobilizations, there is no evidence that both
the Hutu and the Tutsi resorted to the chauvinistic rhetoric right before the civil war broke
out.63 In particular, the symbolic politics theory cannot explain the policy variations of ethnic
politics (Fearon and Laitin 2000). In other words, culture alone cannot explain the variation
of ethnic conflicts (Grigorian and Kaufman 2007). For example, the Habyarimana
government from 1973 to the mid-1980s did attempt to relax ethnic tensions between the
Hutu and the Tutsi. One of the government measures was to assign 10% quota for the Tutsi
63

The chauvinist mobilizations were evident before the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Kaufman 2006b).
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in civil service and education (Waller 1993; Newbury 1998; Andersen 2000). Effective or not,
at least the official stance during this period was not chauvinistic. The Habyarimana
government’s rhetoric was that it represented “ all rural country” (Newbury 1998, 15). That
is to say, the symbolic politics theory does not undermine the strength of this research’s
theory in explaining the Rwanda civil war in 1990.

8.5 Summation
The historical analysis of Rwanda’s structural adjustment programs in the 1990s
demonstrates that ethnically-dominant countries like Rwanda would face bargaining
disadvantage at the international level when negotiating with the IMF because the Fund
would more likely insist on its first-order preference to satisfy its international creditor
constituency when it faces a government which dominates at the domestic level. As a result
it was difficult for the Hutu-dominant Habyarimana government to gain concessions from
the Fund and the austerity measures prescribed by the SAP packages were stringent. The
civil war in Rwanda broke out in October 1990, which was the last period of the SAP
negotiations. That means the theory in this research may underestimate the effect of SAPs
on the outbreak of civil war in ethnically-dominant countries because the rebel group RPF
responded to the signal of negotiating SAPs, which revealed deteriorating capacity of the
government, by launching preemptive attacks.
The grievances resulted from SAP implementation shows Tutsi’s worries about
persecution in the process of SAP implementation were warranted. While the theory
explains the onset of Rwandan civil war in 1990 from perspectives of two-level game and
economic grievances, the symbolic politics theory provide insights into the outbreak of civil
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war by introducing the factors of ethnic myths, ethnic fears, and mass hostility. However,
the strength of this research’s theory in explaining Rwanda’s civil war in 1990 is not undercut
due to the weakness of the symbolic politics theory in explaining the timing of civil war and
variations of ethnic policy.
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Chapter 9
Structural Adjustment Programs, Ethnic Characteristics,
and Armed Civil Conflict: Theoretical and Policy Implications

9.1 Contributions to Extant Research and Summary of Main Findings
This study examines the IMF SAP impact on armed civil conflict in borrowing
countries. Extant research cannot explain the variation of IMF effects on armed civil conflict
in recipient countries. Why does the implementation of IMF SAPs lead to armed civil
conflict in some countries but not in others? To solve the puzzle this research contributes to
the extant literature by taking the variations in recipient countries’ characteristics, SAP
conditionality, and implementation into account. These issues were raised by Steinwand and
Stone (2008) in their review of SAP studies to propose a new research agenda. By doing so,
this study makes the following theoretical and empirical contributions to extant research.

Theoretical Contributions
This research adopts a two-level game perspective to build the theoretical
framework in answering the research question of why there are variations in the onset of
armed civil conflict when borrowing countries negotiate and implement IMF SAPs. While
extant literature focuses on the grievances resulted from IMF SAPs, it cannot explain why
some countries experience the outbreak of armed civil conflict when implementing SAPs
and others do not. This study provides a causal mechanism by illuminating the role played by
the bargaining between the IMF and borrowing governments. It shows that both the IMF
and recipient governments’ preferences matter for SAP conditionality. The theory in this
research argues that the impact of IMF SAPs on the outbreak of armed civil conflict
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depends on the borrowing countries’ ethnic characteristics. Ethnically fractionalized
countries are more likely to get moderate conditionality from the IMF due to their domestic
weakness and the austerity measures are more likely to be implemented across different
ethnic groups, which will reduce relative deprivation resulted from SAPs. By contrast,
ethnically dominant countries are more likely to get stringent conditionality from the IMF
due to their domestic strength and ethnic minorities are more likely to disproportionately
bear the costs of austerity measures. Hence the hypotheses in Chapter 3 predict that IMF
SAPs will decrease the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset in highly ethnically
fractionalized countries but increase the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset in highly
ethnically dominant countries.

Empirical Contributions
One of the main weaknesses of previous research is the measurement of SAP
implementation. The indicator of SAP years that was adopted in most research cannot fully
capture the extent of SAP implementation. In this research I develop SAP indicators by
using IMF materials (Letters of Intent, press release, program reviews, and the MONA
database) to code SAP waivers and the scope of conditionality, which will reflect the extent
of SAP implementation more accurately. I also further disintegrate SAP conditionality into
structural, fiscal, and final conditions to see if the effects of SAPs vary across different
conditions. Moreover, I employ three kinds of statistical models to examine the hypotheses.
The two-stage model corrects for the possible selection bias when the IMF negotiates SAPs
with the borrowing government. The bivariate probit model corrects for the potentially
correlated binary outcomes. And the ivprobit model is used to address the endogeneity
problem. All the improvements on the measurement of IMF SAPs and statistical models are
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helpful in advancing our understanding of the relationship between IMF SAPs and armed
civil conflict.

Main Findings
Of all the indicators coded to measure IMF SAPs in this research, the SAP
implementation variable consistently gains statistical significance among all the three kinds of
models. In Chapter 5, the statistical results confirm that SAP implementation decreases the
likelihood of armed civil conflict onset in highly ethnically fractionalized countries. In
Chapter 6, the empirical results support the second hypothesis that SAP implementation
increases the probability of armed civil conflict onset in borrowing countries characterized
by ethnic dominance. Furthermore, most of the SAP conditionality variables, except the
fiscal condition variable, are also statistically significant. The finding on the variation of SAP
effects across SAP conditionality is interesting. The reason for the insignificance of SAP
fiscal conditions may be attributed to the difficulty in implementing fiscal policy to improve
government revenues. Recipient governments only have limited resources to implement SAP
policy. The most difficult part of the structural reform may not rank high in borrowing
countries’ order of preferences. Finally, the robustness checks that adopt the alternative
variable SAP years confirm the statistical evidence.
In Chapters 7&8, historical analyses demonstrate how SAPs will bring different
impact on countries with various ethnic characteristics. For highly ethnically fractionalized
countries like Ghana, the Rawlings PNDC government was successful at negotiating a less
stringent SAP package and gaining some autonomy when implementing SAPs. The SAPs
were implemented based on flexible strategy and at a gradual pace. Therefore SAP
implementation caused no direct grievances against the government. For highly ethnic
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dominant countries like Rwanda, the Hutu-dominant Habyarimana government had to
swallow the stringent conditionality attached to the structural adjustment programs after
long and difficult negotiations with the Fund and Bank. The rebel group RPF responded to
SAP negotiations, which sent a signal of deteriorating capacity of the government, by
launching preemptive attacks. This means the theory in this research may underestimate the
trigger effect of SAPs on armed civil conflict since the attack happened a few weeks before
the implementation of SAPs.

9.2 Theoretical Implications for Future Research
This study demonstrates the importance of taking into consideration the preferences
of IMF and recipient governments and variations in SAP implementation and conditionality
in exploring the impact of IMF SAPs on the outbreak of armed civil conflict. More
important, borrowing countries’ domestic characteristics, in this study it is ethnicity, will
influence the bargaining strength of recipient governments and how the governments
implement SAPs. All of these factors will affect the likelihood of armed civil conflict onset.
The theoretical implication is that future research should further investigate the
effects of recipient countries’ domestic characteristics in the relationship between SAPs and
armed civil conflict. A few other domestic factors could also affect the bargaining advantage
of the borrowing government at the international level and how it will implement SAPs at
the domestic level. For example, different regime types could vary in their bargaining
advantage and implementation of SAPs. Democratic regimes and authoritarian regimes have
different audience costs at the domestic level and thus would face different bargaining
situations at the international level.
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Furthermore, political systems could play a role in the interaction between IMF and
borrowing government. For instance, the negotiation and implementation of SAPs would
differ in parliamentary and presidential systems. Borrowing countries with different political
systems would face different likelihoods of armed civil conflict onset when they implement
SAPs. Parliamentarism is a system of “mutual dependence” because on the one hand the
government needs the support of the parliament and on the other hand the chief executive
of the government has the power to dismiss the parliament (Stepan and Skach 1993, 3).
Therefore parliamentary systems may have bargaining advantage at the international level
when they negotiate SAPs with the Fund. Additionally, parliamentarian governments are
more inclusive than presidential governments (Lijphart 1994). It means the costs of austerity
measures may be more evenly shared under parliamentary systems. As a result, parliamentary
systems implementing SAPs may be less likely to experience armed civil conflict onset than
presidential systems.

9.3 Policy Implications for IMF Structural Adjustment Programs
In January 2013, the Fund for the first time acknowledged that it underestimated the
negative impact of austerity measures on economic growth when handling the Eurozone
financial crisis because the underestimated fiscal multipliers led to forecast errors (Blanchard
and Lieigh 2013). 64 Meanwhile, the Fund faces competition from the proposed BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Development Bank which was devised as an
alternative to the IMF (Beniwal 2013). The findings of this research do not blame the IMF
for the SAP effects on armed civil conflict onset because it is the recipient government
which decides the way of implementing SAPs. Also, the first aim of attaching conditions to
Also See the Guardian’s report <IMF to ‘Admit Mistakes’ in Handling Greek Debt Crisis and
Bailout> (Elliott and Smith (The Guardian) 2013).
64
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SAPs is to prevent moral hazard (Vreeland 2003). However, the Fund could improve its
policy planning for its structural adjustment programs to make austerity measures less prone
to causing armed civil conflict in borrowing countries.
The key policy implication of this research is that recipient governments should
gain some autonomy in determining the phases of implementing SAPs because local
situations vary across countries. Local participation should be included in designing SAPs to
make the programs more credible (Esman 2001). More important, a gradual pace is
preferable for the implementation of SAPs, particularly in ethnically dominant countries.
Ghana’s experience shows that it is likely to reduce the outbreak of armed civil conflict when
the recipient government gradually implements austerity measures and relieves the pain
resulted from SAP conditionality by focusing on the disadvantaged groups. This research
also shows SAP effects vary across different conditions. Thus “sequencing matters” because
borrowing countries with a weak economy have less capacity for bearing the negative impact
resulted from SAPs (Economist 2012b, 88). Reforms on different kinds of markets, such as
product and labor markets, should be sequenced based on local preferences and conditions.
Additionally, the Fund should not insist on unnecessary stringent conditionality. This is not
to say the Fund should always disburse loans based on moderate conditionality. Nonetheless,
some austerity measures in dealing with economic crises may be “panic-driven” and will
cause unnecessary suffering in borrowing countries (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). If armed civil
conflict breaks out in borrowing countries and the recipient governments are unable to repay
the debt, the Fund could not satisfy its international constituency.
Last, the Fund should broaden its policy mindset by paying more attention to
human development indicators rather than focusing narrowly on economic indicators such
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as economic growth. For example, Bangladesh has made great achievements in improving
the poor’s welfare, although its economic growth has been stagnant. The central reason is
the work of microfinance institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
empowering the poor (Economist 2012a). The Fund already emphasized the importance of
social programs. But the amount committed to such programs is generally paltry compared
to the whole SAP packages. It will benefit the recipient government’s economy in the long
term if the Fund increases financial support for the disadvantaged groups and pushes for
more cooperation with NGOs in the future.
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Appendix 1: Variables and Data Sources
The First-Stage Equation: Dependent Variable
Entering into SAP Agreement:
A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a country has entered into an SAP agreement in any
given year or coded 0 if the country has not. Data is coded from IMF’s online country
information ((IMF 2013a), which includes Letters of Intent and press releases, and the
MONA database (IMF 2013b).
The First-Stage Equation: Independent and Control Variables
GDP Growth:
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Aggregated are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Data is adopted from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (World Bank 2013).
Trade Openness (log):
The sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage in a country’s GDP,
log value. Data is adopted from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World
Bank (World Bank 2013).
Inflation:
Consumer price index, annual percentage. Data is adopted from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (World Bank 2013).
External Debt:
Total external debt that are owned to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or
services as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). Data is adopted from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (World Bank 2013).
Democracy:
Regime type measured by Polity2, ranging from -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most
democratic). The data is from the Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010).
Presence of Armed Civil Conflict:
The incidence of armed civil conflict. It is coded 1 if there are any ongoing armed civil
conflicts in a year or 0 without any conflicts. The data is from the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program / Peace Research Institute of Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
Legislative Fractionalization:
The probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be from
different political parties. The data is from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck
et al. 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Keefer 2010, 2012).
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Political Constraint:
The number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative
chambers) with veto power over policy changes. The data is from the Political Constraint
Index (POLCON) dataset (Henisz 2002).
The Second-Stage Equation: Dependent Variable
Onset of Armed Civil Conflict:
A dummy variable with 1 indicating the onset of armed civil conflict in each country-year
and 0 indicating no occurrence of armed civil conflict. The data is from the UCDP/PRIO
dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
The Second-Stage Equation: Independent Variables
Interaction Terms between SAP Variables and Ethnic Variables:
There are ten interaction terms.
SAP Implementation:
The reverse of the counting of program waivers. Increasing number of waivers indicates the
lack of program implementation. The variable ranges from -16 (no program implementation),
-15 (program slippage or suspension), -14 (program delays), -13 (the maximum number of
waivers), to 0 (full program implementation). The data is coded from the Fund’s country
information, which includes Letters of Intent, program reviews, staff reports, and press
releases, and the MONA database (IMF 2013a, 2013b).
Number of SAP Conditions:
Total number of conditionalities attached to IMF SAPs. For countries entering into SAPs,
the minimum conditions attached to the SAP is 6, and the maximum number is 53. The data
is coded from the Fund’s Letters of Intent (IMF 2013a).
SAP Structural Conditions:
Disaggregating the number of SAP conditions by counting the number of conditionalities
attached to the structural reforms such as privatization and deregulation.
SAP Fiscal Conditions:
Disaggregating the number of SAP conditions by counting the number of conditionalities
attached to the fiscal area such as reducing government debt and increasing revenues.
SAP Financial Conditions:
Disaggregating the number of SAP conditions by counting the number of conditionalities
attached to the financial area such as financial sector reforms.
Ethnic Fractionalization:
The variable measures the “probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are
from different ethno-linguistic groups” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78). The variable ranges
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from 0.004 to 1. The data is from the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) dataset
(Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Ethnic Dominance:
The variable measures the “share of the population belonging to the largest ethnic group”
(Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78). The variable ranges from 0.4% to 99.8%. The data is from the
ELF dataset (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
The Second-Stage Equation: Control Variables
GDP per Capita (log):
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by midyear population, log value, in constant 2000
U.S. dollars (World Bank 2013). The data is from the World Bank’s WDI database.
GDP Growth:
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2013). The data is from the
World Bank’s WDI database.
Trade Openness (log):
The sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage in a country’s GDP,
log value (World Bank 2013). The data is from the World Bank’s WDI database.
Population Density:
People per square kilometers of land area. The variable is calculated by population/land.
Indicators of population and land are all from the World Bank’s WDI database (World Bank
2013).
Percent Mountainous Terrain (log):
Estimated percentage mountainous terrain, log value. The data is from Fearon and Laitin
(2003).
Regime Durability:
The duration of the country being autocratic or democratic respectively. The data is from the
DPI (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Keefer 2010, 2012).
Democracy:
Regime type measured by Polity2, ranging from -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most
democratic). The data is from the Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010).
Democracy Squared:
Squared value of the variable Democracy (polity2).
Primary Commodity Exports:
GDP percentage of merchandise exports in food, fuel, and ores and metal exports. The
variable is calculated from the WDI indicators (World Bank 2013).
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Oil Exporter:
A dummy variable that is coded 1 when a country’s export revenues from fuel exceed 1/3 of
its total export. The data is from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Instrumental Variable for SAP Implementation
Government Corruption:
An index ranges from 1 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean). The data is from Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI 2013).
Robustness Checks Variables
SAP Years:
The number of years that a country is under an IMF SAP. The data is coded from IMF’s
online country information (IMF 2013a).
ETHNICFRACAL:
Alternative measurement of ethnic fractionalization based mainly on languages to define
ethnic groups. The data is from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Ethnic Dominance (dummy):
Alternative measurement of ethnic dominance. A dummy variable coded 1 if one single
ethno-linguistic group comprises 55% of the population or greater. The variable is calculated
from data of Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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Appendix 2: First Difference for the Significant Variables in the First Stage of the Two-Stage
Selection Models: Factors Influencing SAP Initiation (Probit Regression), 1992-2009
Model 5.1b
(armed civil conflict
incidence=0)

Model 5.1b
(armed civil conflict
incidence=1)

-.642***

-.592***

Trade openness (log)

-.111*

-.091*

External Debt

.243**

.215**

Armed civil conflict
Incidence
Democracy

-.039*

-.039*

.076*

.076*

Legislative fractionalization

.104**

.085**

Economic and Financial
Factors
GDP growth

Political Factors

Temporal Dependence
Years since last SAP
.888**
.884**
initiation
Note: The first difference is calculated by moving one independent variable from its
minimum to maximum while holding all other independent variables constant at their means.
The dummy variable, armed civil conflict incidence, is held at 0 (the left column) and 1 (the
right column).
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Appendix 3: First Difference of the Significant Control Variables in the Second Stage of the
Two-Stage Selection Models
Model 5.5a
(oil =0)

Model 5.5a
(oil=1)

SAP conditions

.290**

.486**

Ethnic
fractionalization
GDP per capita (log)

.102***

.281***

-.039*

-.139*

Trade openness (log)

-.057**

-.190**

-.053*

-.165**

.105**

.231**

.028*

.100*

-.031*

-.119*

SAP implementation

Model 5.2b
(oil =0)
.079**

Model 5.2b
(oil =1)
.226**

Population density
Percent mountainous
terrain (log)
Primary commodity
exports
Oil exporter

.025*

.096*

.075***

.075***

.068***

.068***

IMF selection effects

-.045**

-.172**

-.049***

-.171***

Note: The first difference is calculated by moving one control variable from its minimum to
maximum while holding all other variables constant at their means. The interaction variable
is held at their means’ product. The dummy variable, oil exporter, is held at 0 (the left
column) and 1 (the right column).
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